Fletcher v. Coleman

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 8, 2024
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00129
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 TAYJUAN TREVION-WAYNE FLETCHER , Case No. 2:24-cv-00129-JCC-TLF 7 Plaintiff, REPORT AND 8 v. RECOMMENDATION

9 SUZAN COLEMAN , NOTED FOR: OCTOBER 23 2024 10 Defendants. 11 This matter comes before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. 20. 12 Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion. 13 This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Mathews, 14 Sec’y of H.E.W. v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Local Rule 15 MJR 4. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Court 16 grant the motion, with leave to amend. 17 BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at King County Jail, brings this lawsuit 19 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an Eighth Amendment violation. Dkt. 5. Plaintiff 20 proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this matter. Plaintiff alleges that “due to 21 lawsuit involving declines thru Columbia Legal Services I was not supposed to be 22 housed in the whole/ special housing for a long time which as in a long time over 48 or 23 72 hours.” Id. at 5. Despite this, plaintiff claims that he was housed there for two 24 1 months, during which time he experienced PTSD, ADHD, schizophrenia, and anxiety. 2 Id. 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 Dismissal would be proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if plaintiff's complaint,

5 with all factual allegations accepted as true, fails to “raise a right to relief above the 6 speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). 7 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim 8 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 9 misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 10 acted unlawfully.

11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570). 12 A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 13 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 14 necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim 15 is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, et al., 551 U.S. 89, 93 16 (2007) (internal citations omitted). However, the pleading must be more than an 17 “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 18 While the Court must accept all the allegations contained in the Complaint as 19 true, the Court is not required to accept a “legal conclusion couched as a factual 20 allegation.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 21 mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; Jones v. Community Development 22 Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (vague and mere conclusory allegations 23 unsupported by facts are not sufficient to state section 1983 claims); Pena v. Gardner, 24 1 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). While the Court is to construe the complaint liberally, 2 such construction “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 3 pled.” Id. 4 DISCUSSION

5 A. Judicial Notice 6 Defendants have requested the court take judicial notice of court records from 7 State of Washington v. Tayjuan Fletcher, KCSC No. 20-1-02954-4 SEA. See Dkt. 21-1. 8 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court may take judicial notice of 9 matters of public record if the facts are not subject to reasonable dispute. See Lee v. 10 City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 11 omitted)). Court orders and filings are proper subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., 12 United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that a court “may 13 take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 14 system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”); Reyn’s Pasta

15 Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (taking judicial notice 16 of pleadings, memoranda, and other court filings). 17 Thus, the Court grants defendants’ request for judicial notice as to Dkt. 21-1, and 18 the Court will consider this document in deciding the pending motion. 19 B. Personal Participation 20 In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: 21 (1) he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal 22 statute, and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of 23 state law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step in

24 1 a § 1983 claim is therefore to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. 2 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). 3 To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how 4 individually-named defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm

5 alleged in the complaint. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Arnold 6 v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A person subjects another to a deprivation 7 of a constitutional right when committing an affirmative act, participating in another’s 8 affirmative act, or omitting to perform an act which is legally required. Johnson v. Duffy, 9 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Sweeping conclusory allegations against an official 10 are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Further, a § 1983 suit 11 cannot be based on vicarious liability alone; the complaint must allege the defendant’s 12 own conduct violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 13 385-90 (1989). 14 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege particularized facts as to

15 provide notice for the legal basis of his claim and fails to establish personal participation 16 or a causal connection between defendants and a constitutional deprivation. Dkt. 20 at 17 7. Here plaintiff names Suzan Coleman, John Hurt, and Tee/Tina McCraw as 18 defendants, however, he does not allege any actions taken by any of these individuals 19 in the body of the complaint. See Dkt. 5 at 3-5. Indeed, the complaint does not allege 20 any actions taken by any individuals, but rather simply states that he was placed into 21 the maximum security special housing unit. Id. at 4. 22 23

24 1 If plaintiff wishes to pursue this § 1983 action, he must provide a short, plain 2 statement explaining exactly what each defendant did or failed to do and how the 3 actions violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights and caused him harm. 4 C. Fourteenth Amendment

