DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, Appellant,
v.
ANGEL GARCIA,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-2547
[September 2, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Frank David Ledee, Judge; L.T. Case No. 061991CF008523A88810.
Rose Garrison, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Tallahassee, and Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Acting Solicitor General, and Kevin A. Golembiewski, Senior Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Ron M. Kleiner of Law Offices of Ron M. Kleiner, Miami, for appellee.
Robert Wayne Evans and James M. Orchard of Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A., Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae Florida Sheriffs Association on behalf of appellant.
LEVINE, J.
The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) appeals the denial of its motion to vacate the trial court’s order directing FDLE to remove Angel Garcia (“appellee”) from the sexual offender registry. We find the following: (1) we have jurisdiction because proceedings concerning removal from the sexual offender registry are civil in nature; (2) FDLE has standing because the order directly affects its statutory duty to maintain the sexual offender registry; and (3) appellee did not satisfy the statutory requirements for removal under the version of section 943.0435 in effect when he filed his petition in 2024. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s order denying FDLE’s motion to vacate.
In 1991, appellee entered an open guilty plea to one count of sexual battery with slight force, in violation of section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes. Appellee was released from supervision in 2000.
In 1997, the legislature enacted section 943.0435, Florida Statutes, which imposes registration requirements on sexual offenders. Ch. 97-299, § 8, Laws of Fla. Pursuant to the statute, FDLE is required to maintain the sexual offender registry. In 1998, the legislature amended the statute to permit offenders to petition for removal of the registration requirement after being released from sanction for at least twenty years and not being arrested for any crime since release. Ch. 98-81, § 7, Laws of Fla. The legislature again amended the statute in 2007, increasing the release requirement to twenty-five years and exempting certain offenses from seeking relief. Among those crimes excluded from removal from the sexual offender registry are convictions under section 794.011, which includes the crime that appellee pled to. Ch. 07-209, § 2, Laws of Fla.
In 2021, appellee filed a petition, under section 943.0435(11), for removal of the requirement to register as a sexual offender in Florida, arguing he had been released from sanction for over twenty-one years. Appellee claimed that the version of the statute in effect at the time he completed his probation in 2000 was the applicable statute.
The state countered that the current version of the statute applied because sexual offender registration obligations are procedural. According to the state, appellee’s petition was premature because he had not been released from supervision for at least twenty-five years. Further, and more importantly, under the current law, appellee was exempt from the relief requested because he was convicted of a disqualifying offense. The trial court found the state’s arguments well-founded and denied the petition.
In July 2024, appellee filed a second petition for removal of the requirement to register as a sexual offender. By then, appellee had been released from sanction for twenty-four years. Appellee again argued that the version of the statute in effect when he completed his sanctions in 2000 applied and that the 2007 amendment was not the applicable statute and could not be applied retroactively.
The trial court, through a successor judge, granted the petition. The trial court found that the 2007 amendment to section 943.0435 did not apply retroactively. FDLE then moved to vacate the order pursuant to section 943.0436(3), arguing that appellee was ineligible for removal from the registry under the current applicable statute.
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Appellee responded that FDLE was a nonparty without standing to contest the trial court’s order. Appellee argued that under section 943.0435(11), the state attorney—not FDLE—is the proper party to an action for petition for removal from the requirements of sexual offender registration. The trial court agreed with appellee and denied the motion, stating: “FDLE does not have standing to challenge the removal of the Defendant from [the] sexual offender registry pursuant to Florida Statute § 943.0436. That task is imposed on the State Attorney.” From this order, FDLE appeals.
I. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Our jurisdiction turns on whether the proceeding giving rise to the appealed order is civil or criminal in nature. The appeal would not be authorized if criminal in nature because the order appealed is not on the list of authorized appeals under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140, which governs appeals in criminal cases. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c).
