Florida Recovery Solutions, Inc. v. Westport Recovery Corporation

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Docket: 3D2025-0356
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed October 1, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D25-0356 Lower Tribunal No. 91-13989-SP-23 ________________

Florida Recovery Solutions, Inc., et al., Appellants,

vs.

Westport Recovery Corporation, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Jennifer Azar, Judge.

Michael J. Farrar, P.A., and Michael J. Farrar, for appellants.

Friedman & Greenberg, P.A., and Robert D. Friedman (Plantation), for appellees.

Before LINDSEY, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

GORDO, J. Florida Recovery Solutions, Inc. (“Recovery Solutions”) and Cheyenne

Whitfield (“Whitfield”) appeal from a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees

to First Union National Bank of Florida, now known as Westport Recovery

Corporation (“Westport”). We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P.

9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm.

Recovery Solutions and Whitfield contest the trial court’s determination

of Westport’s entitlement to attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida

Statutes, and further challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

amount awarded as reasonable. 1

Upon review of the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in determining Westport’s entitlement to attorney’s fees under

section 57.105. See Paul v. Avrahami, 216 So. 3d 647, 650 (Fla. 4th DCA

2017) (“[S]ection 57.105(1) requires that the trial court ‘shall’ award

attorney’s fees (including prejudgment interest) against a party and the

party’s attorney if either knew or should have known that a claim or defense

1 “We review the trial court’s [order on] attorney’s fees under section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes, for an abuse of discretion.” Paul v. Avrahami, 216 So. 3d 647, 649 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). “To the extent the trial court’s determination on a motion for attorney’s fees is based on an issue of law, our standard of review is de novo.” Id. “We will uphold a trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees so long as it is supported by substantial, competent evidence.” Effective Teleservices, Inc. v. Smith, 132 So. 3d 335, 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

2 when initially presented (a) [w]as not supported by the material facts

necessary to establish the claim or defense; or (b) [w]ould not be supported

by the application of then-existing law to those material facts. The purpose

of sanctions is to deter frivolous pleadings.”) (quotation marks and citations

omitted); Preferred Gov’t Ins. Tr. v. Aelion, 307 So. 3d 129, 130 (Fla. 3d DCA

2020) (“Under [section 57.105(1)], a court may impose sanctions on an

attorney for a frivolous filing where, for example, the claim was not supported

by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or would not be

supported by the application of then-existing law. In this context, we have

defined ‘frivolous’ as a claim that presents no justiciable question and is so

devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little prospect it will ever

succeed. . . . [T]he trial court must find that the action was frivolous or so

devoid of merit both on the facts and the law as to be completely untenable.

Additionally, the trial court’s findings must be based on substantial

competent evidence that is either contained in the record or is otherwise

before the court[.]”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

We also find competent substantial evidence to support the amount of

attorney’s fees award to Westport. See Nants v. Griffin, 783 So. 2d 363, 366

(Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“To support a fee award, there must be evidence

detailing the services performed and expert testimony as to the

3 reasonableness of the fee. The applicant should present records detailing

the amount of work performed and the time to perform each task. . . . Expert

testimony is required to determine both the reasonableness of the hours and

a reasonable hourly rate. However, the attorney performing the work is not

required to testify when there is competent evidence filed in support of the

motion or introduced at the hearing detailing the services performed.”); cf.

Saussy v. Saussy, 560 So. 2d 1385, 1386 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (“To support

a fee award, there must be the following: (1) evidence detailing the services

performed and (2) expert testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee. . . .

In this case, there was competent evidence either filed in support of the

motion or introduced at the hearing detailing the services performed by the

wife’s attorneys, which included an affidavit by a partner of the law firm with

attached summaries of legal services provided by the firm, time slips,

testimony of an associate with the firm as to his own work in the case, and

testimony from an expert witness that the firm's fee and the work performed

were reasonable. We find this evidence sufficient to support the award of

fees for the time reasonably and necessarily spent by all attorneys who

worked on the matter.”).

Affirmed.