Flores v. United States

• Court: United States Court of Federal Claims
• Decided: April 3, 2023
• Docket: 23-194
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims ERIC FLORES,

Plaintiff, No. 23-cv-194 v. Filed: April 3, 2023 THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Eric Flores, Washington, D.C., appearing pro se.

Kristin Elaine Olson, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., appearing for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Eric Flores, appearing pro se, seeks redress against the United States for alleged

violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, tortious conduct, and violations of criminal law.

Complaint (ECF No. 1) (Compl.) at 2–22. 1 Presently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) (IFP Motion) and the United States’

(Defendant’s) Response in Opposition to Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis and Motion for

Summary Dismissal (Summary Dismissal Motion). ECF No. 7 (Mot.). Defendant contends

Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed because it lodges claims outside of this Court’s

jurisdiction and is frivolous. Id. For the reasons stated below, this Court GRANTS Defendant’s

Summary Dismissal Motion (ECF No. 7), DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1)

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims

(Rule(s)), and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (ECF No. 2).

1 Citations in this Memorandum and Order reference the ECF-assigned page numbers, which do not always correspond to the pagination within the document. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has filed hundreds of cases in the federal court system over the past fifteen years.

See, e.g., Flores v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. GJH-15-3007, 2015 WL 13235211 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2015)

(stating a review of PACER “reveal[ed] [Plaintiff] has filed approximately . . . 240 cases” in federal

courts). These cases included two filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims in 2011

(Consolidated Flores), which attempted to bring a class action and alleged the “Government has

been using satellites from outer space to ‘calculate[] a genetic code to inflict . . . genetic [viruses

causing] severe pain.’” Flores, et al. v. United States (Consolidated Flores), Nos. 11-110C & 11-

127C, 2011 WL 1457142, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 8, 2011) (Miller, J.). After consolidation, the two

cases were dismissed sua sponte “for lack of jurisdiction and because [Plaintiff’s] claims are

frivolous.” Id.

On November 8, 2022 — eleven years after that dismissal and entry of that judgment —

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(d)(3). Motion to Vacate

Judgment, Consolidated Flores, Nos. 11-110C & 11-127C (Fed. Cl. Nov. 8, 2022), ECF No. 7.

The Honorable Elaine D. Kaplan denied Plaintiff’s motion on November 22, 2022, explaining that

while Plaintiff’s motion was not time-barred, its allegations were vague and failed to demonstrate

that improper influence or fraud tainted the court’s prior adjudication of the case. Order Denying

Motion to Vacate Judgment, Consolidated Flores, Nos. 11-110C & 11-127C (Fed. Cl. Nov. 22,

2022) (Kaplan, C.J.), ECF No. 8. On November 30, 2022, Plaintiff appealed the denial of his

Motion to Vacate Judgment, which appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit (Federal Circuit) dismissed due to Plaintiff’s failure to timely file a brief as required by

Federal Circuit rules. Notice of Appeal, Consolidated Flores, Nos. 11-110C & 11-127C (Fed. Cl.

Nov. 30, 2022), ECF No. 9; Flores, et al. v. United States, 2023-1243, 2023 WL 2493756 (Fed.

2 Cir. Mar. 14, 2023).

On December 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed a pleading in Consolidated Flores styled as a

“Petition Against [Fabricated] Judgment,” as well as two motions to set aside the court’s

November 22, 2022 denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Judgment. Petition Against Fabricated

Judgment, Consolidated Flores, Nos. 11-110C & 11-127C (Fed. Cl. Dec. 27, 2022), ECF No. 10.

In denying Plaintiff’s two motions and “Petition,” the court entered an anti-filing order instructing

the Clerk of the United States Court of Federal Claims to accept no further filings by Plaintiff in

the consolidated cases. Anti-filing Order Denying Petition Against Fabricated Judgment,

Consolidated Flores, Nos. 11-110C & 11-127C (Fed. Cl. Dec. 27, 2022), ECF No. 11.

Plaintiff filed his present Complaint (ECF No. 1) on February 6, 2023, arguing allegedly

corrupt federal government officials used advanced technology to “take physical control” of

individuals and forced them to commit “terroristic” acts. Compl. at 8–9. According to the

Complaint, these alleged acts that used such advanced technology included the 2012 Sandy Hook

Elementary School shooting, the 2018 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting, the 2017

shooting in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the 2015 crash of a Texas Department of Criminal Justice bus

transporting inmates. Id. at 9–15. Plaintiff’s Complaint further alleges government actors at the

United States Department of Justice, the United States Department of Defense, and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation acted negligently in closing complaints Plaintiff filed concerning his

“mind controlling computers” assertions. Id. at 18–19. Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint

characterizes federal courts’ past dismissals of Plaintiff’s complaints as invalid, stating “corrupt

government officials have [fabricated] documents [resembling] legitimate federal district court

judgements that falsely portrayed to dismiss the [Plaintiff’s] cause of actions as frivolous.” Id. at

20–21. As relief, Plaintiff seeks $280 million in damages, the appointment of a grand jury to

3 investigate his allegations of misconduct, directed indictments, increased security measures for

public buildings, and having a medical examiner “revive” the victims of tragedies outlined in his

Complaint. Compl. at 28–30.

