Florentino De Los Santos v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: June 12, 2026
• Docket: 6D2025-0765
• Status: Published

Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________

Case No. 6D2025-0765 Lower Tribunal No. 2024-CF-000962 _____________________________

FLORENTINO DE LOS SANTOS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee. _____________________________

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County. Catherine L. Combee, Judge.

June 12, 2026

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Monroe v. State, 191 So. 3d 395, 401 (Fla. 2016), receded

from on other grounds by Steiger v. State, 328 So. 3d 926, 932 (Fla. 2021) (“There

are only two instances in which an unpreserved challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence can be reviewed: (1) the mandatory review by this Court of the evidence

by which a capital defendant was convicted and sentenced to death; and (2) when

there is insufficient evidence that a defendant committed any crime.”); Rosen v.

State, 940 So. 2d 1155, 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“This court has held that when conduct occurs as described in the statute, the question of whether the acts were

committed lewdly or lasciviously is one of fact. . . . Thus, it was up to the jury to

decide whether Rosen’s behavior violated the statute based upon the totality of the

circumstances. . . . Whether Rosen’s acts were intentional acts of a lewd and

lascivious nature depended on the jury’s factual determination of his intent when

he touched the children.”); State v. Santiago, 938 So. 2d 603, 605 (Fla. 4th DCA

2006) (“Whether Santiago acted with lewd or lascivious intent must be decided by

the trier of fact and is not subject to dismissal by the trial court upon Santiago’s

Motion to Dismiss.”); Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 2005) (“Like the

United States Supreme Court, we have been reluctant to declare a sentence cruel or

unusual simply because of its length. . . . As we have stated more than once, ‘the

length of the sentence actually imposed is generally said to be a matter of

legislative prerogative.’ . . . We noted in Hall [v. State, 823 So. 2d 757, 760 (Fla.

2002), abrogation on other grounds as recognized in State v. Johnson, 122 So. 3d

856, 862 (Fla. 2013),] that both ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and . . . article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution have

historically provided protection relative to the mode and method of punishment,

not the length of incarceration.’”).

STARGEL, NARDELLA and MIZE, JJ., concur.

2 Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Kimberly Nolen Hopkins, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and J. Wade Stidham, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED