Flick v. Commonwealth

34 S.E. 39, 97 Va. 766, 1899 Va. LEXIS 92
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedSeptember 21, 1899
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 34 S.E. 39 (Flick v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flick v. Commonwealth, 34 S.E. 39, 97 Va. 766, 1899 Va. LEXIS 92 (Va. 1899).

Opinions

Keith, P.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Joseph L. Flick, a married man, was indicted in the County Court of Augusta county for seducing and having illicit connection with one Augusta Y. Wise, an unmarried female of previous chaste character. He was found guilty of the offence by the jury, and sentenced to the penitentiary for five years. During the progress of the trial sundry exceptions were taken to rulings of the court, and a writ of error to the judgment of the County Court was granted by the Circuit Court, and the case is now before us upon a writ of error to a judgment of that court.

[768]*768The first bill of exceptions presented by the record is to the refusal of the court to give an instruction asked by the defendant, which is as follows:

“ The court instructs the jury that, in order to find the prisoner guilty as charged in the indictment, they must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the prosecutrix was, previous to the alleged seduction, of chaste character; second, that she was seduced by the prisoner, that is to say, he used arts-, blandishments, wiles and artifices, corrupted her, and caused her to be drawn aside from the path of virtue, which she was pursuing, gaining her affections, polluting her mind and thoughts, and by these means inducing her to have illicit intercourse with him. And, third, the jury are further told that if, on the contrary, she had illicit intercourse with the prisoner, not for the above reasons, but for some other reason, such as the gratification of her sexual desire, then the jury are told that in law this is no seduction, and they must find him not guilty.”

That instruction tells the jury that, in order to find the prisoner guilty as charged in the indictment, they must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was, previous to the alleged seduction, of chaste character. This court held in Barkers Case, 90 Va. 820, that in a prosecution for felonious seduction, the chastity of the prosecutrix is presumed by law, and the burden of disproving it lies on the accused. In that case Judge Lewis, after an examination of the authorities, quotes with approbation the language of Judge Cooley: “The presumption of law should be in accordance with the general fact; and whenever it shall be true of any country that the women, as a general fact, are not chaste, the foundations of civil society will be wholly broken up. Fortunately, in our country, an unchaste'female is comparatively a rare exception to the general rule; and whoever relies upon the existence of the exception in a particular case should be required to prove it.” [769]*769That proposition, was reaffirmed in Mills v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 815, and may be considered the settled law of this State. Such being the case, the instruction offered would have been misleading. There was no evidence in the record of the unchastity of the prosecutrix; nothing which tended to impair the force of the presumption in her favor, and the jury were, therefore, under no obligation to consider the evidence in order to' determine the first element of the crime wherewith the prisoner was charged.

The next instruction asked by the defendant, and refused by the court, is as follows:

“ The court instructs the jury that the word “seduction,”when applied to the conduct of a man towards a female, means the use of some influence, promise, art, or means on his part, by which he induces the woman to surrender her chastity and her virtue to his embraces. There must be something more than mere reluctance on the part of the woman to commit the act, and her consent must be obtained by flattery, false promises, artifice, urgent importunity, based upon professions of attachment, or the like, for the woman, and that, relying solely on said promises or professsions of flattery or artifice or importunity, she surrendered her person and chastity to her alleged seducer; and that, relying and being influenced solely by.such promises, flattery, artifice, and urgent importunity, she then being chaste, surrendered her person and chastity to her alleged seducer.”

In lieu thereof, the court instructed the jury that “ seduction, as applied to this case, is the offence of inducing an unmarried female, of previous chaste character, by a married man, to consent to unlawful sexual intercourse by enticements and influences which overcome her scruples.”

It must be borne in mind that the offence here charged is seduction by a married man, which of itself excludes many of the [770]*770arts, wiles, professions, and promises which may be brought to bear by a single man to- establish a footing and influence with a woman, and thus become the means by which he accomplishes her ruin. As was said in a note to Mills v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Law Reg. 679: “ Illicit intercourse alone, during the existence of a marriage engagement, is insufficient—there must be the £ seduction ’ besides. "We understand the court to so decide in approving the third instruction, that she must have yielded * by reason of the promise ’; in other words, that seduction ,£ under ’ promise of marriage is tantamount to illicit connection accomplished £ by means of ’ such promise. IVIany of the ■courts have taken a narrower view of the statute, and by re■quiring proofs of £ arts, blandishments and artifice,’ or deceits ;and false promises, have made comparatively easy the way of the .-seducer.”

.In all cases arising under section 3677 of the Code, it is con'ceded that there must be seduction superadded to illicit connection to constitute the crime. To seduce is to lead astray from the path of virtue. It does not consist in arts and blandishments. They are the means by which the crime is accomplished, and not •the crime itself, and therefore Bishop says: ££ In determining whether or not there is a sufficient seducing, "the precise statutory terms should be regarded. Aside from such terms, the kind and 'extent of the seductive arts appear, to depend less on absolute rule than on the circumstances of the-particular case—among them the character, age, intelligence, and education of the woman. In general, if in fact they accomplish the object they are sufficient in law.” Bish. Stat. Crimes, sec. 610.

Keeping in mind, therefore, the distinction between the crime and the methods by which it may be accomplished, it is obvious that the latter may be as various as the characters and environments of the parties, and are incapable of being brought within the terms of a definition, and it may be observed that to undertake to define with precision the conditions necessary to the per-[771]*771pet-ration of the offence would tend, in the language above quoted from the Law Register, “ to make comparatively easy the path -of the seducer.” It is better to leave each case to be determined by its own circumstances. The crime may be complete, although in a particular case “ flattery, false promises, artifice, urgent importunity based upon professions of attachment, and the like, for the woman ’’ did not conspire to cause the surrender of her person and chastity to her alleged seducer. The court properly refused the instruction asked for, because it would have been misleading as applied to the facts of the case which the jury were •called upon to consider. The instruction given by the court was quite sufficient to enable the jury intelligently to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused upon the evidence before them.

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Bluebook (online)
34 S.E. 39, 97 Va. 766, 1899 Va. LEXIS 92, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flick-v-commonwealth-va-1899.