On the same day he filed his Complaint, Plaintiff also moved for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (IFP). Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). Defendant filed its

Summary Dismissal Motion on February 24, 2023, arguing for dismissal of the Complaint under

Rule 12(b)(1), dismissal of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and denial of Plaintiff’s IFP

Motion due to Plaintiff’s history of lodging frivolous filings in federal courts. Mot. This Court

subsequently stayed Defendant’s obligation to respond to the Complaint until after it ruled on

Defendant’s Summary Dismissal Motion. See Order, ECF No. 8. Plaintiff did not file a response

to Defendant’s Summary Dismissal Motion.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) require this Court to dismiss an action if it “determines at any

time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction” over it. Rule 12(h)(3). This duty is also reflected in

28 U.S.C. § 1915, which governs the granting of IFP status to litigants and demands this Court

dismiss a case “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is considered frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis

either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see Hastings v. United

States, No. 22-cv-1705, 2023 WL 2401196, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 8, 2023).

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, provides this Court with jurisdiction over “any claim

against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any

regulation of an executive department, . . . or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not

4 sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign

immunity for “certain claims for monetary relief against the United States,” but it does not create

a right to relief itself. Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014);

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 218 (1983). To establish a right to relief under the

Tucker Act, a “substantive right must be found in some other source of law.” Mitchell, 463 U.S.

at 216; see Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[J]urisdiction under the

Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the

United States separate from the Tucker Act itself.”). The constitutional, statutory, or regulatory

provision must be “fairly . . . interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government

for the damage sustained.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976) (internal quotations

omitted). Thus, this Court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act does not extend to “every claim

invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation.” Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216.

Additionally, this Court’s jurisdiction does not extend to cases against private parties or

government employees in their individual capacities. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.

584, 588 (1941) (discussing how the Court of Federal Claims’ limited jurisdiction does not include

relief “against others than the United States”); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed.

Cir. 1997) (“The Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits against the

United States, not against individual federal officials.”). This Court must dismiss claims outside

its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).

In considering dismissal, this Court must liberally construe a complaint filed by a pro se

plaintiff because pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(internal quotations omitted); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Although held

5 to a less stringent standard, pro se plaintiffs must still prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Curry v. United States, 787 F. App’x 720, 722

(Fed. Cir. 2019); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988);

Kelley v. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987). While a pro se complaint may

include ambiguities, pro se filing status “does not excuse [] failures” on the merits. Henke v.

United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court may grant IFP status to a pro se plaintiff who “submits an

affidavit . . . that the person is unable to pay [requisite filing fees] or give security therefor,”

allowing the plaintiff to proceed without the payment of such fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The

granting of IFP status is not mandatory but done at the discretion of the court. See Chamberlain

v. United States, 655 F. App’x 822, 825 (Fed. Cir. 2016). A court considering a request to proceed

IFP has a “duty to deny in forma pauperis status to those individuals who have abused the system,”

In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991), so as to “discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial

and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because

of the cost of bringing suit.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. When considering a motion to proceed

IFP, this Court “is free to consider a history of frivolous filing in determining whether to grant a

motion to proceed in forma pauperis.” Straw v. United States, 2021-1600 & 2021-1602, 2021 WL

3440773, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2021).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings constitutional, tort, and criminal law claims against Defendant, none of

which fall within this Court’s limited subject matter jurisdiction. As this Court lacks jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s claims, it must dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and

6 12(h)(3) and must accordingly deny Plaintiff’s IFP Motion as moot. Further, due to the frivolous

nature of Plaintiff’s Complaint and his long history of such filings, this Court enjoins Plaintiff

from filing further complaints in the United States Court of Federal Claims under certain

circumstances without first obtaining leave to file from the Chief Judge.

I. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims Must Be Dismissed

Plaintiff contends the dismissals of his previous lawsuits by various federal courts violate

“his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment[s] of the United States

Constitution.” Compl. at 2. While the Tucker Act confers subject matter jurisdiction over money-

mandating constitutional claims, per 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), the Federal Circuit has expressly held

the United States Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims arising under the Due

Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Black v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 177,

186 (1993), aff’d, 16 F.3d 421 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); LeBlanc

v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clauses). Accordingly, this Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s constitutional claims for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. Plaintiff’s Tort Claim Must Be Dismissed

Plaintiff contends that under the doctrine of respondeat superior Plaintiff is liable “for its

governmental employee negligent torturious [sic] conduct of failure to prosecute a complaint by a

private citizen of a terrorist attack,” which this Court liberally construes as an attempt to bring a

tort claim against Defendant. Compl. at 18, 20. The Tucker Act expressly states this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over such claims sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Rick’s

Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Brown v. United

States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see Straw, 4 F.4th at 1361 (“The [Court of Federal

7 Claims] was also correct in holding that [plaintiff’s] claim is in essence a tort claim, which is

outside the jurisdiction of the . . . Court under the Tucker Act.”); Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d

1454, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating the Court of Federal Claims cannot decide questions of tort

liability); Hartman v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 794, 797–98 (2020) (dismissing a pro se

complaint containing claims sounding in tort); Redd v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 602, 607 (2020)

(same); Starnes v. United States, 162 Fed. Cl. 468, 473–74 (2022) (same). Plaintiff’s claims

concerning the “negligent” behavior of government agencies thus are not within this Court’s

jurisdiction. See Compl. at 20. This Court accordingly DISMISSES Plaintiff’s tort claims for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

III. Plaintiff’s Criminal Law Claims Must Be Dismissed

Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests Defendant is guilty of criminal conspiracy, murder in the

first degree, and of “providing material support to aid and abide terrorism” in violation of federal

criminal statute 18 U.S.C § 2339(A). Compl. at 20–21, 24. These claims must be dismissed as it

is well established that this Court lacks jurisdiction over claims of criminal conduct and “has no

jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code.” Joshua v.

United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Johnson v. United States, 144 Fed. Cl. 578, 582

(2019) (“The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims does not include jurisdiction

over criminal causes of action.”) (citations omitted); Zhengxing v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 732,

739 (2006) (same); Perales v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 495, 498 (2010) (same). Accordingly,

this Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s criminal law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IV. Even Assuming Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Claims, Plaintiff’s Complaint Must Be Dismissed as Frivolous Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

Even assuming this Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, it must dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Section 1915 provides the procedures for

8 federal courts to consider and grant requests for IFP status, including a requirement that such courts

“dismiss [a] case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious,”

regardless of whether the litigant has paid the filing fees or been granted IFP status. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e). This screening provision thus obliges this Court to consider whether Plaintiff’s

Complaint is frivolous such that it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” and if so, to

summarily dismiss it. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains vague legal claims clearly outside of

this Court’s jurisdiction that are based solely on factual allegations so outlandish as to be

unbelievable. See supra Discussion Sections I–III (dismissing Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rules

12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Compl. at 5–30 (detailing Plaintiff’s

factual allegations concerning mind control and the impersonation of federal judges). While

Plaintiff may very well believe his allegations, their fantastical nature coupled with a paucity of

factual support means the Complaint lacks a credible basis in fact or in law. See Hastings, 2023

WL 2401196, at *5 (finding a complaint to be frivolous where plaintiff sought “extraordinary

relief” while providing “minimal specificity as to the allegations and relevant facts”).

Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous and would be subject to

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) in the event this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claims.

V. Plaintiff’s History of Frivolous Filings Would Preclude IFP Status

Since this Court lacks subject matter over Plaintiff’s claims and finds the Complaint to be

frivolous, this Court is required to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Rules 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is therefore moot. However, even if this Court had

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, it would still deny Plaintiff’s IFP Motion due to Plaintiff’s long

9 history of frivolous filings in federal courts. In considering Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, this Court has

a duty to deny IFP status should it determine Plaintiff has abused the judicial system with frivolous

filings, and this Court is free to consider Plaintiff’s filing history in making its decision. In re

Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180; Straw, 2021 WL 3440773, at *6.

As discussed above, Plaintiff is a prolific filer in the federal courts system, consistently

alleging extraordinary and unbelievable schemes by government actors. See supra Background

Section; see, e.g., Flores v. U.S. Att’y Gen., Nos. Civ. 15-5026 & Civ. 15-5028, 2015 WL 3644836,

at *3 (D.S.D. June 10, 2015) (“Mr. Flores has a lengthy history of frivolous and vexatious filings

. . . .”); Flores, 2015 WL 13235211, at *1; Flores v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 3:15-cv-217, 2015 WL

3949090, at *2 (D. Nev. June 29, 2015) (observing that Plaintiff “has made identical or similar

filings in at least twenty-five other district courts across the country”); Flores v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

No. 1:15-cv-644, 2015 WL 2260551, at *3 (D. Or. May 12, 2015) (describing Plaintiff’s claims

“of government employees directing satellite transmissions at Mexican-American citizens”).

