Floyd v. Black
This text of Floyd v. Black (Floyd v. Black) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-cv-21907-ALTMAN/Louis
CHARMAINE ELIS FLOYD,
Plaintiff, v.
JERRY BLACK, et al.,
Defendants. ______________________________/ ORDER
Our Plaintiff, Charmaine Elis Floyd, filed her non-prisoner Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1] and Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs, or, in forma pauperis (the “IFP Motion”) [ECF No. 3]. On June 3, 2025, U.S. Magistrate Judge Lauren F. Louis submitted a Report and Recommendation (the “Report”) [ECF No. 10], in which she recommended that we dismiss the Complaint “with leave to amend” and deny the IFP motion without prejudice. Id. at 4. In that Report, Magistrate Judge Louis warned the Plaintiff as follows: The parties will have FOURTEEN (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with this Court. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by a District Judge of this Court of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
Ibid. (cleaned up). The Plaintiff then filed two sets of documents (the “Correspondence”) on June 13, 2025— within the objection deadline. See Correspondence [ECF Nos. 12, 13]. We have no idea what message these documents are supposed to convey—or even how they’re at all relevant to this case. Both sets of documents are just illegible compilations of nonsensical word salad. The first set even includes an April calendar and instructions for a Visa “Netspend” program. See Correspondence [ECF No. 12]. Obviously, we won’t be treating the Correspondence as any kind of properly filed objection to the Report. Although “pro se pleadings are held to a more lenient standard than pleadings filed by lawyers,” Abram-Adams v. Citigroup, Inc., 491 F. App’x 972, 974 (11th Cir. 2012), that “leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order
to sustain an action,” Curtiss v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 856 F. App’x 276, 276 (11th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). But even if we did treat the Correspondence as objections, those objections would still fail. “Parties filing objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation must specifically identify those findings objected to.” Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). “Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” Ibid. Where, as here, the plaintiff “fails to explain the basis for [her] disagreement, and [s]he identifies no legal or factual error in . . . the Report[,] [her] objections simply are not sufficient to justify de novo review.” Johnson v. Curry, 2023 WL 3613818, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 24, 2023) (Howard, J.) (first citing McCullars v. Comm’r, 825 F. App’x 685, 694 (11th Cir. 2020); then citing Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006); and then citing Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1988)). When no party has timely (or sufficiently) objected to the Report, “the court need only satisfy
itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72 advisory committee’s notes (citation omitted). Although Rule 72 itself is silent on the standard of review, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress’s intent was to require de novo review only where objections have been properly filed—and not, as here, when no party objects. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate [judge]’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.”). In any event, the “[f]ailure to object to the magistrate [judge]’s factual findings after notice precludes a later attack on these findings.” Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 1982)). Having reviewed the Report, the record, and the applicable law, we find no clear error on the face of the Report. Accordingly, we hereby ORDER AND ADJUDGE as follows: 1. The Report [ECF No. 10] is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED in full.
2. The Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by July 21, 2025. If the Plaintiff amends her Complaint, she must “set forth what rights were violated, or whether the Defendants acted under color of law.” Report at 4. She must also advance some facts in support of her claim. See id. at 3 (noting that the Plaintiff’s “limited allegations do not advance any facts in support”); see generally Compl. (alleging no facts in support of her claim). And if she’s filing a Bivens claim, the Plaintiff should only answer the questions pertaining to Bivens claims in her complaint form. See Compl. at 3–4 (alleging that she’s suing solely “[f]ederal officials (a Bivens claim),” but then never answering which “constitutional right(s)” she’s claiming were violated “by federal officials”). 3. The Plaintiff’s IFP Motion [ECF No. 3] is DENIED without prejudice. If the Plaintiff submits an amended complaint, she must also re-submit her IFP Motion. This
time, she must “[c]omplete all questions” and “not leave any blanks.” IFP Mot. at 1. That’s so we can accurately assess her financial need. 4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case. All pending deadlines, other than the deadline for the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, are TERMINATED, and any pending motions are DENIED as moot. DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on July 8, 2025.
ROY K. ALTMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE CC: counsel of record
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