However, if civil in nature, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030, which governs appeals in civil cases, provides for review of “final orders of trial courts.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). A final order is one that ends judicial labor in the cause. S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974). We conclude, for reasons explained below, that the proceedings giving rise to the appealed order are civil in nature, not criminal. Thus, this court has jurisdiction to review the order denying FDLE’s motion to vacate.
The version of section 943.0435 in effect when the petition was filed in July 2024, states as follows:
(11) Except as provided in s. 943.04354, a sexual offender shall maintain registration with the department for the duration of his or her life . . . . However, a sexual offender shall be considered for removal of the requirement to register as a sexual offender only if the person:
(a) 1. Has been lawfully released from confinement, supervision, or sanction, whichever is later, for at least 25 years and has not been arrested for any felony or misdemeanor offense since release, provided that the sexual offender’s requirement to register was not based upon an adult conviction:
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....
b. For a violation of s. 794.011, excluding s. 794.011(10);
....
2. If the sexual offender meets the criteria in subparagraph 1., the sexual offender may, for the purpose of removing the requirement for registration as a sexual offender, petition the criminal division of the circuit court of the circuit . . . .
3. The court may grant or deny relief if the offender demonstrates to the court that he or she has not been arrested for any crime since release; the requested relief complies with . . . federal standards applicable to the removal of registration requirements for a sexual offender or required to be met as a condition for the receipt of federal funds by the state; and the court is otherwise satisfied that the offender is not a current or potential threat to public safety. The state attorney in the circuit in which the petition is filed must be given notice of the petition at least 3 weeks before the hearing on the matter. The state attorney may present evidence in opposition to the requested relief or may otherwise demonstrate the reasons why the petition should be denied. If the court denies the petition, the court may set a future date at which the sexual offender may again petition the court for relief, subject to the standards for relief provided in this subsection.
4. The department shall remove an offender from classification as a sexual offender for purposes of registration if the offender provides to the department a certified copy of the court’s written findings or order that indicates that the offender is no longer required to comply with the requirements for registration as a sexual offender.
....
(12) The Legislature finds that sexual offenders . . . often pose a high risk of engaging in sexual offenses even after being released from incarceration or commitment and that protection of the public from sexual offenders is a paramount government interest. Sexual offenders have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public’s interest in
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public safety and in the effective operation of government. Releasing information concerning sexual offenders to law enforcement agencies and to persons who request such information, and the release of such information to the public by a law enforcement agency or public agency, will further the governmental interests of public safety. The designation of a person as a sexual offender is not a sentence or a punishment but is simply the status of the offender which is the result of a conviction for having committed certain crimes.
§ 943.0435, Fla. Stat. (2024) (emphasis added).
Section 943.0435(11)(a)(2) permits a sexual offender to “petition the criminal division of the circuit court” “for the purpose of removing the requirement for registration as a sexual offender . . . .” We find that a petition filed in the criminal division does not transform an otherwise civil regulatory proceeding into a criminal proceeding. A petition under section 943.0435(11) does not challenge the criminal judgment or sentence. Rather, it seeks relief from an ongoing statutory registration obligation imposed by chapter 943.
The legislature has expressly stated that “[t]he designation of a person as a sexual offender is not a sentence or a punishment but is simply the status of the offender . . . .” § 943.0435(12), Fla. Stat. This is particularly relevant here because appellee’s offense and sentencing predated the enactment of Florida’s sexual offender registration requirements. Treating the registration requirement as part of appellee’s punishment could obviously raise ex post facto concerns.
The United States Supreme Court and Florida courts have clearly rejected treating a later-enacted statutory requirement for sexual offender registration as an additional punishment for an offense committed, especially in the present case before the requirement even existed. For example, in Smith v. Doe, the United States Supreme Court held that sexual offender registration laws like Florida’s are “nonpunitive” “civil regulatory scheme[s],” not systems for “impos[ing] punishment,” and therefore do not violate the ex post facto clause. 538 U.S. 84, 92, 102, 105-06 (2003). Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court has stated: “The registration requirement has absolutely no effect on the ‘range of the defendant’s punishment’ for the crime,” and is therefore merely a “collateral consequence” of a criminal conviction. State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003). This court has similarly held that section 943.0435 is procedural and regulatory in nature, does not increase punishment, and does not violate the ex post facto clause. Simmons v.
