Flett v. Bowles

142 F.2d 559, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3451
CourtEmergency Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 5, 1944
DocketNo. 7
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 142 F.2d 559 (Flett v. Bowles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Emergency Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flett v. Bowles, 142 F.2d 559, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3451 (eca 1944).

Opinion

MAGRUDER, Judge.

Complainant here challenges the validity of a provision of Maximum Price Regulation No. 30—Wastepaper, which authorizes paper mills to pay certain allowances, in addition to the specified maximum prices, to sellers who took title and warranted the merchantability of wastepaper packed by a prior vendor.

The Price Administrator, pursuant to authority of Executive Order April 11, 1941, No. 8734, first instituted price control over wastepaper through Price Sched[560]*560ule No. 30, issued on September 18, 1941, effective October 1, 1941. 6 F.R. 4822. On October 29, 1941, the Administrator introduced into the price schedule a provision authorizing the payment of so-called jobbers’ or brokerage allowances. 6 F.R. 5535, 5536. This brokerage provision was amended, in respects not now material, on December 15, 1941, 6 F.R. 6457, 6459, and on February 2, 1942, 7 F.R. 660, 661. Meanwhile, on November 4, 1941, Flett had filed a petition with the Administrator objecting to these allowances on the ground that they discriminated against his type of marketing operation. This petition was pending before the Administrator when the Emergency Price Control Act was passed, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 901 et seq., and administrative consideration of the petition continued after February 11, 1942, when Price Schedule No. 30 became effective under § 206 of the Act. On February 21, 1942, the price schedule, still containing the brokerage provision to which Flett was objecting, was republished as Revised Price Schedule No. 30—Wastepaper. 7 F.R. 1201, 1260. Having been advised informally by representatives of the Office of Price Administration that the relief requested in his petition would not be granted, Flett on April 18, 1942, filed with the Administrator a formal protest against the brokerage provisions of the price schedule.

It would have been too late on April 18, 1942, to file an original protest against this provision of the price schedule. Harlem Metal Corp. v. Brown, Em.App.1943, 136 F.2d 242, 244. However, Flett’s petition, dated November 4, 1941, set forth specific objections to the brokerage provisions, and contained the substance of a statutory protest. This petition was treated by the Administrator as being still pending before him on and after February 11, 1942, the date on which he took office under the Emergency Price Control Act. The Administrator accordingly acknowledges, we think rightly, that this petition should be treated as a statutory protest filed as of February 11, 1942, and that the protest filed April 18, 1942, should be deemed an amended protest, curing formal defects in the original protest. See United States v. Kales, 1941, 314 U.S. 186, 194, 62 S.Ct. 214, 86 L.Ed. 132. The protest was denied on the merits by order of the Administrator dated August 20, 1942, and Flett duly filed his complaint in this court» on September 18, 1942. We have jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the complaint.

On November 19, 1942, complainant filed in this court his application for leave, to introduce additional evidence. Upon consideration of this application and of the stipulation of the parties agreeing thereto, this court on November 30, 1942, granted the application and ordered that such additional evidence should be presented to the Price Administrator together with such other evidence as the Administrator might deem necessary or proper to receive. Pursuant thereto, the Administrator received oral testimony and other evidence, and on October 23, 1943, issued a supplemental opinion adhering to his earlier conclusion that the protest should be denied. A supplementary transcript of these further proceedings before the Administrator was subsequently filed in this court.

For an understanding of the case, some outline needs to be given of the organization of the wastepaper industry as it existed prior to price control.

Paper mills are large consumers of wastepaper as a substitute for wood pulp in the manufacture of paper board, paper containers of all sorts, writing, printing, book or other converted papers, roofing materials, wallboard of various kinds, and many specialty products. The primary sources of wastepaper are homes, offices, hotels, stores, and other business establishments. Business houses and institutions which in the course of their operations accumulate wastepaper as a by-product are referred to as industrial producers or industrial accumulators. The quantity of wastepaper available to consuming mills varies directly with the price, but the quantity derived from industrial producers depends upon the extent of their main operations rather than upon the price of wastepaper. Thus the increase in supply of wastepaper when prices are raised comes largely through increased activities of peddlers and others who collect wastepaper from households, small stores, dumps, etc.

Peddlers are the most numerous of the various groups of persons engaged directly in the wastepaper industry. In the city of Chicago, for example, it has been estimated that the number of peddlers engaging in the collection of wastepaper may vary ■ from 5,000 to 15,000, depending on the price of paper. The peddler performs the scavenger function, gathering paper [561]*561from any available source, in an unsortcd and unbaled condition.

Directly above the peddler in the hierarchy is the junk shop, which purchases wastepaper (and other waste materials) from the peddler, paying on the average from about $3 to $3.50 per ton below the market price of wastepaper prevailing at consuming mills, and deriving its profit from this differential on resale. The junk shop undertakes to segregate the miscellaneous assortment of wastepaper into various grades, such as newspapers, magazines, or books, packed and baled so as to be ready for mill consumption without further processing. Such wastepaper, so processed, is customarily sold then to a middleman on a higher level who in that type of transaction is called a broker. In such sales the junk shop warrants the merchantable quality, weight and grade of the paper and is primarily responsible for defects which may appear. The broker, in turn, then sells the wastepaper without further processing to a paper mill, giving his own warranty as vendor in this transaction.

The number of persons in the industry who are brokers and nothing more is negligible.

By far the greater number of persons in the distribution level above junk shops are broker-dealers, who perform two distinct types of operation. First, they perform the broker’s operation, namely, that of seeking out sources of supply of wastepaper which has already been segregated and packed for direct mill consumption, purchasing the same and reselling it to consuming mills at a profit, the seller giving warranties of title and merchantability. Second, they perform what is known as a dealer’s operation, that is, they purchase wastepaper which is in need of further processing before sale to consuming mills, segregate and pack the same, and sell it in turn to consuming mills with a warranty of title and merchantability or, in some instances, sell it to a broker middleman. In their capacity as dealers they consequently operate sorting and packing plants as an adjunct of their operations, and their profit lies in the margin between the cost to them of purchasing the miscellaneous unsorted paper, plus the cost of processing the same, and the price obtained by them on subsequent sale of the graded and baled paper.

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Bluebook (online)
142 F.2d 559, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3451, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flett-v-bowles-eca-1944.