MEMORANDUM OPINION
WILBUR, Judge: This matter is before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment filed February 19, 1981, pursuant to Rule 121(a), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
The Commissioner determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax for the year 1977 in the amount of $ 357 and an addition to tax under section 6653(a) 1 in the amount of $ 17.50. For purposes of this motion only, respondent concedes that petitioner is liable for no addition to tax under section 6653(a). Petitioner resided at Park Hill, Oklahoma at the time of filing his petition.
Petitioner is a self-employed farmer who, for 1977, reported earnings from his profession of $ 4,518.95 as well as other compensation of $ 108. Petitioner's farming activities were not performed in the capacity of a member of a religious order and petitioner is not a member of a religious sect which makes a practice of providing for its dependent members. Petitioner did not timely file an application for exemption from self-employment tax under section 1402(g)(2). 2
The Commissioner determined that the earnings of petitioner from his farming activities were subject to self-employment taxes and issued an appropriate notice of deficiency. Petitioner timely filed for a redetermination of that deficiency claiming an exemption from self-employment taxes on religious grounds. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121(a), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, on the basis that the petition filed set forth no genuine issue of material fact.
Petitioner contends that he need not meet the statutory requirements for exemption from paying self-employment taxes. Rather, he seeks to interpose the First Amendment between his religious aversion to certain forms of insurance and section 1401, which imposes the self-employment tax. He contends that as a Christian and follower of Jesus' teachings he is opposed to making "any payments public or private that are made with the purpose in mind of insuring for future basic needs." The cause of his opposition to making such payments is alleged to be a statement contained in Matthew 6:25 "where Jesus taught 'therefore I say unto you, take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink.'" Since it is clear that petitioner does not meet the requirements for an exemption under section 1402(g), the only question before us is whether petitioner is entitled to an exemption from payment of self-employment taxes on constitutional grounds.
The tax imposed under the Social Security Act "upon both employees and the self-employed has been held to be constitutional." Palmer v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 310, 313 (1969), citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Cain v. United States, 211 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1954). Further, this Court has held on a number of occasions that the exemption provisions of section 1402 are not unconstitutionally narrow. Palmer v. Commissioner, supra; Henson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 835 (1976); Randolph v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 284 (1980). 3 Nonetheless, petitioner seeks exemption contending that the Palmer case, supra, is distinguishable. He contends that merely by paying the self-employment tax he is giving thought for tomorrow, whereas in Palmer it was the religious prohibition against receipt of benefits which caused the taxpayers therein to resist payment of the tax. Further, petitioner contends that the self-employment tax is justified by no compelling state interest (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)), and argues that the self-employment tax impedes the free exercise of his religion. We are not of the opinion that the First Amendment requires us to carve out of section 1401 a new exemption from self-employment taxes or that it requires us to hold the self-employment tax unconstitutional.
In Sherbert v. Verner, supra, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unemployment benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act for refusing to accept employment which would require her to work on Saturdays, the Sabbath of her faith. The Supreme Court held this denial constituted a violation of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Petitioner would have us equate the burden of loss of one's means of support (unemployment benefits) for declining to work on the Sabbath to the burden of paying an income tax. This we cannot do under the applicable law. Petitioner has no religious objection to payment of income taxes generally. He will receive the benefits of social security only if he applies for them and meets other requirements determined by Congress. See Palmer v. Commissioner, supra.As the Supreme Court stated in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961):
To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature. Statutes which tax income and limit the amount which may be deducted for religious contributions impose an indirect economic burden on the observance of the religion of the citizen whose religion requires him to donate a greater amount to his church; * * * The list of legislation of this nature is nearly limitless. [Emphasis added.]
Petitioner is a sincere and honest man with strong religious convictions. We understand his position, but the law is clear. Relief, if there is to be any, must come from the legislature. Since petitioner's case presents no genuine issue of material fact respondent is, in view of the above, entitled to a summary judgment in his favor as a matter of law.
Accordingly, respondent's motion is granted, and,
An appropriate order will be issued.