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State, 753 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also Freeland v. State, 832 So. 2d 923, 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“The registration and reporting requirements of Section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (2000) are regulatory and procedural in nature and do not violate the ex post facto clause.”); Givens v. State, 851 So. 2d 813, 814-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Registration clearly is not a punishment. And this clearly is not a criminal proceeding.1
The reasoning in State v. Whitt, 96 So. 3d 1125 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and State v. Brena, 278 So. 3d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), further supports treating proceedings concerning the registration requirement as separate and distinct from a criminal proceeding. In Whitt, the Fifth District held that the trial court lacked postconviction jurisdiction to determine whether a defendant was required to register because the registration requirement was “unrelated to his sentence and was a collateral consequence of his judgment and sentence.” 96 So. 3d at 1126. Similarly, in Brena, the Third District held that the trial court lacked postconviction jurisdiction to remove the statutory registration requirement because the designation was not part of the defendant’s plea or sentence. 278 So. 3d at 854-55. 2
Appellee relies on State v. Korson, 413 So. 3d 207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025), review denied, No. SC2025-0970, 2026 WL 371524 (Fla. Feb. 10, 2026), arguing that the supreme court’s denial of discretionary jurisdiction is dispositive. However, the supreme court’s decision not to review Korson “does not provide substantive guidance.” Heine v. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 360 So. 3d 412, 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Further, decisions from other districts are not binding on this court. State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53
1 The civil nature of sexual offender registration proceedings is further illustrated
by an analogy to Jimmy Ryce Act proceedings, which are also civil in nature. See § 394.910, Fla. Stat.; Osborne v. State, 907 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 2005). Both Jimmy Ryce and sexual registration requirements occur after completion of the criminal sentence and are based on public safety concerns. See § 943.0435(12), Fla. Stat. (stating that “protection of the public from sexual offenders is a paramount government interest”); Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 104 (Fla. 2002) (recognizing “protection of the public” as a purpose for the Jimmy Ryce Act).
2 Although Whitt and Brena both involved petitions for writ of certiorari, we note
that other cases have reviewed orders concerning removal from the sexual offender registry by direct appeal. See State v. Marcel, 67 So. 3d 1223, 1224-25 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (reversing, on direct appeal, an order granting a petition for removal under section 943.04354 after determining the defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief); accord State v. Samuels, 76 So. 3d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). None of these cases discuss whether they could have proceeded, or did proceed, as civil appeals.
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(Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
In Korson, the Second District concluded that an order granting removal from the sexual offender registry was part of a criminal proceeding and dismissed the state’s petition for writ of certiorari. 413 So. 3d at 208. The court relied on King v. State, 911 So. 2d 229, 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (en banc), which held that a postconviction challenge to a sexual predator designation is not a separate civil order, but rather part of the criminal proceeding. The court also relied on LaFave v. State, 149 So. 3d 662, 670 (Fla. 2014), which held that a “district court lack[s] jurisdiction to grant the State’s petition for writ of certiorari where the trial court’s order is a final order and where the State had no statutory right to appeal the order.”
We disagree with Korson’s jurisdictional analysis. Further, LaFave is distinguishable because it involved the trial court’s early termination of probation, which was clearly part of the defendant’s criminal sentence. 149 So. 3d at 664-65. In contrast, the present case concerns a statutory registration requirement that was imposed independently from the sentence. King is likewise distinguishable because it involved a sexual predator designation that was expressly incorporated into the defendant’s plea. 911 So. 2d at 231. Here, the registration requirement was not part of appellee’s plea or sentence.
In summary, because these proceedings concern a statutory civil regulatory requirement separate and apart from appellee’s criminal sentence, FDLE’s appeal is authorized under rule 9.030(b)(1)(A). Thus, we have jurisdiction to review the final order on appeal.
