Flood v. Logan Iron & Steel Co.

20 A.2d 792, 145 Pa. Super. 206, 1941 Pa. Super. LEXIS 318
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 12, 1941
DocketAppeal, 27
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 20 A.2d 792 (Flood v. Logan Iron & Steel Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flood v. Logan Iron & Steel Co., 20 A.2d 792, 145 Pa. Super. 206, 1941 Pa. Super. LEXIS 318 (Pa. Ct. App. 1941).

Opinion

Cunningham, J.,

Opinion by

When this workmen’s compensation case was before us in 1939 (136 Pa. Superior Ct. 101, 5 A. 2d 621), its history up to that time was set forth at length. As the findings of fact of the compensation authorities upon the issues involved were not sufficiently specific to enable us to decide the questions of law raised by the employer and its insurance carrier by their appeal, we vacated, on April 21, 1939, the judgment against them, remitted the record to the court below, and directed that it be returned to the board for specific findings upon the issues outlined in our opinion.

For present purposes, it is only necessary to recall *208 that the claimant suffered an accidental injury to his right foot when a piece of iron fell upon it during the course of his employment on July 28, 1931. A bone of his fourth toe was fractured and the soft part of the foot injured. Because claimant had a preexisting ailment — arteriosclerosis—which impaired the blood supply to his foot, the injury did not heal as rapidly as would a similar injury to a normal person. An open agreement was duly executed and approved providing for the payment of compensation for total disability, under Section 306 (a) of our Workmen’s Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, as amended April 13, 1927, P. L. 186, 77 PS §511, at the rate of $13.19 per week.

Under this agreement payments were made until March 7,1937, a period of 291-6/7 weeks and aggregating $3849.57. On that date the payments were automatically suspended by reason of the filing by the defendants on February 18th of a petition under the second paragraph of Section 413, 77 PS §772, to modify the agreement into an agreement for compensation for “the permanent loss of the use” of claimant’s right leg as provided for in paragraph (c) of Section 306, 77 PS §513. The theory upon which this modification was sought was that claimant’s injuries had by that time resolved themselves into the permanent loss of the use of his leg, entitling him to receive compensation for a period of only 215 weeks for “all disability resulting from [that] permanent, injury.” As claimant had already been paid for 291-6/7 weeks the practical result of the granting of the petition would be the termination of the agreement. The referee and board before whom the petition was heard in 1939 sustained claimant’s contention that, in addition to the injuries to his foot and leg, other parts and organs of his body had been so injuriously affected by his accidental injury as to cause disabilities, separate, apart and distinct, from *209 those normally flowing from the loss of the use of his leg, as to entitle him to a continuance of payments under Section 306 (a). Accordingly, an award was made for additional compensation for total disability under Section 306 (a), beginning March 8, 1937 — the date upon which payments had been suspended — and to continue, within the limitations of the statute, until claimant’s disability changed in extent or ceased.

For the reasons stated at length in our former opinion we vacated the judgment entered by the court below upon that award and returned the record for specific findings upon these issues:

(1) At the date compensation payments were suspended (March 7,1937,) had claimant’s injury resulted in the permanent loss of the use of his right leg, within the meaning of Section 306 (c)?

(a) If so, had any other organs or parts of his body been so injured, affected or destroyed, as a direct result of the injuries to his leg, as to cause a disability separate, apart and distinct, from the pain, annoyance, inconvenience, and disability to work normally resulting from the loss of the use of his leg (Lente v. Lud, 275 Pa. 217, 119 A. 132) ?

(2) If the use of the leg has not been permanently lost, has he a total disability attributable to the accident?

Pursuant to our order the matter came on in December, 1939, for additional testimony before Referee Patterson, the successor of Referee Lawly. Defendants, having the burden of proof, recalled Doctors H. C. Cassidy and R. R. Decker; claimant, in addition to his own testimony, recalled Dr. F. W. Black and called a new witness, Dr. S. K. Schultz, who declined to express an opinion upon the permanency of his injuries.

Referee Patterson, on February 29, 1940, made findings of fact, the sixth and seventh of which read:

“6. That the time of the accident and injury on *210 July 28, 1931, this claimant was fifty-five years of age and was at that time suffering from some generalized arteriosclerosis. At that time this had not reached a stage where it was disabling to any extent. The injury to the right foot described above was in the nature of a crushing injury and so aggravated the arteriosclerosis in the right foot and leg that it was necessary for Dr. •Cassidy to perform two operations, one in 1935 and one in 1936 for the purpose of restoring proper circulation to the injured member. After the second operation there was definite improvement in that the swelling was reduced, the foot and leg returned to almost normal pink color and the claimant was able to be on his foot to some extent. Since the opinion submitted by Referee Lawly dated March 31,1937, in which he found that the claimant had lost the industrial use of the right leg there has been a further improvement in this condition. This improvement is very noticeable to the examining physicians and the claimant himself has stated that he is now able to walk better and greater distances than at the time of the previous hearings before Referee Lawly. The medical evidence also discloses that there may be still further improvement, and for the reasons cited your referee is unable to find that this disability in fthe foot and leg represents the permanent 'industrial loss] of use of that member. (Italics supplied.)
“7. That the claimant now complains of constant pain across the lumbar region of the back, radiating up along the spinal column into the shoulders and arms and into the temples. This pain is at times more severe than others but is constantly present. He also complains that his kidneys have been affected, that he has what he has described as an itching sensation on the neck and hands and that at times when he lies down ‘everything will turn black in my room.’ He also complains of general loss of strength, that [his appetite is poor and of pain in the abdomen near the site of the *211 scar of the second operation in 1936. Physical examinations reveal that the claimant has some enlargement of the heart downward and to the left and that the heart shows a tendency to myocardial changes. Numerous laboratory tests also show a reduction in functional power of the kidneys to approximately one-third of the normal. Taking into consideration the fact that up until the date of the accident in question on July 28,1931, this claimant had worked regularly at hard manual labor, that on that date he suffered a crushing injury to the foot followed by the symptoms above described, together with all the medical testimony offered in this case, we must find as a fact that the symptoms above described separate, apart and distinct from the leg condition, are directly connected with the accident of July 28, 1931.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Corrado v. Mattioli
21 Pa. D. & C.2d 775 (Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 1960)
Curran v. Walter E. Knipe & Sons, Inc.
138 A.2d 251 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1958)
Monarko v. Culmerville Coal Co.
47 A.2d 295 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1946)
Snyder v. Hoffman
48 A.2d 78 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1946)
Trostle v. State Workmen's Insurance Fund
48 Pa. D. & C. 109 (Centre County Court of Common Pleas, 1943)
Berkhamer v. Heinsling
28 A.2d 807 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1942)
Kennedy v. Holmes Const. Co. (Et Al.)
24 A.2d 451 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1941)
Bauman v. Spokas
23 A.2d 211 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1941)
Swalm v. J. H. Brokhoff, Inc.
20 A.2d 797 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1941)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
20 A.2d 792, 145 Pa. Super. 206, 1941 Pa. Super. LEXIS 318, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flood-v-logan-iron-steel-co-pasuperct-1941.