Flournoy v. Priest

486 P.2d 689, 5 Cal. 3d 350, 95 Cal. Rptr. 793, 1971 Cal. LEXIS 257
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 9, 1971
DocketSac. 7900
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 486 P.2d 689 (Flournoy v. Priest) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flournoy v. Priest, 486 P.2d 689, 5 Cal. 3d 350, 95 Cal. Rptr. 793, 1971 Cal. LEXIS 257 (Cal. 1971).

Opinion

Opinion

THE COURT.

In this proceeding petitioner Houston I. Flournoy, the Controller of the State of California, seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent Ivy Baker Priest, the Treasurer of the State of California, to register a demand and adopt a resolution providing for the issuance of State of California notes as authorized by sections 17300-17302 of the Government Code. These sections are part of chapter 223 of the Statutes of 1971 (see appendix), which was enacted as an urgency measure and signed by the Governor on June 28, 1971 “to provide an additional means of temporary borrowing to meet cash flow needs, and avoid more costly registered warrants. . . (Ch. 223, § 6.) Respondent refuses to register petitioner’s demand and to adopt a resolution providing for the issuance of notes on the *352 ground that chapter 223 violates the California Constitution. She contends that the issuance of notes pursuant thereto without an election would create a state indebtedness in excess of $300,000 in violation of article XVI, section 1, of the Constitution; that such issuance would result in payments from the state treasury without “warrants duly drawn thereon by the Controller” in violation of article XIII, section 21, of the Constitution; and that chapter 223 is invalid as an urgency measure on the ground that it purports to change the duties of the Controller and Treasurer in violation of article IV, section 8, of the Constitution. We find no merit in any of these contentions. Accordingly, the writ will'issue.

Chapter 223 was enacted to meet the practical problem created by the fact that the collection of state revenues within the fiscal year 1971-1972 will lag behind the expenditures required by appropriations for that year, thereby necessitating the borrowing of funds to be repaid when the anticipated revenues are collected. In the past the problem of dealing with temporary insufficiencies of the funds in the state treasury to meet current operating expenses of the state government has been solved by the use of registered warrants. The validity of the registered warrant procedure was established in Riley v. Johnson (1933) 219 Cal. 513 [27 P.2d 760, 92 A.L.R. 1292], and Riley v. Johnson (1936) 6 Cal.2d 529 [58 P.2d 631], which upheld the constitutionality of chapter 605 of the Statutes of 1933.

In brief chapter 605 provided that if there were insufficient funds in the treasury to pay warrants drawn by the Controller, the Treasurer should register such warrants and provide that they should bear interest at the rate of five percent per annum. The warrants were then delivered to the payees thereof and were thereafter payable when sufficient funds became available in the treasury. The court held that the Legislature could validly provide for this method of discharging the state’s obligations. It pointed out that the payment of interest was based on the appropriation for such interest contained in chapter 605, and that the payment of the principal of the warrants was based both on the appropriations of that chapter and the appropriations for the underlying expenditures involved. It rejected the contention that the warrants created an indebtedness in excess of $300,-000 in violation of article XVI, section 1, of the Constitution. “It is our opinion that no indebtedness or liability is created within the meaning of the constitutional provision in question, when, as here, the Legislature, at the time of authorizing the obligation, appropriates money to meet such obligation. We have already held that the provisions of chapter 605 of the Statutes of 1933 constitute an appropriation of the unapplied moneys in the general fund of a sufficient amount of money to pay the interest and principal of the registered warrants. It is well settled in this state that *353 revenues may be appropriated in anticipation of their receipt just as effectually as when such revenues are physically in the treasury. The appropriation of such moneys and the issuance of warrants in anticipation of the receipt of revenues in effect operates in the nature of a cash payment and, therefore, does not create an indebtedness or liability within the meaning of the debt limitation clause. [Citations.]” (Riley v. Johnson, supra, 219 Cal. 513, 520-521; Riley v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.2d 529, 531-532.)

We perceive no constitutionally relevant distinctions between chapter 605 upheld in the Riley cases and chapter 223. The Legislature has merely provided for a more orderly procedure for dealing with the treasury’s cash flow problems. Instead of providing for the issuance of numerous unpaid warrants on a haphazard basis, chapter 223 provides for an orderly procedure whereby the Controller estimates in advance the funds that will be needed to meet the current expenses of government. He then draws a demand or demands in that amount “against appropriations made from the General Fund to be paid in the then current fiscal year prior to the receipt of [estimated probable income] . . .” and delivers the demands to the Treasurer. “The State Treasurer shall register the same for nonpayment and notify the State Controller. The State Controller may then authorize the State Treasurer to issue and sell notes of the State of California representing said registered demand or demands. Such notes shall be issued only to provide cash in an amount sufficient to satisfy said” demands. (Gov. Code, § 17300.) “Upon receipt of the purchase price of the notes, the State Treasurer shall notify the State Controller that funds for the payment of such registered demand or demands are in the State Treasury. . . . The State Controller may thereupon proceed to draw warrants against appropriations lawfully made by the Legislature to be paid in said fiscal year and represented by said registered demand or demands. . . .” (Gov. Code, § 17303.) Government Code, section 17304, then provides for the payment of the notes with interest from moneys in the General Fund in the fiscal year of issuance, 1 and section 17310 expressly appropriates the funds necessary to pay the principal and interest of the notes and necessary administrative expenses. Thus, in this case as in the case of the statute considered in the Riley cases, the Legislature has appropriated revenues in anticipation of their receipt and provided for the *354 issuance of notes in anticipation of such receipt. Such appropriation and issuance “operates in the nature of a cash payment and, therefore, does not create an indebtedness or liability within the meaning of the debt limitation clause.” (Riley v. Johnson, supra, 219 Cal. 513, 520-521; Riley v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.2d 529, 531-532.)

Respondent contends, however, that chapter 223 violátes article XIII, section 21, of the Constitution on the ground that, it authorizes money to be drawn from the treasury without a warrant “duly drawn thereon by the Controller.” 2

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
486 P.2d 689, 5 Cal. 3d 350, 95 Cal. Rptr. 793, 1971 Cal. LEXIS 257, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flournoy-v-priest-cal-1971.