Flowers-Bey v. Cabrera

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedFebruary 17, 2022
Docket2:20-cv-00004
StatusUnknown

This text of Flowers-Bey v. Cabrera (Flowers-Bey v. Cabrera) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flowers-Bey v. Cabrera, (E.D. Mo. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NORTHERN DIVISION

SHAWN FLOWERS-BEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:20-CV-4 RLW ) TOMAS CABRERA, et al, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Defendants Tomas Cabrera, Miguel Paniagua, Karen Rhodes, Mary Chandler, Bonnie Brennen, Tamara Anderson, and Tamra Crouch’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 51). Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay, (ECF No. 54), and Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 59). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies all three motions. I. Background Plaintiff Shawn Flowers-Bey, who is proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action on January 27, 2020, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking relief for alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while he was incarcerated at Northeast Correctional Center (“NCC”). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff claims he has suffered from a left inguinal hernia since June or July of 2016. He alleges medical staff at NCC refused to provide him with medically necessary corrective surgery, and instead they provided him with a hernia truss to alleviate his symptoms. (Id.) He claims the truss is inadequate, and any type of physical movement causes him pain. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that if he were not incarcerated, the standard of care would require surgical intervention. (Id.) On July 20, 2020, the Court conducted a frivolity review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Liberally construing the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court found Plaintiff states a plausible claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation

of his Eighth Amendment rights against the following defendants in their individual capacities: Tomas Cabrera, Miguel Paniagua, Karen Rhodes, Mary Chandler, Bonnie Brennen, Tamara Anderson, and Tamra Crouch, Unknown McCollum, and Unknown Kim.1 The Court later dismissed without prejudice defendants Dr. Unknown McCollum and Dr. Unknown Kim for lack of information to effectuate service. II. Discussion A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants move that the Court sanction Plaintiff and dismiss his case with prejudice for his failure to provide his disclosures as required by the Case Management Order (“CMO”) and the

Court’s Order dated January 11, 2021. As background, on October 9, 2020, the Court issued a CMO. Under the deadlines in the CMO, the parties were to make disclosures to the other parties no later than November 9, 2020. The required disclosures are described in detail in the CMO. The parties are warned in the CMO that “[f]ailure to make the above disclosures may result in sanctions, including dismissal, entry of default judgment or any other sanction that the Court deems just.” (ECF No. 34 at 2).

1On September 11, 2020, the Court ordered the Clerk to correct the spelling of several defendants’ names on the docket sheet and change the short caption of the case because the first- named defendant was dismissed from the action. (ECF No. 17). On December 11, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to compel Plaintiff’s disclosures pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. (ECF No. 40). Plaintiff did not respond to the motion, and on January 11, 2021, the Court granted Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 42). Plaintiff was ordered to provide to the Defendants, no later than February 8, 2021, “a list, including addresses, of all persons having knowledge or information of the facts giving rise to plaintiff’s claim, and all

documents that plaintiff believes mention, relate to, or in any way support plaintiff’s claim.” (Id. at 2). The Court warned Plaintiff that “failure to timely and fully comply with this Order may result in the exclusion from evidence of undisclosed information and other appropriate sanctions as contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii), including but not limited to dismissal of this action.” (Id.) Plaintiff did not provide Defendants with his disclosures by the deadline in the Order. Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to provide Defendants with his disclosures as required by the CMO and the Court’s January 11, 2021 Memorandum and Order. In their motion, Defendants state they had yet to receive Plaintiff’s disclosures, despite the Court

ordering him to do so no later than February 8, 2021. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s noncompliance has prejudiced their ability to engage in the discovery process, prepare dispositive motions, or otherwise defend this lawsuit. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Instead, less than two days after Defendants filed their motion, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay these proceedings. Plaintiff asks that the Court stay the case for 120 days based on the fact that he says he has been in “ag- seg” for conduct violations, which he was in the process of appealing. Plaintiff states in his motion he anticipated that he would continue to be in ad-seg or “dis-seg” for at least 50 more days. (ECF No. 54). Plaintiff also states that his property, including his legal materials, was being held in the property room pursuant to “policy.” (Id.) On June 10, 2021, approximately 50 days later, Plaintiff filed with the Court a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. Plaintiff attached to his motion for leave a hand-written document entitled “Persons Having Knowledge of Complaint,” which contains a list of individuals

and their addresses. Plaintiff also attached 53 pages of documents, many of which appear relevant to Plaintiff’s hernia, the treatment he received for his hernia, and grievances he pursued about that treatment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 authorizes the district courts to impose sanctions upon parties who fail to comply with discovery orders, but dismissal may be considered as a sanction only if there is (1) an order compelling discovery, (2) a willful violation of that order, and (3) prejudice to the other party. Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000). A dismissal with prejudice is “an extreme sanction” and “should be used only in cases of willful disobedience of a court order or where a litigant exhibits a pattern of intentional delay.” Hunt v.

City of Minneapolis, Minn., 203 F.3d 524, 527 (8th Cir. 2000). “This does not mean that the district court must find that the appellant acted in bad faith, but requires ‘only that he acted intentionally as opposed to accidentally or involuntarily.’” Id. (quoting Rodgers v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 135 F.3d 1216, 1219 (8th Cir. 1998)). Where a court gives meaningful notice of what is expected of pro se litigants, initially imposes less stringent sanctions when plaintiffs fail to cooperate, and warns them that their failure to comply with subsequent court orders would result in “dismissal of their action,” dismissal is proper. Farnsworth v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 863 F.2d 33, 34 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). An action may also be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) if a plaintiff has failed to comply with any order of the court. Aziz v. Wright,

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Flowers-Bey v. Cabrera, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flowers-bey-v-cabrera-moed-2022.