Federal courts — including the United States Supreme Court — have responded by dismissing

Plaintiff’s complaints as frivolous, enjoining Plaintiff from filing further pro se complaints, and

by ordering monetary sanctions against Plaintiff. See, e.g., Flores v. Holder, 566 U.S. 984 (2012)

(denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, stating Plaintiff “has repeatedly

abused [the Supreme] Court’s process,” and directing the Clerk of the Court to not accept “any

further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee . . . is paid and the

petition [complies] with Rule 33.1”); Flores v. Moore, 700 F. App’x 367, 367 (5th Cir. 2017) (per

curiam) (dismissing Plaintiff’s appeal as frivolous and imposing a monetary sanction of $100).

In the Court of Federal Claims specifically, Plaintiff filed two complaints consolidated and

dismissed as frivolous in 2011. Consolidated Flores, 2011 WL 1457142, at *5. Plaintiff followed

10 up eleven years later, in 2022, by filing a Motion to Vacate Judgment, which the court denied as

frivolous. Order Denying Motion to Vacate Judgment, Consolidated Flores, Nos. 11-110C & 11-

127C (Fed. Cl. Nov. 22, 2022) (Kaplan, C.J.), ECF No. 8. Plaintiff responded to that denial by

filing three documents — two motions and one document styed as a “Petition Against Fabricated

Judgment” — requesting the court’s denial of the Motion to Vacate Judgment be set aside. Petition

Against Fabricated Judgment, Consolidated Flores, Nos. 11-110C & 11-127C (Fed. Cl. Dec. 27,

2022), ECF No. 10. In denying Plaintiff’s “Petition” and accompanying motions as frivolous, the

court also issued an anti-filing order directing the Clerk of Court to accept no further filings from

Plaintiff in case numbers 11-110C & 11-127C. Anti-filing Order Denying Petition Against

Fabricated Judgment, Consolidated Flores, Nos. 11-110C & 11-127C (Fed. Cl. Dec. 27, 2022),

ECF No. 11.

Any review of Plaintiff’s filing history in the Court of Federal Claims and in federal courts

generally leaves no doubt that Plaintiff has abused the federal judicial system through the repeated

filing of frivolous complaints. Even assuming this Court did not dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or dismiss the action as

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), Plaintiff’s voluminous filing history would disqualify him

from receiving IFP status and this Court would accordingly deny Plaintiff’s IFP Motion on that

ground.

VI. Anti-Filing Order

As Plaintiff has repeatedly filed complaints which needlessly consume the resources of this

Court and other federal courts, this Court enters the following anti-filing injunction: Effective

immediately, Plaintiff Eric Flores is ENJOINED from filing new complaints pro se in this Court

without first obtaining leave to file from the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Federal

11 Claims. If Plaintiff seeks to file a new complaint in this Court, he shall submit a Motion for Leave

to File and explain why the new complaint is timely and properly before the Court. Any motion

for leave to file a new complaint must also include as an attachment the complaint Plaintiff intends

to file. The complaint must satisfy the requirements of Rule 8. In the event the Court grants a

motion for leave to file a new complaint, Plaintiff will be required to pay the Court’s full filing fee

to proceed. Notwithstanding the prior restrictions, Plaintiff may file a new complaint without first

submitting a Motion for Leave if the complaint is signed and filed by an attorney who is duly

licensed and authorized to practice law under the laws of at least one state or territory of the United

States or the District of Columbia and is a member in good standing of the Bar of the United States

Court of Federal Claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Dismissal (ECF No. 7) is

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(h)(3) without leave to replead, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis

(ECF No. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT.

The Clerk of Court shall REJECT all future filings in this case that are not in accordance

with the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Plaintiff is ENJOINED from filing new complaints pro se in the United States Court of

Federal Claims without first obtaining leave to file from the Chief Judge.

Notwithstanding the prior restrictions, Plaintiff may file a new complaint without first

obtaining leave to file if his complaint is signed and filed by an attorney who is duly licensed and

authorized to practice law under the laws of at least one state or territory of the United States or

12 the District of Columbia and is a member in good standing of the Bar of the United States Court

of Federal Claims.

Finally, this Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this

Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the

purpose of an appeal. See Harrison v. United States, No. 2020-1765, 2020 WL 6482121, at *1

(Fed. Cir. July 21, 2020). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter Judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Eleni M. Roumel ELENI M. ROUMEL Judge

April 3, 2023 Washington, D.C.