Floreal v. State Attorney

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedSeptember 22, 2020
Docket1:20-cv-23360
StatusUnknown

This text of Floreal v. State Attorney (Floreal v. State Attorney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Floreal v. State Attorney, (S.D. Fla. 2020).

Opinion

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

Remy Floreal, Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) Civil Action No. 20-23360-Civ-Scola State Attorney / Prosecutor, ) Defendant. )

Order This matter is before the Court upon an independent review of the record and a screening of the complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff Remy Floreal, a pretrial detainee, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Defendant, an unnamed prosecutor, has violated his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights through an unlawful arrest and continued detention. (ECF No. 1.) The Plaintiff has listed “State Attorney/Prosecutor” as the Defendant. (Id.) Although this matter was automatically referred to United States Magistrate Judge Lisette M. Reid pursuant to Administrative Order 2019-2, the Court sua sponte withdrew the referral on September 4, 2020. I. Background The Plaintiff is presently being held at the Miami-Dade County Pretrial Detention Center. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) On June 4, 2019, the Plaintiff was arrested for an armed robbery and remained in custody until July 8, 2019 when he was released on his own recognizance. (Id. at 4.) According to the Plaintiff, the case was closed on July 15, 2019 for lack of evidence. (Id.) On July 24, 2019, unbeknownst to the Plaintiff, the charges were refiled. (Id.) The Plaintiff alleges that his attorney had no contact with him and conducted hearings without him. (Id.) On November 7, 2019, the Plaintiff was arrested for driving with an expired tag. (Id. at 5.) After his arrest, he was unable to “bond out” and was not told why. (Id.) He then learned that the armed robbery case had been refiled. (Id.) Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages in the amount of $8 million from Defendant in his official capacity. (Id.) He claims to have “suffered mental anguish, psychological distress, deprivation of [his] freedom and emotional distress.” (Id.) II. Legal Standard Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), where a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the complaint must be dismissed if the court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018). Pursuant to Section 1915, a case is also subject to dismissal where a plaintiff seeks redress from the government if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Id. In reviewing the complaint under § 1915(e), the court takes the allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Maps v. Miami Dade State Attorney, 693 F. App’x 784, 785 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Complaints filed by pro se prisoners are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)(per curiam). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), courts may dismiss as frivolous claims that are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or "whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001). In order to “avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). Although a pro se pleading is liberally construed, it must still “suggest that there is some factual support for a claim.” Id. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, the same standards govern dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court may dismiss a complaint that fails “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Although federal courts give liberal construction to pro se pleadings, courts “nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.” Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). Rule 8 requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). There is no required technical form, but “each allegation must be simple, concise, and the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 550 U.S. 544 at 555 (quotation omitted) (ellipses in original). Additionally, each separate claim should be presented in a separate numbered paragraph, with each paragraph “limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). “Precedent also teaches, however, that a court, of course, should not abandon its neutral role and begin creating arguments for a party, even an unrepresented one.” Sims v. Hastings, 375 F.Supp.2d 715, 718 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001)). When read liberally, a pro se pleading “should be interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].’” Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)). III. Discussion The Plaintiff is only seeking punitive damages; therefore the complaint should be dismissed because the Defendant has absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for damages.

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Rehberg v. Paulk
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Mitchell v. Farcass
112 F.3d 1483 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
Bilal v. Driver
251 F.3d 1346 (Eleventh Circuit, 2001)
Adem A. Albra v. Advan, Inc.
490 F.3d 826 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Imbler v. Pachtman
424 U.S. 409 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Rehberg v. Paulk
132 S. Ct. 1497 (Supreme Court, 2012)
Bobby J. Anderson v. Alfred Hardman
241 F.3d 544 (Seventh Circuit, 2001)
Sims v. Hastings
375 F. Supp. 2d 715 (N.D. Illinois, 2005)
Michael A. Maps v. Miami Dade Staff Attorney
693 F. App'x 784 (Eleventh Circuit, 2017)
Adam Keith Waldman v. Alabama Prison Commissioner
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Burgos v. Hopkins
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Graham v. Henderson
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Floreal v. State Attorney, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/floreal-v-state-attorney-flsd-2020.