Flood v. Village of Lomira, Board of Review

451 N.W.2d 422, 153 Wis. 2d 428, 1990 Wisc. LEXIS 90
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 22, 1990
Docket88-0862, 88-0863
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 451 N.W.2d 422 (Flood v. Village of Lomira, Board of Review) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flood v. Village of Lomira, Board of Review, 451 N.W.2d 422, 153 Wis. 2d 428, 1990 Wisc. LEXIS 90 (Wis. 1990).

Opinion

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.

This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals, Flood v. Village of Lomira, Board of Review, 149 Wis. 2d 220, 440 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1989), reversing a judgment of the *431 circuit court for Dodge county, Joseph E. Schultz, Judge. The circuit court affirmed the order of the village of Lomira board of review which sustained the assessor's valuation of Mark Flood's real property.

Flood challenges the board's assessment on two grounds: (1) The board relied solely on the sale price in determining market value, refusing to consider whether the seller's financing terms affected the sale price; and (2) the board assessed the property at six percent more than market value to reflect the equalized value of property established by the Department of Revenue pursuant to sec. 70.57, Stats. 1987-88.

Relying on State ex rel. Flint v. Kenosha County Rev. Bd., 126 Wis. 2d 152, 376 N.W.2d 364 (Ct. App. 1985), the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the board of review did not comply with sec. 70.32(1) when it determined market value without considering whether the financing terms between the seller and buyer affected the sale price. The court of appeals also concluded that the property assessment at six percent more than market value violated sec. 70.32(1), which requires real property to be assessed at full value.

We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. We hold that when a seller finances the purchase of property, sec. 70.32(1) requires the board of review to consider whether the financing terms between the seller and buyer affected the price of the real property in determining market value. We also hold that sec. 70.32(1) proscribes assessing real property in excess of market value.

This case has been before the board of review twice, the circuit court twice and the court of appeals once. The facts in this case are undisputed, and we shall state the facts and the procedural chronology in summary form.

*432 Flood purchased a mobile home park in September 1984 for $650,000. The seller financed the entire price through two fifteen-year mortgages. The first mortgage secured a note for $500,000 with a 10 percent interest rate; monthly payments on the note were to be applied to interest during the first year, then amortized over the remaining fourteen year term. The second mortgage secured a note for $150,000 with an interest rate of 15 percent; the note required payments of $22,500 in the first and second years and payments of $2,420 per month during the third through fifteenth years.

The board first set the market value of the mobile home park at $704,100 for the 1986 property tax assessment. Flood objected in circuit court, asserting among other arguments that the recent purchase price of the mobile home park was $650,000. The circuit court remanded the matter to the board. The board adjusted the 1986 and 1987 assessments to $689,000, calculated at the sale price of $650,000, plus an additional $39,000 representing an equalization adjustment to 106 percent.

At the second hearing before the board, Flood objected to the board's assessing the property at the sale price. Contending that the sale price reflected the seller's favorable financing terms, Flood argued that the assessor should make a cash equivalency adjustment to the sale price to assess the real property at market value. He submitted a report to the board prepared by a licensed real estate broker to support this position. The report concluded that Flood obtained a favorable financing package in exchange for paying a higher price for the real property and that the market value of the real property as determined by applying a cash equivalency analysis to the sale price was $490,000. The deputy assessor for the city of Madison testified on Flood's behalf before the board that cash equivalency adjustments were widely *433 accepted throughout the appraisal industry and had been applied in Madison since 1981.

Flood testified before the board that he had pur-, chased five other mobile home parks around the state at about the same time as his purchase in Lomira. All the purchases had similar financing terms. All five properties — located in Spooner, Rice Lake, Eden, Iron Ridge, and Ripon — were assessed using a cash equivalency adjustment.

The board refused to consider the alleged impact of the seller's financing arrangements on the price of the real property in determining full value for assessment purposes. Flood again sought relief from the board's assessment in the circuit court. This time the circuit court affirmed the decision of the board. The court of appeals reversed the order of the circuit court and remanded the case to the circuit court for remand to the board. The board of review petitioned this court for review.

A court's power to review on certiorari a board's determination of a real property assessment is limited. The court may review the board's determination to consider whether the evidence is sufficient and whether the board kept within its jurisdiction, acted according to law, or acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Darcel, Inc. v. Manitowoc Review Bd., 137 Wis. 2d 623, 625-26, 405 N.W.2d 344 (1987); Dempze Cranberry Co. v. Biron Board of Review, 143 Wis. 2d 879, 883-84, 422 N.W.2d 902 (Ct. App. 1988); Rosen v. City of Milwaukee, 72 Wis. 2d 653, 661-62, 242 N.W.2d 681 (1976); State ex rel. Markarian v. Cudahy, 45 Wis. 2d 683, 686, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970).

In this case Flood asserts that the board has committed an error of law. He contends that the board did *434 not comply with sec. 70.32(1) when it examined only the sale price to determine full value of the real property in this case.

Section 70.32(1), Stats. 1987-88, the statute governing the valuation of real property for the purposes of taxation, provides that the assessor shall value real property at the full value which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at a private sale. Section 70.32(1) further requires the assessor to value real property in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual. Section 70.32(1) provides in part as follows:

70.32 Real estate, how valued. (1) Real property shall be valued by the assessor in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or from the best information that the assessor can practicably obtain, at the full value which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale. 1

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Mayfair Mall LLC v. City of Wauwatosa
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2025
Veritas Village, LLC v. City of Madison
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2023
John T. Lange v. City of Middleton
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2022
Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison
2008 WI 80 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2008)
Gottsacker v. Monnier
2005 WI 69 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2005)
Gottsacker v. Monnier
2004 WI App 25 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2004)
Duesterbeck v. Town of Koshkonong
2000 WI App 6 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1999)
Hermann v. Town of Delavan
572 N.W.2d 855 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1998)
Doneff v. Review Board of Two Rivers
516 N.W.2d 383 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1994)
Lloyd v. Board of Review
505 N.W.2d 465 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1993)
Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kenosha County Board of Review
501 N.W.2d 883 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1993)
Steenberg v. Town of Oakfield
482 N.W.2d 326 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1992)
Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Board of Review
482 N.W.2d 654 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1992)
State v. Board of Review of Village of Greendale
473 N.W.2d 554 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
451 N.W.2d 422, 153 Wis. 2d 428, 1990 Wisc. LEXIS 90, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flood-v-village-of-lomira-board-of-review-wis-1990.