Fletcher v. New York Life Ins.

E.D. Missouri

Fletcher v. New York Life Ins.

11 F. 377, 3 McCrary's Cir. Ct. Rpts 603, 1882 U.S. App. LEXIS 2408

DecidedApril 10, 1882

StatusPublished

This text of 11 F. 377 (Fletcher v. New York Life Ins.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fletcher v. New York Life Ins., 11 F. 377, 3 McCrary's Cir. Ct. Rpts 603, 1882 U.S. App. LEXIS 2408 (E.D. Mo. 1882).

Pincite

Opinion

Treat, D. J.,

(charging jury.) Contracts of insurance are contracts of public good faith. In other words, a party applying to an insurance company must state truthfully the matters on which the risk is based, so that the company may determine whether it will undertake the risk or not. On the other hand, the company, when it does take a risk on the facts correctly stated to it, if a loss occurs, must pay the loss. You will, therefore, consider, in all controversies between an insurance company and the party assured, that you are dealing honestly and fairly, according to the terms of these contracts. In these insurance contracts, as in all other contracts, persons are held to the obligations which they assume in regard to that. "Whether it be a corporation on the one side, or a private individual or natural person on the other, the same rule must prevail. But when a supposed contract has been entered into between two parties, whether natural persons or corporations, and there is an element connected therewith, as of fraud, whether the contract should not be hold either obligatory originally, or be avoided, — fraudulent questions entering into it, — juries have to determine that matter. Therefore, I take it for granted, in this case, you will deal between this corporation on the one side, and the representatives of the deceased on the other, j ust as if the contract were between two natural persons.

It having been admitted that the deceased died of diabetes, and that he had at the date of the application said disease, and had previously had said disease, and it being also admitted that he had a usual medical attendant, who had treated the deceased for said disease, and that his answers to the questions were material to the risk, there is for the consideration of the jury the determination only of this essential fact, the burden of proving which is on the plaintiff, viz., whether the deceased (Alford) ever answered the questions presented written down in the application, which answers, as so written down, are admitted to be false and material.

Every one who signs a document, like the application in this case, is presumed to know what he signed, and is to be held thereto, unless he can show, by competent evidence, that he answered the questions truthfully, and not as written down, and signed the application believing that the truthful answers made by him were correctly writ[380]*380ten, and contained in the application by him signed. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, unless he has proved that the signature of Alford to' the application was obtained from him on the belief that he’.(Alford) was signing a--written statement which contained the truthful answers which he had really made to the question put to him, which answers were falsely written down unknown to him (Alford) when he attached his signature to the application.

If the plaintiff recovers, the verdict must be for $10,000, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, from the date of proof, submitted say from February 10, 1881.

If, therefore, the signature of Alford was obtained, as stated, without knowledge on his part that his answers were falsely recorded, the plaintiff is entitled to recover; but, on the other hand, if his signa-ture was not thiis fraudulently procured, the verdict must be for the defendant. ■ . ’

Verdict for plaintiff for $10,000, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, from February 10, 1881.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Treat, D. J.,

(charging jury.) Contracts of insurance are contracts of public good faith. In other words, a party applying to an insurance company must state truthfully the matters on which the risk is based, so that the company may determine whether it will undertake the risk or not. On the other hand, the company, when it does take a risk on the facts correctly stated to it, if a loss occurs, must pay the loss. You will, therefore, consider, in all controversies between an insurance company and the party assured, that you are dealing honestly and fairly, according to the terms of these contracts. In these insurance contracts, as in all other contracts, persons are held to the obligations which they assume in regard to that. "Whether it be a corporation on the one side, or a private individual or natural person on the other, the same rule must prevail. But when a supposed contract has been entered into between two parties, whether natural persons or corporations, and there is an element connected therewith, as of fraud, whether the contract should not be hold either obligatory originally, or be avoided, — fraudulent questions entering into it, — juries have to determine that matter. Therefore, I take it for granted, in this case, you will deal between this corporation on the one side, and the representatives of the deceased on the other, j ust as if the contract were between two natural persons.

It having been admitted that the deceased died of diabetes, and that he had at the date of the application said disease, and had previously had said disease, and it being also admitted that he had a usual medical attendant, who had treated the deceased for said disease, and that his answers to the questions were material to the risk, there is for the consideration of the jury the determination only of this essential fact, the burden of proving which is on the plaintiff, viz., whether the deceased (Alford) ever answered the questions presented written down in the application, which answers, as so written down, are admitted to be false and material.

Every one who signs a document, like the application in this case, is presumed to know what he signed, and is to be held thereto, unless he can show, by competent evidence, that he answered the questions truthfully, and not as written down, and signed the application believing that the truthful answers made by him were correctly writ[380]*380ten, and contained in the application by him signed. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, unless he has proved that the signature of Alford to' the application was obtained from him on the belief that he’.(Alford) was signing a--written statement which contained the truthful answers which he had really made to the question put to him, which answers were falsely written down unknown to him (Alford) when he attached his signature to the application.

If the plaintiff recovers, the verdict must be for $10,000, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, from the date of proof, submitted say from February 10, 1881.

If, therefore, the signature of Alford was obtained, as stated, without knowledge on his part that his answers were falsely recorded, the plaintiff is entitled to recover; but, on the other hand, if his signa-ture was not thiis fraudulently procured, the verdict must be for the defendant. ■ . ’

Verdict for plaintiff for $10,000, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, from February 10, 1881.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

11 F. 377, 3 McCrary's Cir. Ct. Rpts 603, 1882 U.S. App. LEXIS 2408, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fletcher-v-new-york-life-ins-moed-1882.