Flowers v. City of Springfield

• Court: District Court, C.D. Illinois
• Decided: August 12, 2021
• Docket: 3:18-cv-03250
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

WILLIE FLOWERS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 18-3250 ) CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ) Springfield Police Officers ) RENFRO, #719 and ) T. DAVIS, #527, ) ) Defendants. )

OPINION

RICHARD MILLS, United States District Judge:

Defendants move for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Willie Flowers filed a four-count complaint against the Defendants. In Count I, Flowers asserts an excessive force claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City of

Springfield, Officer Nicholas Renfro and Officer Terrance

Davis.

In Count II, Flowers asserts a state law claim for

battery against Renfro and Davis.

Count III is a respondeat superior claim wherein

Flowers alleges the City is liable for the officers’ actions.

Count IV is an indemnification claim against the City pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On May 6, 2018, and at all relevant times related to

this incident, Renfro and Davis were off-duty police

officers hired by Dirty South, a late-night bar in Springfield, Illinois, for security purposes. Renfro and

Davis were acting under color of law as Springfield Police

Department peace officers. Dirty South is located in a

high-crime area of Springfield.

The Defendants allege that during the early morning

hours of May 6, 2018, Flowers was involved in an

altercation with several individuals inside Dirty South. Flowers disputes the assertion he was involved in a

physical altercation with others at the bar. He claims he

was upset that individuals had grabbed his girlfriend and

was trying to explain the situation to bouncers. Following

the incident, the owner of Dirty South informed Flowers he

needed to leave the bar. The Defendants claim that, subsequently, a bouncer

and another individual informed Flowers again that he

needed to leave the establishment. Flowers continually

questioned why he had to leave and would not physically

leave the establishment. Flowers disputes that assertion and claims that when he was told to leave, he began to

leave.

Davis later became involved and again told Flowers

that he needed to leave. The Defendants allege Flowers

continued to question why he had to leave and did not

immediately do so. Davis informed Flowers a second time

he had to leave. Flowers disputes the assertion that he did

not comply with the request to leave and stated that he did not want any problems. Once Flowers was outside, Defendants allege he

continued to argue with Davis regarding why he had to

leave and why he was being kicked out. Flowers disputes

the assertion that he argued with Davis. He claims he was

waiting outside for his girlfriend.

The Defendants allege that, outside the bar, when

Davis told Flowers he was under arrest, Flowers turned around to face Davis “man to man,” “face to face,” within

one to two feet of Davis. Flowers disputes this assertion,

claiming he did not turn as he was already facing Davis.

Renfro witnessed this and in order to ensure Davis’s safety

and to effectuate the arrest, Renfro then, without warning,

wrapped his arms around Flowers and slammed him to the ground. Davis subsequently arrested Flowers by placing

him in handcuffs.

Renfro did not say anything to Flowers before he took

him to the ground. Flowers did not put up any resistance

to Renfro. Flowers’s face hit the ground first. The force

of the impact knocked Flowers’s tooth out.

Slamming someone to the ground and causing their

head to hit is considered a “strike.” Renfro testified he

could have used another technique that did not involve a “strike.” Davis grabbed Flowers’s wrist when he was

already on the ground. Flowers was not resisting the

handcuffs.

Renfro testified he was not aware as to whether

Flowers clinched his fist or was in a fighting stance. He further stated that he feared for Davis’s safety when

Flowers turned toward Davis. Flowers never took a swing

at any officer and did not make any overt verbal threats.

The Defendants move for summary judgment,

claiming that the undisputed facts viewed in a light most

favorable to Flowers, establish that Defendants did not

violate his civil rights. The Defendants further assert the officers are entitled to qualified immunity and immunity

under the Tort Immunity Act. Flowers asserts factual

disputes preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor

of Renfro and Davis on Flowers’s claim of excessive force.

Moreover, Renfro and Davis are not entitled to qualified

immunity or immunity under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. II. DISCUSSION

Legal standard Summary judgment is appropriate if the motion is

properly supported and “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court

views the evidence and construes all reasonable inferences

in favor of the non-movant. See Driveline Systems, LLC v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 936 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2019). To

create a genuine factual dispute, however, any such

inference must be based on something more than

“speculation or conjecture.” See Harper v. C.R. England,

Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “The court does not assess the credibility of witnesses,

choose between competing reasonable inferences, or

balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence.”

