Flores v. Town of Islip

382 F. Supp. 3d 197
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMay 28, 2019
Docket2:18-cv-3549 (ADS)(GRB)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 382 F. Supp. 3d 197 (Flores v. Town of Islip) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flores v. Town of Islip, 382 F. Supp. 3d 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

SPATT, District Judge.

This is an action brought under Section Two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, *20552 U.S.C. § 10301 et seq ("VRA"). The plaintiffs, Hispanic residents of the Town of Islip (the "Town" or "Islip") as well as two community advocacy organizations, contest the at-large voting procedure used in the Town to elect the four councilpersons of the Town Board of the Town of Islip (the "Town Board") (together with the Town, the "Islip Defendants"). The Plaintiffs complain that the at-large system dilutes the voting strength of the Hispanic minority, in violation of the VRA. They seek a preliminary injunction that enjoins the Islip Defendants and the Suffolk County Board of Elections ("BOE") from holding elections for the Town Board under the current system and establishes a transition to single-member districts for all future elections. The BOE has not taken a position in this litigation but objects to the issuance of a preliminary injunction. In response to this motion, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which 16 witnesses testified over a period of 12 days. The hearing concluded with closing arguments on May 2, 2019 and the Court reserved its decision.

In deciding the instant motion, the Court notes that "enjoining an election is an 'extraordinary remedy' involving far-reaching power, which is almost never exercised by federal courts prior to a determination on the merits[.]" Cano v. Davis , 191 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting Oden v. Brittain , 396 U.S. 1210, 1211, 90 S.Ct. 4, 24 L.Ed.2d 32 (1969) ).

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Preliminary Injunction

In general, a preliminary injunction may be granted when the party seeking the injunction shows that (1) absent injunctive relief, she will suffer irreparable injury and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of the claims to make them a fair ground for litigation, and a balance of hardships tips decidedly in her favor. N. Am. Soccer League, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed'n, Inc. , 883 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2018) ; Wright v. Giuliani , 230 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 2000) ; Brenntag Int'l Chems., Inc. v. Bank of India , 175 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1999). If, on the other hand, "the moving party seeks a preliminary injunction that will affect government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, the injunction will be granted only if the moving party meets the more rigorous likelihood-of-success standard." No Spray Coal., Inc. v. City of New York , 252 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

As here, when the movant seeks an injunction against the government that "will alter rather than maintain the status quo, the movant must show ... [a] substantial likelihood of success." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Torres v. New York State Bd. of Elections , 462 F.3d 161, 183 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[w]here ... the relief that plaintiffs seek either (1) stays governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory scheme, or (2) mandates an affirmative action, plaintiffs must demonstrate a 'clear' or 'substantial' likelihood of success on the merits of their claim"), rev'd on other grounds , 552 U.S. 196, 128 S.Ct. 791, 169 L.Ed.2d 665 (2008) ; see, e.g. , Pankos Diner Corp. v. Nassau Cty. Leg. , 321 F.Supp.2d 520, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (requiring a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits where the plaintiffs sought "to enjoin enforcement of and, ultimately, void a statute that was already in effect at the time that the Complaint was filed").

An injunction in this case will alter the status quo by not only enjoining the Town *206and the BOE from holding elections under the current at-large structure, but requiring a transition to single-member districts on a preliminary basis. As a result, the Plaintiffs are required to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. See Queens Cty. Republican Comm. ex rel. Maltese v. New York State Bd. of Elections , 222 F.Supp.2d 341, 345-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (Spatt, J.). In addition, the Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction and that it is in the public interest "to grant injunctive relief [when] faced with an impending election." Montano v. Suffolk Cty. Legislature , 268 F.Supp.2d 243, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (Spatt, J.).

B. Voting Rights Act

Section Two of the VRA, as amended, establishes the following:

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382 F. Supp. 3d 197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flores-v-town-of-islip-nyed-2019.