Florida Women's Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Smith

478 F. Supp. 233, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10065
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 31, 1979
Docket79-6063-CIV-JAG
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 478 F. Supp. 233 (Florida Women's Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Florida Women's Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Smith, 478 F. Supp. 233, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10065 (S.D. Fla. 1979).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GONZALEZ, District Judge.

The Florida Women’s Medical Clinic is an out-patient facility located in Fort Lauder-dale, Florida which performs only first trimester pregnancy terminations. Garry H. Wachtel, M.D. is a physician licensed to practice medicine in the state of Florida who regularly performs first trimester pregnancy terminations at the Florida Women’s Medical Clinic. Michael J. Benjamin, M.D. is also a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Dr. Benjamin, however, regularly performs first trimester pregnancy terminations in his private office.

Dr. Wachtel, Dr. Benjamin and the Florida Women’s Medical Clinic have filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves; on behalf of those similarly situated; and on behalf of all women of childbearing age who are or may become pregnant and who desire to terminate their pregnancies.

The plaintiffs seek declaratory relief permanently enjoining the enforcement of the Florida Abortion Clinic Law, Chapter 78-382, Laws of Florida, F.S. 390.011-390.021 (1978 Supp.), and the rules promulgated thereunder by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Florida Administration Code, Chapter 10D-72.

This Court on March 16, 1979, after oral argument by counsel for the respective parties, entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the above statute and rules. At that time, the Court sua sponte directed the filing of cross motions for summary judgment to effect an expeditious disposition of this matter. These motions are presently before the Court. Also awaiting determination is plaintiffs’ Motion for class certification.

It is clear that the plaintiff physicians have standing to seek relief as each has a liberty and property interest at stake. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-118, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1970). Standing in this type of case has also been extended to clinics which perform pregnancy terminations, as well as to the clinics’ officers. See Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1145-48 (7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997, 95 S.Ct. 1438, 43 L.Ed.2d 680 (1975). Finally, physicians have been allowed to argue jus tertii the rights of pregnant women. Singleton v. Wulff, supra, 428 U.S. at 118, 96 S.Ct. 2868.

This action seeking a declaration as to the constitutionality vel non of the aforementioned statutes and rules is so clearly appropriate for Rule 23(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., class treatment that extended discussion of this issue is unnecessary. See e. g. Doe v. Mundy, 514 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975), John Jones, M.D. v. Smith, 474 F.Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla.1979); Baird v. Department of Public Health of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Case No. 73-3869-MA (D.Mass.1978), reversed on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1098 (1st Cir. 1979); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F.Supp. 1302 (N.D.Ill.1978); Gary-Northwest Indiana Women’s Services, Inc. v. Bowen, 421 F.Supp. 734 (N.D.Ind.1976), affirmed 429 U.S. 1067, 97 S.Ct. 799, 50 L.Ed.2d 785 (1977); Doe v. Turner, 361 F.Supp. 1288 (S.D.Iowa 1973), affirmed, 488 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1973).

The state’s argument that the clinic is not a proper representative class plaintiff because it has voluntarily complied with some of the rule imposed requirements presently under attack borders on the frivolous.

The Court finds that the Florida Women’s Medical Clinic and Drs. Wachtel and Benjamin should be certified as representative class plaintiffs on behalf of (1) all facilities in the state of Florida which provide first trimester pregnancy terminations, (2) all physicians who perform first trimester pregnancy terminations in the state of Florida, and (3) all pregnant females who *235 desire a first trimester pregnancy termination in the state of Florida.

The sole issue presently before the Court for resolution is whether Florida Statutes 390.011-390.021 (1978 Supp.) and the rules promulgated thereunder by the Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, Florida Administrative Code, Chapter 100-72, constitute an unconstitutional infringement upon the plaintiff’s right of privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976); and Sendak v. Arnold, 429 U.S. 968, 97 S.Ct. 476, 50 L.Ed.2d 579 (1976).

The Abortion Clinics Law, F.S. 390.011-390.021 (1978 Supp.) requires all facilities in which pregnancy terminations are performed (other than hospitals and doctors’ offices not primarily used for pregnancy terminations) to apply for and to be licensed by the Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services. The statute delegates to the Department the authority to promulgate and enforce rules regulating the operation of pregnancy termination clinics. Specifically F.S. 390.012 (1978 Supp.) states as follows:

The department shall have the authority to develop and enforce standards for the health, care, and treatment of persons in abortion clinics and for the safe operation of such clinics, and to that end it may adopt and enforce rules necessary and proper to carry out such standards. These rules shall be comparable to rules which apply to all surgical procedures requiring approximately the same degree of skill and care as the performance of first trimester abortions. The rules shall be reasonably related to the preservation of maternal health of the clients. The rules shall not impose a legally significant burden on the woman’s freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. The rules shall provide for, but shall not be limited to:
(1) The establishment of minimum standards for the care and treatment of clients of an abortion clinic;
(2) The availability of aftercare services and emergency medical services to be administered by a hospital; and
(3) The transportation of patients requiring emergency care from an abortion clinic to a licensed hospital.

The law provides a one year period of transition within which presently existing clinics may come into compliance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department. F.S. 390.013.

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478 F. Supp. 233, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10065, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/florida-womens-medical-clinic-inc-v-smith-flsd-1979.