Driveline Systems, 36 F.3d at 579 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Ultimately, there must be enough evidence in favor of the non-movant to permit a jury to return a verdict

in its favor. See Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484

(7th Cir. 2008).

Excessive force

Flowers alleges the two officers used excessive force

when Renfro grabbed and slammed him to the ground and

when Davis grabbed Flowers while he was already on the

ground. The inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is

whether the officers acted “objectively reasonably” based on the particular facts and circumstances. See Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Factors to consider

include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396.

The Defendants claim the force used was objectively reasonable because Flowers had to be told numerous times

to leave the establishment. He remained inside until he was

escorted out. Flowers stated he could not leave

immediately because he was holding his girlfriend’s drink

and he could not take it outside. The parties agree Flowers

was outside of the Dirty South when Renfro wrapped his arms around Flowers and took him to the ground. The parties dispute what happened immediately before Flowers

was taken to the ground. The Defendants claim Flowers

had turned and was arguing within one or two feet of Davis,

“face to face” and “man to man” after being told he was

under arrest. Flowers disputes the Defendants’ account, stating that he did not turn and was already facing Davis.

Flowers claims he did not fight, resist or make threats.

Upon viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the

non-movant, Flowers, the Court concludes there is a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Renfro’s use of

force was objectively reasonable. If the Plaintiff’s version

of the incident is credited, the fact that Flowers was

standing man-to-man within one to two feet of Davis was not threatening or an act of aggression. Trespassing is not a particularly serious crime. Flowers was later charged

with a more serious crime, resisting and obstructing arrest,

but all charges were eventually dropped. Flowers was no

longer in the establishment at the time of the incident.

While he may have been arguing, Flowers did not resist arrest. Although Renfro testified he took Flowers to the

ground to ensure Davis’s safety, a jury could find that the

amount of force was objectively unreasonable based on all

of the facts and circumstances. Accordingly, the Court will

deny the motion for summary judgment on the excessive

force claim as to Renfro.

Flowers also claims that Davis used excessive force by

grabbing him when he was already on the ground. Flowers claims that Davis pulled his arms behind him to be placed in handcuffs when Flowers was compliant and not resisting

arrest. The Court is unable to conclude that this was a

constitutional violation. It is not unusual during an arrest

for an officer to grab an individual’s wrists, pull his arms

behind him and place them in handcuffs. Absent something more, that does not constitute excessive force.

The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of

Davis on the excessive force claim.

Qualified immunity

(A)

“The doctrine of qualified immunity balances dueling interests—allowing officials to perform their duties

reasonably without fear of liability on the one hand and

affording members of the public the ability to vindicate constitutional violations by government officials who

abuse their offices on the other.” Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook

County, 993 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In determining whether an

officer is entitled to qualified immunity, courts consider whether the officer’s “conduct violated a constitutional

right and, if so, whether that right was clearly established

at the time of the alleged violation.” Id.

Courts should look at past cases with specificity in

determining whether an officer violated clearly established

law. See id. at 988. “The Supreme Court has time and

again instructed lower courts not to define clearly

established law at a high level of generality.” Id. While a case with identical factual circumstances is not required, the right must be “so clearly established that it is

sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

understood what he is doing violates that right.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

While it has long been established that police officers

may not use excessive force, that principle does not tell

officers what kinds of force, in what situations, are excessive. See Johnson v. Rogers, 944 F.3d 966, 969 (7th

Cir. 2019). “Emmons illustrates the point by holding, first,

that ‘do not use unreasonable force’ does not establish any

concrete rule ‘clearly’ and, second, that an officer is

entitled to immunity for a takedown that enables the officer

to control a suspect during an arrest.” Id. Damages may only be awarded if applicable law “places the invalidity of

a particular action beyond debate.” Id.

The court in Johnson noted that other courts have held

“there is no clearly established rule forbidding a clean

takedown to end mild resistance.” See id. “Any takedown

can go awry—some suspects fall clumsily, while others

have fragile bones—but, if the officers use steps reasonably likely to effect a clean takedown, an injury does

not lead to liability.” Id. A court must make an objective

inquiry, determining whether the force used was

reasonable, not whether things turned out badly. See id.

