Flores v. Arizona

172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20799, 2000 WL 33647332
CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJanuary 24, 2000
Docket92-596-TUC-ACM
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (Flores v. Arizona) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flores v. Arizona, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20799, 2000 WL 33647332 (D. Ariz. 2000).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

MARQUEZ, Senior District Judge.

August 20, 1992, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking declaratory relief against the Defendants for failing to provide limited English proficient (LEP) children with a program of instruction calculated to make them proficient in speaking, understanding, reading, and writing English, while enabling them to master the standard aca *1226 demic curriculum as required of all students. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (failure to provide English instruction to students of Chinese decent who do not speak English denies them a meaningful opportunity to participate in public education and violates Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d). Plaintiffs charge that the Defendants fail to adequately fund, administer and oversee the public school system in districts enrolling predominantly low-income minority children, and that Defendants ahow these schools to provide less educational benefits and opportunities than those provided to students who attend predominantly anglo-schools.

On August 28, 1997, this Court certified the case as a class action law suit and defined the class as follows: all minority “at risk” and limited English proficient children (LEP), now or hereafter, enrolled in Nogales Unified School District (NUSD), as well as their parents and guardians.” (Order filed August 28, 1997 at 4-5.)

After an arduous history, which has previously been described in detail (Order filed April 14, 1999 at 7-13), the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § ■ 1983, but held that Plaintiffs’ LAU claims could proceed under the Equal Education Act of 1974 (EEOA), (Title 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f)), 1 and that Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim could be brought under the implementing regulations. ( 34 C.F.R. Part 100), for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (42 U.S.C. § 2000d). 2 (Order filed April 14, 1999 at 2-7.) The Court set the matter for trial to determine whether Defendants fail to provide adequately for the instruction of LEP students and other “at risk” minority students attending public school systems in districts like NUSD. (Order filed April 14, 1999 at 11.)

The Court held a three-day bench trial, beginning on August 16,1999. The parties presented live testimony and stipulated to admit into evidence all exhibits. The trial addressed only two specific issues because the parties reported that a Consent Decree disposed of the majority of Plaintiffs’ LAU claims. (Minute Entry August 18, 1999.) The following issues were tried: 1) whether or not Defendants’ adequately fund and oversee the LAU program in NUSD, and 2) whether or not the AIMS test disparately impacts minority students at NUSD. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint did not include the AIMS challenge; nevertheless, the Court heard the parties’ arguments and finds that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence at trial to make a prima facie case of disparate impact. Accordingly, the Court considers the evidence regarding academic performance only as it is indicative of deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ education.

The cause having come to trial, before the Court sitting without a jury, with Timothy M. Hogan and William Morris appearing as counsel for Plaintiffs, and Roger W. Hall appearing as counsel for Defendants, the State of Arizona, et. al.;

*1227 The Court having heard the testimony and having examined the proofs offered by the parties, and having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised herein, the Court now finds generally in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants, and hereby makes the following special Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) and (c) which constitutes the decision of the Court herein:

FINDINGS OF FACT

To the extent these Findings of Fact are also deemed to be Conclusions of Law, they are hereby incorporated into the Conclusions of Law that follow.

1. The public elementary and secondary schools of Arizona, including NUSD, are financed by a combination of revenues from local, county, state and federal sources. Federal funding sources make up a very small percentage of total funds for Arizona’s schools. For example in 1991-1992, federal revenues were only 6.5% of the State’s total school revenues. In main part. Arizona School Districts are funded from local and state revenues. (Ps’ Ex. 16: Boreher Report (1993).)

2. The minimum level of funding per student or (Base Revenue Control Limit (BRCL)) derives from a 1979-80 cost study which determined the amount of money being spent per student at that time. Transportation costs (Transportation Revenue Control Limit (TRCL)) are added to the BRCL to derive the revenue control limit (RCL) for each district, and then there are add-ons for capital outlay. There are two different funds for capital outlay. One is the Capital Outlay Revenue Limit (CORL) which may be spent on capital expenditures or shifted to maintenance and operations. The other is the Capital Levy Revenue Limit (CLRL) which is exclusively for capital improvements. (Day 1, TR at 4-50); (Ps’ Ex. 16: Boreher Report (1993).)

3. Each district has a Revenue Control Limit (RCL), which is the sum of the BRCL and the TRCL (transportation funding, see ¶4). These funds and any CORL funds (capital outlay funding, see ¶ 4) which the district has shifted to operations make up the State guaranteed amount of operational funding for a school district. (Day 1, TR at 4-50); (Ps’ Ex. 16: Boreher Report (1993).) Recent legislative changes to the State financing scheme, known as Students FIRST, provides more money for maintenance of buildings and additional technology and instructional materials. Funding increases from Students FIRST are largely capital in nature and NUSD did not experience any increase in its operational funding. (Day 1, TR at 31-34.)

4. The State’s financing scheme is basically a foundation program, which means that the State guarantees a minimum level of funding for each student to ensure that each student receives a basic education.

5. The base level amount in 1992-1993 was $2,410.26 per student. (Day 1, TR at 35); (Ps’ Ex. 16: Boreher Report (1993) at 6.) The legislature has increased the base level amount on an average of nine-tenths of a percent a year. (Day 1, TR at 35-36.) The inflation rate during the eight years has been an average of 2.8 % a year, or toughly three times more than funding increases by the State. (Day 1, TR at 35-36.) The current base level amount is approximately $3,174.11. (Day 1, TR at 17.)

6.

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Bluebook (online)
172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20799, 2000 WL 33647332, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flores-v-arizona-azd-2000.