II. Standing
A. Standing in Trial Court
We next address whether FDLE has standing. FDLE argues that the trial court erred in finding it lacked standing to challenge the order directing appellee’s removal from the sexual offender registry. We agree.
Whether a party has standing presents a question of law reviewed de novo. Johnson v. State, 78 So. 3d 1305, 1314 (Fla. 2012). Standing exists when a party demonstrates that it reasonably expects to be affected by the outcome of the proceedings. Id.
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Section 943.0436(3), Florida Statutes (2024), states:
If the court enters an order that affects an agency’s performance of a duty imposed under the laws governing sexual predators or sexual offenders, or that limits the agency’s exercise of authority conferred under such laws, the Legislature strongly encourages the affected agency to file a motion in the court that entered such order. The affected agency may, within 1 year after the receipt of any such order, move to modify or set aside the order . . . .
(emphasis added).
We rely on section 943.0436(3), which expressly recognizes FDLE’s authority to challenge an order affecting its statutory duties. FDLE is the agency charged with maintaining Florida’s sexual offender registry. The challenged order directly affected FDLE’s statutory duties to maintain the sexual offender registry because the order required FDLE to remove appellee from Florida’s sexual offender registry.
The trial court’s reliance on only section 943.0435(11) is misplaced. 3 Section 943.0435(11) addresses the state attorney’s participation in the petition for removal. It does not address standing to challenge the resulting order, nor does it preclude FDLE from seeking relief when an order affects its statutory duties. The legislature’s authorization of the state attorney’s ability to oppose a petition does not negate FDLE’s independent duty to maintain the registry. Indeed, section 943.0436 expressly authorizes an affected agency to seek relief when an order interferes with its duties. An order directing FDLE to remove a name from the sexual offender registry would affect FDLE’s duties. Thus, FDLE has the requisite standing to challenge the order.
B. Standing on Appeal
Appellee does not address FDLE’s standing in the trial court and
3 At the time appellee filed his July 2024 petition, section 943.0435(11) provided:
“The state attorney in the circuit in which the petition is filed must be given notice of the petition at least 3 weeks before the hearing on the matter. The state attorney may present evidence in opposition to the requested relief or may otherwise demonstrate the reasons why the petition should be denied.” Section 943.0435 was amended effective October 1, 2024, see ch. 2024-73, § 2, Laws of Fla., and now provides that both the state attorney and FDLE are entitled to notice and to present evidence in opposition.
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instead claims only that FDLE does not have standing to appeal the denial of the motion to vacate. We disagree. A nonparty may seek review on appeal of an order that “directly adjudicates” its rights. Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice §§ 10:2-10:3 (2026 ed.). “[T]hose who are aggrieved in some way by the order” may seek appellate review upon “showing that the decision sought to be reviewed adversely affects some legitimate interest of the party seeking relief . . . .” Id. at § 10:4; see also Dep’t of Transp. v. Baird, 992 So. 2d 378, 381 n.4 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (finding that a county expressway authority, a nonparty, had standing to challenge an order expressly enjoining the authority); Mem’l Health Sys., Inc. v. Halifax Hospice, Inc., 689 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (finding a licensing agency—an adversely affected nonparty—had standing to move to dissolve an injunction forbidding the agency from issuing a license).
Here, FDLE was not simply an unrelated nonparty. As previously discussed, section 943.0436(3) expressly authorizes FDLE to file a motion challenging an order affecting its performance of a statutory duty. FDLE exercised that statutory authority by timely filing a motion to vacate. The denial of that motion left in place an order directing FDLE to remove appellee from the registry. Accordingly, we find that FDLE has standing to appeal the trial court’s denial of its motion to vacate.