The Defendants claim Renfro is entitled to qualified

immunity because he used a clean takedown to end

Flowers’s mild resistance and to effectuate an arrest. However, Flowers disputes there was any resistance. He

had complied with the order to leave Dirty South. Flowers

also disputes that Renfro employed a “clean takedown,”

alleging that Renfro is a mixed martial arts fighter who

knew how to take a person down so that their head struck the ground. Because of these genuine issues of material

fact pertaining to whether Flowers resisted and concerning

the nature of the takedown, Renfro is not entitled to

qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

(B)

The Court previously found Defendant Davis was

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive

force claim. Even if Flowers could assert an excessive

force claim, however, Davis would be entitled to qualified immunity. Flowers alleges Davis grabbed him and

handcuffed him after Flowers had complied with the order

to leave Dirty South, was already on the ground and not

resisting. Flowers asserts there was no reason for Davis to

handcuff and arrest him at that point.

In Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2003), the

Seventh Circuit held “it was unlawful to use excessively tight handcuffs and violently yank the arms of arrestees

who were not resisting arrest, did not disobey the orders of

a police officer, did not pose a threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and were suspected of committing only

minor crimes.” Id. at 780. In Payne, the court credited the

plaintiff’s allegations that two police officers struggled over her arm for thirty minutes while arguing about who would handcuff her, jerked her arm behind her back,

slammed handcuffs onto her wrist, tightened them so tight

that she experienced pain and numbness in her hands, and

did not loosen them when she complained. See id. at 774-

75. The allegations in this case relating to Davis handcuffing Flowers are not nearly as egregious as the

allegations in Payne.

In Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661 (7th Cir.

2006), the Seventh Circuit noted that, under certain

circumstances, excessively tight handcuffs might

constitute excessive force. See id. at 666 (citing Payne, 337

F.3d 767). The court in Tibbs found the officer’s actions

objectively reasonable when the plaintiff complained “once about his handcuffs without elaborating on any injury, numbness, or degree of pain.” Id. “Thus, Tibbs

establishes that, absent any indication an officer is aware

the handcuff tightness or positioning is causing

unnecessary pain or injury, the officer acts reasonably in

not modifying the handcuffs.” Day v. Wooten, 947 F.3d 453, 462 (7th Cir. 2020). “[T]he key fact is that the officer

must know the handcuffs will cause unnecessary pain or

injury.” Id. There is no allegation that Davis was aware

that Flowers experienced any discomfort or pain resulting

from the handcuffs. Accordingly, Davis is entitled to

qualified immunity assuming Flowers has asserted a Fourth Amendment violation. Summary judgment will be

entered on the excessive force claim in favor of Davis.

Illinois Tort Immunity Act The Defendant Officers next claim they are entitled to

immunity under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS

10/1-101 et seq., on the basis that their actions were lawful.

They assert immunity relating to the state law claims

Flowers brings against Defendants, including the state law claim for battery (Count II), the state law respondeat

superior claim alleging the City is liable (Count III), and

an indemnification claim against the City under 725 ILCS

10/9-102 (Count IV). “[T]he Illinois Tort Immunity Act

bars a public entity from liability for the conduct of its

employees when the employees are not liable.” Shachter v. City of Chicago, 848 F. App’x 208, 209 (7th Cir. 2021)

(citing 745 ILCS 10/2-109). “A local public entity is not

liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employees where the employee is not liable.” 745 ILCS

10/2-109.

The Court has determined there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to the Plaintiff’s excessive force claim

asserted against Officer Renfro. Because there is a factual

dispute regarding Renfro’s liability, the Court will deny the

City’s motion for summary judgment under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act to the extent that the City seeks

immunity for Renfro’s alleged actions.

The Court has determined that Officer Davis is entitled

to summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s excessive force

claim against Davis. Accordingly, the Court will grant the

City’s motion for summary judgment under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act to the extent that the City seeks

immunity for Davis’s alleged actions.

Ergo, the Motion of Defendant City of Springfield,

Officer Nicholas Renfro and Officer Terrance Davis for

Summary Judgment [d/e 25] is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.

The motion is GRANTED as to the claims asserted

against Davis.

The motion is DENIED as to the claims asserted

against Renfro.

The City of Springfield’s motion is GRANTED as to

the state law claims which are based on Davis’s alleged

conduct. The City of Springfield’s motion is DENIED as to the

state law claims which are based on Renfro’s alleged

conduct.

The Clerk will terminate Officer T. Davis, #527, as a

Defendant.

ENTER: August 10, 2021

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Richard Mills Richard Mills United States District Judge