5 “Eighth Amendment protections apply only once a prisoner has been convicted of 6 a crime, while pretrial detainees are entitled to the potentially more expansive 7 protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Mendiola- 8 Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1246 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Kingsley v. 9 Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015)). Even though conditions of confinement claims 10 brought by pretrial detainees arise under the Due Process Clause, the guarantees of 11 the Eighth Amendment “provide a minimum standard of care for determining rights as a 12 pretrial detainee.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018). 13 To state a Fourteenth Amendment claim relating to medical care of a pre-trial 14 detainee, a plaintiff must include factual allegations that a state actor acted, or failed to

15 act, in a manner that shows objective deliberate indifference to their serious medical 16 needs. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1124-25. 17 The elements are:“(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the 18 plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable 19 official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved – making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and 20 (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.”

21 Id., at 1125. The defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable; concerning 22 element (iii), plaintiff is required to show more than negligence, but less than subjective 23 24 1 intent – “something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. (citations and internal quotations 2 omitted). 3 Plaintiff must show his medical condition is “objectively a serious one.” Brock v. 4 Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2nd Cir. 2003). Seriousness of the condition may be present

5 where there is: 6 … The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical 7 condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain… 8 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Brock, 315 F.3d at 9 162. 10 Some Courts have found that holding inmates with serious mental illness in 11 prolonged isolated confinement may cause serious illness and needless suffering in 12 violation of the Eighth Amendment. Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1335 (D. 13 Ariz. 2014), amended, No. CV-77-00479-PHX-NVW, 2014 WL 6983316 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14 10, 2014), and judgment terminated sub nom. Graves v. Penzone, No. CV-77-00479- 15 PHX-NVW, 2019 WL 4535543 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2019) (citing Coleman v. Brown, 938 16 F.Supp.2d 955, 979 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (mentally ill inmates in administrative segregation 17 faced substantial risk of serious harm, including exacerbation of mental illness and 18 potential increase in suicide risk)). “To determine whether segregated confinement 19 meets constitutional standards, courts must consider both the length of the segregated 20 confinement of inmates with serious mental illness and the specific conditions of the 21 confinement.” Id. (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978)). 22 Conditions that have been considered in making this determination include: “(1) 23 the length of time prisoners with mental illness spent in solitary confinement 24 1 (approximately 22 hours or more a day); (2) the extent to which solitary confinement 2 interfered with prisoners' ability to obtain adequate mental health treatment; (3) the 3 conditions accompanying the solitary confinement experienced by prisoners with 4 serious mental illness; and (4) the extent to which systemic deficiencies at the facility,

5 e.g., deficiencies in mental health programming, screening, and accountability, 6 contributed to an overreliance on solitary confinement as a means of controlling 7 prisoners with serious mental illness.” Id. (citing Coleman, 2013 WL 6071977 8 (publication of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division)). 9 Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s complaint is “blatantly contradicted by the 10 record” so that “no reasonable jury could believe it,” because plaintiff was a legal adult 11 over the age of eighteen at all times throughout his arrest, booking, and pretrial 12 detention at King County Correctional Facility. Dkt. 20 at 6 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 13 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). 14 Here plaintiff alleges that the two months he spent in maximum security housing

15 impacted his mental health and resulted in him being under suicide watch for a week. 16 Dkt. 5 at 5. He states that he was not supposed to be in special housing for over 48 to 17 72 hours “due to juvenile decline protocols and due to a lawsuit involving declines thru 18 Columbia legal services.” Id. 19 It does appear from the record that plaintiff was over 18 years of age at the time 20 that he was housed in maximum security housing. The “Prosecuting Attorney Case 21 Summary and Request for Bail and/or Conditions of Release” states that plaintiff was 18 22 years old at the time that he was charged with two counts of Murder in the Second 23 Degree and one count of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the Second Degree. Dkt.

