Flournoy v. Commissioner

1981 T.C. Memo. 435, 42 T.C.M. 723, 1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 306
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedAugust 17, 1981
DocketDocket No. 17520-80.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1981 T.C. Memo. 435 (Flournoy v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flournoy v. Commissioner, 1981 T.C. Memo. 435, 42 T.C.M. 723, 1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 306 (tax 1981).

Opinion

RICHARD MARK ALLEN FLOURNOY, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Flournoy v. Commissioner
Docket No. 17520-80.
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1981-435; 1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 306; 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 723; T.C.M. (RIA) 81435;
August 17, 1981.
Richard Mark Allen Flournoy, pro se.
Joan B. Renegar, for the respondent.

WILBUR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILBUR, Judge: This matter is before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment filed February 19, 1981, pursuant to Rule 121(a), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

*307 The Commissioner determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax for the year 1977 in the amount of $ 357 and an addition to tax under section 6653(a) 1 in the amount of $ 17.50. For purposes of this motion only, respondent concedes that petitioner is liable for no addition to tax under section 6653(a). Petitioner resided at Park Hill, Oklahoma at the time of filing his petition.

Petitioner is a self-employed farmer who, for 1977, reported earnings from his profession of $ 4,518.95 as well as other compensation of $ 108. Petitioner's farming activities were not performed in the capacity of a member of a religious order and petitioner is not a member of a religious sect which makes a practice of providing for its dependent members. Petitioner did not timely file an application for exemption from self-employment tax under section 1402(g)(2). 2

*308 The Commissioner determined that the earnings of petitioner from his farming activities were subject to self-employment taxes and issued an appropriate notice of deficiency. Petitioner timely filed for a redetermination of that deficiency claiming an exemption from self-employment taxes on religious grounds. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121(a), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, on the basis that the petition filed set forth no genuine issue of material fact.

Petitioner contends that he need not meet the statutory requirements for exemption from paying self-employment taxes. Rather, he seeks to interpose the First Amendment between his religious aversion to certain forms of insurance and section 1401, which imposes the self-employment tax. He contends that as a Christian and follower of Jesus' teachings he is opposed to making "any payments public or private that are made with the purpose in mind of insuring for future basic needs." The cause of his opposition to making such payments is alleged to be a statement contained in Matthew 6:25 "where Jesus taught 'therefore I say unto you, take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, *309 or what ye shall drink.'" Since it is clear that petitioner does not meet the requirements for an exemption under section 1402(g), the only question before us is whether petitioner is entitled to an exemption from payment of self-employment taxes on constitutional grounds.

The tax imposed under the Social Security Act "upon both employees and the self-employed has been held to be constitutional." Palmer v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 310, 313 (1969), citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Cain v. United States, 211 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1954). Further, this Court has held on a number of occasions that the exemption provisions of section 1402 are not unconstitutionally narrow. Palmer v. Commissioner, supra; Henson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 835 (1976); Randolph v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 284 (1980). 3 Nonetheless, petitioner seeks exemption contending that the Palmer case, supra, is distinguishable. He contends that merely by paying the self-employment tax he is giving thought for tomorrow, whereas in Palmer it was the religious prohibition against receipt of benefits*310 which caused the taxpayers therein to resist payment of the tax. Further, petitioner contends that the self-employment tax is justified by no compelling state interest (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)), and argues that the self-employment tax impedes the free exercise of his religion.

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Related

Helvering v. Davis
301 U.S. 619 (Supreme Court, 1937)
Braunfeld v. Brown
366 U.S. 599 (Supreme Court, 1961)
Sherbert v. Verner
374 U.S. 398 (Supreme Court, 1963)
Cain v. United States
211 F.2d 375 (Fifth Circuit, 1954)
Palmer v. Commissioner
52 T.C. 310 (U.S. Tax Court, 1969)
Henson v. Commissioner
66 T.C. 835 (U.S. Tax Court, 1976)
Randolph v. Commissioner
74 T.C. 284 (U.S. Tax Court, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
1981 T.C. Memo. 435, 42 T.C.M. 723, 1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 306, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flournoy-v-commissioner-tax-1981.