FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS vs JONATTAN MANUEL ROBLES AND STATE OF FLORIDA

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: May 13, 2022
• Docket: 22-0077
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 5D22-77 LT Case No. 2018-CF-011960-A-O

JONATTAN MANUEL ROBLES AND STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondents.

________________________________/

Opinion filed May 13, 2022

Petition for Certiorari Review of Order from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Renee A. Roche, Judge.

Mark S. Urban, Deputy General Counsel, of Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

William R. Ponall, of Ponall Law, Maitland, for Respondent, Jonattan Manuel Robles.

No Appearance for Respondent, State of Florida.

PER CURIAM. The Florida Department of Corrections (“DOC”) petitions for a writ of

certiorari to quash an order that directs DOC to permit Respondent, Jonattan

Manuel Robles, to have supervised visitation with his three minor children

while incarcerated in a State of Florida prison. Because the order departs

from the essential requirements of law and DOC has no remedy on appeal,

we grant the petition.

Robles is serving a life sentence after being convicted of various sex

offenses. In his criminal case, Robles, through counsel, filed a motion for

visitation with his minor children. DOC, an interested nonparty, was not

served with the motion. The trial court granted the motion two days later.

Thereafter, DOC timely filed this petition.

“We have jurisdiction because DOC’s nonparty status deprives it of an

adequate remedy by direct appeal.” Fla. Dep’t of Corr. v. Grubbs, 884 So. 2d

1147, 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The trial court’s order constitutes a departure

of the essential requirements of law because the trial court lacked the

authority to enter an order compelling DOC to allow visitation privileges to an

inmate. See Moore v. Peavey, 729 So. 2d 494, 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (“We

agree with DOC that matters of visitation should be left within the discretion

of DOC . . . . [U]ltimately, the trial court’s order usurped the authority of DOC

2 to exercise its lawful discretion in these matters, and has thereby violated the

separation of powers doctrine.”); see also Moore v. Perez, 756 So. 2d 1086,

1087 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (quashing order compelling DOC to allow visitation

privileges to inmate in DOC custody).

We grant DOC’s petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order of the

trial court.

PETITION GRANTED.

EISNAUGLE and SASSO, JJ., concur. EVANDER, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.

3 EVANDER, J., concurring specially. Case No. 5D22-77 LT Case No. 2018-CF-11960-A-O

I would also observe that the trial court’s order constituted a departure

from the essential requirements of law because DOC was entitled to notice

and an opportunity to be heard. See Singletary v. Duggins, 724 So. 2d 1234,

1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (order quashed where DOC was not given notice

of proceedings).