Flores v. Mediation Services

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJanuary 19, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-09849
StatusUnknown

This text of Flores v. Mediation Services (Flores v. Mediation Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flores v. Mediation Services, (N.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JORGE FLORES, Case No. 21-cv-09849-JSC

8 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER PURSUANT TO 9 v. 28 U.S.C. § 1915

10 MEDIATION SERVICES, Re: Dkt. No. 1 Defendant. 11

12 13 The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Dkt. 14 No. 5.) It must now review the complaint’s allegations under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Because 15 Plaintiff’s claims do not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the Court gives Plaintiff 16 the opportunity to amend the complaint. 17 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 18 Defendant “regularly operate[s] as [a] third-party debt collector[].” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 6.) On 19 October 9, 2020, Defendant called Plaintiff and left the following pre-recorded voicemail 20 message: Our offices are trying to get in touch with you in regards to a personal 21 business matter. If you could please take the time to return our call, we would very much appreciate speaking with you directly. We can 22 be reached at 833-506-0359. Our office is open from 9:00am to 5:00pm. Thank you. 23 24 (Id. ¶ 8.) Concerned, Plaintiff retained counsel. On November 2, 2021,1 Plaintiff’s counsel called 25 Defendant at the phone number provided. “Defendants confirmed that they were attempting to 26 collect a consumer debt from [Plaintiff].” (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff’s counsel informed Defendant that 27 1 Plaintiff was represented. 2 On December 16, 17, and 18, 2020, Defendant called Plaintiff and left the same pre- 3 recorded voicemail. On December 21, 2020, Defendant called Plaintiff twice and left the same 4 pre-recorded voicemail. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel consented to Defendant communicating 5 directly with Plaintiff. 6 Plaintiff brings claims for violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 7 (“FDCPA”) and California’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”). 8 LEGAL STANDARD 9 A court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service of process if it is 10 frivolous, fails to state a claim, or contains a complete defense to the action on its face. 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e)(2) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 12(b)(6) regarding dismissals for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also 13 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000). The complaint therefore must allege 14 facts that plausibly establish each defendant’s liability. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 15 544, 555-57 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 16 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 17 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 18 A complaint must also comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires the 19 complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 20 to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Moss v. Infinity Ins. Co., No. 15-CV-03456-JSC, 2015 21 WL 5360294, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2015). “While the federal rules require brevity in 22 pleading, a complaint nevertheless must be sufficient to give the defendants ‘fair notice’ of the 23 claim and the ‘grounds upon which it rests.’” Coleman v. Beard, No. 14-CV-05508-YGR (PR), 24 2015 WL 395662, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2015) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 25 (2007)). A complaint that fails to state a defendant’s specific acts “that violated the plaintiff’s 26 rights fails to meet the notice requirements of Rule 8(a).” Medina Chiprez v. Becerra, No. 20-CV- 27 00307-YGR (PR), 2020 WL 4284825, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2020) (citing Hutchinson v. 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. FDCPA 3 The FDCPA regulates “debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). A debt collector 4 “include[s]: (1) any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in 5 any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, and (2) any person who 6 regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be 7 owed or due another.” Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013) 8 (cleaned up). To state a claim for a violation of the FDCPA by a debt collector, a “complaint must 9 plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that [defendant] is a 10 debt collector.” Id. (cleaned up). 11 Counts one, two, three, and four of Plaintiff’s complaint allege violations of FDCPA 12 provisions that “apply only to debt collectors.” Id. (cleaned up); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 13 1692e(11), 1692g(a), 1692c(a)(2). As to whether Defendant is a debt collector, the complaint 14 alleges only that Defendant “regularly operate[s] as [a] third-party debt collector[],” is a “‘debt 15 collector[]’ as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1692a,” and “confirmed that they were attempting to collect a 16 consumer debt from [Plaintiff].” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 6, 10.) The former two are conclusory statements, 17 and the latter is a factual allegation that is insufficient to support a plausible inference that 18 Defendant meets either definition of a debt collector. Plaintiff’s complaint “fails to provide any 19 factual basis from which we could plausibly infer that the principal purpose of [Defendant’s] 20 business is debt collection.” Schlegel, 720 F.3d at 1209; see McAdory v. M.N.S. & Assocs., LLC, 21 952 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The complaint alleged that [defendant] lacks any other 22 business purpose besides debt collection. These allegations are sufficient to allege that 23 [defendant] is a debt collector” under the “principal purpose prong.”). Nor does the complaint 24 make “factual allegations from which we could plausibly infer that [Defendant] regularly collects 25 debts owed to someone other than [Defendant].” Schlegel, 720 F.3d at 1209. As such, the 26 complaint does not allege facts that plausibly support an inference that Defendant is a debt 27 collector under either definition. I. Rosenthal Act

2 The Rosenthal Act defines “debt collector” as “any person who, in the ordinary course of 3 business, regularly, on behalf of that person or others, engages in debt collection,” including “any 4 person who composes and sells, or offers to compose and sell, forms, letters, and other collection 5 || media used or intended to be used for debt collection.” Cal. Civ.

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Related

Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Schlegel Ex Rel. Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA
720 F.3d 1204 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Jillian McAdory v. Dnf Associates, LLC
952 F.3d 1089 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Flores v. Mediation Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flores-v-mediation-services-cand-2022.