24 1 21-1. However, even if plaintiff was not a juvenile throughout this period, he still may be 2 able to allege a claim for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights due to his 3 placement in maximum security housing. It is not clear from plaintiff’s complaint whether 4 the factual allegations concerning conditions of confinement would meet constitutional

5 standards. Therefore, if plaintiff wishes to pursue this claim he must amend his 6 complaint to allege facts to support a plausible claim that his Fourteenth Amendment 7 rights were violated by his placement into maximum security housing. See, Coleman v. 8 Brown, 938 F.Supp.2d 955, 979 (E.D. Cal. 2013). 9 D. Qualified Immunity 10 Defendants argue that, alternatively, they are entitled to dismissal of the claim 11 based on qualified immunity. Unless plaintiff makes a two-part showing, qualified 12 immunity shields government officials from liability. The plaintiff must show both: the 13 official(s) violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and – at the time of the 14 alleged act or failure to act there was clearly established law that defined the contours

15 of the federal right objectively putting the official(s) on notice – i.e., any reasonable 16 official would understand that what they are doing is unlawful. Escondido v. Emmons, 17 586 U.S. 38, 42-43 (2019); District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018). 18 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must review the complaint and take all 19 well-pleaded factual allegations as true; the Court must construe such allegations in the 20 light that is most favorable to the non-movant; and the Court must evaluate whether 21 those facts plausibly state a claim that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under applicable 22 law. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 23

24 1 On a motion to dismiss, the District Court reviews “whether the complaint alleges 2 sufficient facts, taken as true, to support the claim that the officials’ conduct violated 3 clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would be aware ‘in 4 light of the specific context of the case.’” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1235, 1235 (9th Cir.

5 2018) (quoting, Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam)). Determining 6 whether qualified immunity applies to a defendant in the pre-trial motion stage under 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) can be problematic. Keates v. Koile, at 1234. “If the operative 8 complaint ‘contains even one allegation of a harmful act that would constitute a violation 9 of a clearly established constitutional right,’ then plaintiffs are ‘entitled to go forward’ 10 with their claims. Id. at 1235 (quoting, Pelletier v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of San 11 Francisco, 968 F.2d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 1992)). 12 Here, as stated above, in the proposed Complaint, plaintiff has not shown that 13 any of the defendants have violated a clearly established law because he has not 14 alleged sufficient facts to allege participation by any of the defendants. Therefore if

15 plaintiff does not amend his complaint to allege sufficient facts regarding defendant’s 16 actions, and allege sufficient facts to support a plausible claim that the acts or omissions 17 of each of the defendant constituted a violation of his rights, the Court may submit a 18 report and recommendation to Judge Coughenour recommending dismissal. If the 19 defendants are, on the face the Amended Complaint, entitled to qualified immunity, 20 dismissal with prejudice may be appropriate. 21 CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that plaintiff’s claims against 23 defendants be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.

24 1 Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court should provide leave to 2 amend unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any 3 amendment. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 4 2003). Even after a complaint has been amended or a responsive pleading has been

5 served, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[t]he court should freely give 6 leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit 7 requires that this policy favoring amendment be applied with “extreme 8 liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 9 1990). “In determining whether leave to amend is appropriate, the district court 10 considers ‘the presence of any of four factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the 11 opposing party, and/or futility.’” Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 12 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 13 (9th Cir. 1999)). 14 The Court reminds plaintiff that if he files an amended complaint, it must be

15 legibly written or retyped in its entirety and contain the same case number. All claims 16 that he wishes to bring against each defendant must be raised in the Amended 17 Complaint, and the Court will not consider claims raised by a separate memorandum or 18 other filing. Any cause of action alleged in the original complaint that is not alleged in 19 the amended complaint is waived. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th 20 Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds, Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 21 (9th Cir. 2012). 22 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties shall 23 have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also

24 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for 2 purposes of de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can 3 result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 4 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations

5 omitted). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Clerk is 6 directed to set the matter for consideration on October 23, 2024 as noted in the 7 caption. 8 9 Dated this 8th day of October, 2024. 10 11 A 12 Theresa L. Fricke 13 United States Magistrate Judge

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