Flynn ex rel. Young Quong On v. Tillinghast

63 F.2d 729, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 3542
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedFebruary 18, 1933
DocketNo. 2760
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 63 F.2d 729 (Flynn ex rel. Young Quong On v. Tillinghast) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flynn ex rel. Young Quong On v. Tillinghast, 63 F.2d 729, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 3542 (1st Cir. 1933).

Opinions

WILSON, Circuit Judge.

The issue in this class of eases where admission is denied is (3) whether tho applicant was given a fair hearing, that is, was permitted to introduce all the evidence he desired and have it made a part of tho record of the administrative board before which his ease was heard; (2) whether there was an entire lack of convincing evidence, or any substantial evidence contra, on which [730]*730the conclusion of the immigration officials could rest.

The burden of proving his right to enter the country as a citizen is on the applicant. This burden involves satisfying the immigration officials, "who have the sole power to determine the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence as to the facts entitling the applicant to enter as a citizen. The conclusion of a Special Inquiry Board may rest, therefore, on a lack of evidence of sufficient weight in the minds of the members to carry conviction.

Bearing in mind that they have the power to determine the credibility of witnesses, and whether the evidence has sufficient weight to sustain the burden on the applicant, to reverse a decision of the immigration officials refusing admission to an applicant, and of the District Court in denying a petition for habeas corpus, this court must find that the evidence in favor of the applicant is so clear and convincing that the immigration officials must have acted arbitrarily in rejecting the evidence in favor of the applicant because in their opinion the witnesses for the applicant were unworthy of belief, or in finding ,that all the evidence in applicant’s favor did not satisfy the members of the board that the applicant was a citizen of this country.

It is often difficult to determine, not only what evidence the immigration officials rejected as unworthy of belief and on what ground, but also what weight they attached to the evidence in favor of or against the applicant.

The question is not what this court would have found on the evidence that appears in the printed record. • The Supreme Court said, in Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, at page 13, 28 S. Ct. 201, 203, 52 L. Ed. 369: “But, unless and until it is proved to the satisfaction of the judge that a hearing properly so called was denied, the merits of the case are not open,, and, we may add, the denial of a hearing cannot be established by proving that the decision was wrong.” U. S. ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 106, 47 S. Ct. 302, 71 L. Ed. 560; Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131, 133, 44 S. Ct. 260, 68 L. Ed. 590.

The conduct of the hearing and the conclusion of the immigration officials must be so clearly arbitrary and unfair as to amount to a denial of due process. Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 681, 32 S. Ct. 359, 56 L. Ed. 606.

Upon the evidence as it appears in the printed case, a court exercising judicial powers might have decided that the applicant was a son of a citizen of this country. Six different witnesses stated that the alleged father, Quong Yuen, alias Young Quong Yuen, had a son, by name Quong On, or referred, to him by that name, three of whom were not related, but were testifying in support of the applicant on the other occasions, when he was deported. A brother of the alleged father and one son also testified, in other proceedings, that Quong Yuen had a son, by name Quong On.

The alleged father and a younger brother of the applicant stated that there was a picture of the alleged father and the applicant framed and hanging on the walls of the home in China, which the applicant at first denied and said he was never photographed with any other member of his family. After the evidence was closed, the infimigration board opened the case to permit the offering of the photograph, which the alleged father claimed to have had forwarded from China. The picture was identified by the applicant and the younger brother as that of the alleged father and the applicant. The father said the photograph was taken at Hong Kong in 1911, or just before the.first application for admission by this applicant, though it does not appear to have been produced in support of that application. While the applicant on his first examination in this ease insisted that there was no such photograph, when it was produced he remembered with considerable detail that it was taken sixth month S. H. 3; or just before he sailed for Vancouver in 1911. He recalled how he and his alleged father went to Hong Kong, and where they stayed; that he had his passport photograph taken at the same time; that their costumes were furnished by the photographer, whose name he remembered, and also the route by which they returned home. Such plethora of detail of an event of which he remembered nothing a short time before may have raised a suspicion in the minds, of the immigration officials that whoever wrote him that his case was to be reopened may have given him more ■information.

If the immigration officials believed all these witnesses and there was no discrediting evidence, they could have found that the applicant was the son of an American citizen; the citizenship of Quong Yuen being admitted.

Upon what grounds then, may the Board of Inquiry have denied the applicant’s right to enter? In the first place, this was. the [731]*731applicant’s third application, he having been twice rejected before, first in 1911 and again in 1923. On his previous applications, the alleged father and the applicant gave their names as Quong Yuen and Quong On. They now claim the family name is Young. An alleged uncle of the applicant and all the uncle’s family go by the family name of Quong. Standing alone, a Chinese name would have little significance, though the family name is considered of great importance in China, as the deceased members of the family are objects of reverent worship. No adequate explanation of this change of name was made.

The applicant testified that he worked on his father’s farm, which consisted of five ows of land in one parcel, and was working on it during one of his father’s visits to China. The alleged father testified that he had no single parcel as large as five ows, but his farming land consisted of several smaller parcels, and that at none of his visits did the applicant work on the land farming. The applicant, after his denial of admission in 1923, lived in what is called the Straits Settlement. The alleged father says he wrote to him while there at least two letters each year, and received at least one letter each year from the applicant. The applicant testified he neither wrote his father during that time nor received any letters from him. These discrepancies by themselves, however, we deem of minor importance.

But the immigration board may have properly attached considerable weight to the evidence of the applicant, the alleged father, and the alleged uncle and his family as to the date and place of the death of the paternal father and mother of the alleged father. Ancestor worship is a well-known and deep-rooted custom in China, and the younger generations hold in reverence their forbears, especially after their decease.

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Bluebook (online)
63 F.2d 729, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 3542, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flynn-ex-rel-young-quong-on-v-tillinghast-ca1-1933.