III. Eligibility for Removal
Finally, our review turns to the merits of removing appellee from the sexual offender registry. FDLE argues that appellee is not eligible for removal from the sexual offender registry because section 943.0435 bars removal for offenders convicted of sexual battery and, additionally, at the time of the petition, appellee had not been released from sanction for at least twenty-five years. We agree.
“The question of whether a statute applies retroactively or prospectively is a pure question of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo.” Bionetics Corp. v. Kenniasty, 69 So. 3d 943, 947 (Fla. 2011).
The threshold issue is which version of section 943.0435 applies to appellee’s petition. Appellee contends the version in effect at the time his supervision ended in 2000 applies, while FDLE asserts that the version in effect when appellee filed his petition in 2024 applies. We agree with FDLE and find that the trial court erred by applying the 2000 version of the
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statute. 4
In determining whether a statute applies retroactively, a court considers (1) whether the statute itself expresses an intent that it apply retroactively and (2) whether retroactive application is constitutional. Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass’n One, Inc., 986 So. 2d 1279, 1284 (Fla. 2008). The “general rule is that a substantive statute will not operate retrospectively absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, but that a procedural or remedial statute is to operate retrospectively.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 61 (Fla. 1995). “[S]ubstantive law prescribes duties and rights” whereas procedural law concerns itself with “the means and methods to apply and enforce those duties and rights.” Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994).
Section 943.0435 does not express an intent that it apply retroactively.
Still, applying the version of the statute in effect when appellee filed his petition is constitutionally permissible because section 943.0435 is procedural rather than substantive. This court and other courts have recognized that the registration and reporting requirements of section 943.0435 are “procedural in nature.” Simmons, 753 So. 2d at 763; see also Freeland, 832 So. 2d at 923; Givens, 851 So. 2d at 814-15. Even Korson acknowledged that “‘section 943.0435 is procedural in nature’ and may properly be applied retroactively” and that “the current version of section 943.0435” governs a petition for removal. 413 So. 3d at 209 (quoting Givens, 851 So. 2d at 814-15). Because section 943.0435 is procedural, it may be applied retroactively so long as doing so does not impair vested rights. Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 61.
No vested rights are implicated here. “A substantive vested right is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future enjoyment.” Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 1987) (citation omitted). “To be vested a right must be more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a demand.” Id. (citation and emphasis omitted). A cause
4 FDLE also argues appellee would remain subject to the federal Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), which generally requires lifetime registration for certain tier III offenders. See 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911(4), 20915(a). Because appellee is ineligible for removal under section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (2024), we need not decide whether appellee’s Florida conviction would qualify as a tier III offense under SORNA or what effect, if any, SORNA would have on the relief sought in this proceeding.
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of action becomes a substantive vested right when it accrues. Williams v. Am. Optical Corp., 985 So. 2d 23, 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), aff’d sub nom. Am. Optical Corp. v. Spiewak, 73 So. 3d 120 (Fla. 2011).
We find that appellee had no vested right to seek removal of the sexual offender registration requirement when the legislature amended section 943.0435 in 2007. At the time of the amendment, appellee had not satisfied the statutory prerequisites necessary to petition for removal of the registration requirement because he had not been released from sanction for twenty years. Thus, appellee had no accrued or vested right to seek removal under the statute. Instead, he had only a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law, which is not a vested right. Clausell, 515 So. 2d at 1276.
Section 943.0435(11) establishes threshold eligibility requirements that must be satisfied before a court may consider removing a registrant from Florida’s sexual offender registry. Appellee did not satisfy the statutory prerequisites for removal because he had not been released from sanction for twenty-five years when he filed his petition. Moreover, and more importantly, his conviction for sexual battery independently rendered him ineligible for relief under the present statute.
Thus, because the current version of section 943.0435 governs appellee’s 2024 petition, and appellee did not satisfy that statute’s eligibility requirements, the trial court erred in granting his petition for removal and in denying FDLE’s motion to vacate. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to grant FDLE’s motion to vacate and to strike the trial court’s order removing appellee from the sexual offender registry.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
GROSS and FORST, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.