Flood v. Hicks

9 F. Cas. 289, 2 Biss. 169
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illnois
DecidedJuly 15, 1869
DocketCase No. 4,877
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 9 F. Cas. 289 (Flood v. Hicks) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illnois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flood v. Hicks, 9 F. Cas. 289, 2 Biss. 169 (circtndil 1869).

Opinion

DRUMMOND, District Judge.

The plaintiff claims, by virtue of a patent,■ dated the 15th of October, ISO" [No. G9,7SD], an improvement in a wagon reach, and the allegation is that the defendant, who also has a patent, [290]*290dated the 27th of October, 18GS, violates the patent of the plaintiff.

The specifications attached to the plaintiff’s patent describe the particular manner in which the reach is made, and declare that the object of the invention is so to construct the reach that the vehicle with which it is used can be turned in the least possible space, and so that the wheel can never strike against the reach; and this object, it is said, is accomplished by the peculiarity of the form of the reach, the peculiarity being by giving it a turn or curve upward at the point where the wheel would strike an ordinary reach, which is always straight.

The claim of the plaintiff consists of two parts. He claims, First, a curved or bent reach, when so constructed that the line of draft is the same as in a straight reach, and so that the reach rests on and is supported by the sway bar, as in the ordinary reach, substantially as described in the specification; and secondly, he claims a curved reach —referring to the drawing A in combination with the iron E of the sway bar, when such iron is extended, and so constructed as to furnish a support for the reach in all positions, substantially as and for the purpose mentioned.

This last claim consists of the extension of the ordinary sway bar upon which the reach rests, which bar is usually placed upon hounds, as they are termed, round and forward, so that the reach shall rest upon the sway bar, when the forward wheels of the wagon pass under the reach and are placed at right angles with the hind wheels.

The question is, whether this patent can be sustained, in view of the evidence which has been produced before the court. No question was made, and, of course, none can be made, that if the plaintiff’s patent is sustainable, the defendant’s- wagon or reach inflinges, and therefore the only question is whether the plaintiff’s patent can stand.

I am of opinion that it is not sustainable in point of law, under the facts which have been adduced.

The position taken by the counsel of the plaintiff as to the first claim, was that it was not a broad claim for a bent reach, but that it was a claim for a bent reach under certain conditions, one of which was that the line of draft must be the same as in a straight reach, and another that the curve must be so returned to the straight line that the reach will rest on the sway bar and be supported by it, and thirdly, that it must be so curved that the wheels must not strike against it. Taking that view of it, can the claim be sustained V

It was in evidence that a wagon or carriage had been used for many years, manufactured as early as 1854 or 1S55, in which the reach had a bend or curve upward, so as to admit of the forward wheels passing under the reach to a certain extent, when the carriage was in the act of turning, and with a sway bar, or what is sometimes called the fifth wheel of the wagon, forming an entire circuit, resting upon the forward axle and upon the hounds. )

It is ti-ue that in this carriage the forward wheels could not pass entirely under the reach, but it is clear to my mind that when the idea is once presented of a curve or bend in the reach, so as to admit of the forward wheel passing to a certain extent beneath the reach, that you have got- the substantial invention of the plaintiff, so far as concerns the reach, because the idea once being suggested that by a curve in the reach the wagon or carriage is permitted to make a sharper turn by the forward wheels going partially beneath the reach; all you have to do is to make the bend greater or the forward wheels smaller, and you accomplish to all intents and purposes the object stated by the plaintiff. That is to say, by elevating the curve more or diminishing the circumference of the forward wheels, either, or by both combined, you cause the forward wheels to pass completely under the reach, and with this carriage before us as it was, bodily in court, and which had been in existence some fifteen or sixteen years, it was not possible to say that a man could have a patent simply by making the curve greater in the reach or diminishing the circumference of the forward wheels of the carriage. There is the idea. There is whatever of invention there is, and it is a mere mechanical expedient to change the structure either of the reach or of the forward wheels.

Again, so far as the sway bar is concerned. In that carriage thus having existed for so long a time, there was this circular sway bar, sometimes called the fifth wheel, and it was clear that if the wheel was lessened so as to pass beneath the reach, or the curve increased, that the reach would rest upon the sway bar as the carriage was turned and as the wheels passed beneath the reach. It is because the idea is apparent in the carriage that was manufactured some fifteen years ago, of the effect of the curve in the reach, that the first claim of the plaintiff’s patent cannot be sustained. In that the reach passed from the axle of the hind wheels in a straight line toward the axle of the forward wheels until it came to a curve, and then there was a sweep upward and it came down to a straight line and was so continued on to the axle of the forward wheels.

The idea in the first claim of the plaintiff was in that carriage, and to make the forward wheels go beneath was simply a change which any mechanic could make and which would naturally suggest itself, if that was the desideratum, to any mechanic looking at the construction of the carriage.

Then, as to the second claim. The plaintiff constructs his wagon with what he calls a fifth wheel, that is, a circular piece of wood, iron, or of any other material, (of course it may be so constructed) passing over hounds [291]*291and on the forward axle, and outside of and concentric with that, what he terms a sixth wheel, which constitutes a sway bar, also passing over the hounds and on the forward axle, and upon which the reach rests as the wagon turns, in the manner suggested by this model, which is a perfect resemblance of the plaintiff’s wagon.

The question is, what is the difference between the structure of, this and the one which was referred to in the testimony, and which, it was established, has been in existence for fifteen or sixteen years? Of course, what this circular piece of wood, of iron, or ■of other material is called is immaterial; calling it- a sway bar does not change the nature or form of the thing itself, and in that carriage which was constructed long before the plaintiff’s there was the equivalent to all intents and purposes, as it seems to me, of what the plaintiff calls the sway bar; that is to say, there was a circular piece of wood or iron.

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Bluebook (online)
9 F. Cas. 289, 2 Biss. 169, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flood-v-hicks-circtndil-1869.