Fletcher v. City of Helena

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: December 20, 1973
• Docket: 12336
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 12336

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN

MARY M. FLETCHER,

Plaintiff,

THE CITY OF HELENA, MONTANA, a Municipal C o r p o r a t i o n ,

Defendant, ......................................... THE CITY O HELENA, MONTANA, a F Municipal C o r p o r a t i o n ,

T h i r d - P a r t y P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

THE M N A A POVER COMPANY, a OTN Municipal C o r p o r a t i o n ,

T h i r d - P a r t Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. B e n n e t t , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For Appellants :

C . W. L e a p h a r t , J r . , Helena, Montana Keller, Reynolds & Drake, Helena, Montana P a u l F. Reynolds a r g u e d , Helena, Montana

For Respondents:

Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Ronald F. Waterman, a r g u e d , Helena, Montana

Submitted: October 1, 1973

Filed: T ; i; j n j,yT$ M r . J u s t i c e Gene R . Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

T h i r d p a r t y p l a i n t i f f and a p p e l l a n t t h e C i t y of Helena, a municipal c o r p o r a t i o n , b r i n g s t h i s a p p e a l from a summary judg- ment e n t e r e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Lewis and C l a r k County i n f a v o r of t h i r d p a r t y defendant and r e s p o n d e n t , t h e Montana Power Company, a Montana c o r p o r a t i o n , o r d e r i n g t h a t t h e C i t y r e c o v e r n o t h i n g from t h e Power Company by way of indemnity. The o r i g i n a l complaint u n d e r l y i n g t h i s c a u s e was f i l e d on June 23, 1971, by Mary M. F l e t c h e r , p l a i n t i f f , a g a i n s t t h e C i t y of Helena, d e f e n d a n t . The C i t y s u b s e q u e n t l y f i l e d an answer and t h i r d p a r t y complaint a g a i n s t t h e Montana Power Company a s t h i r d party defendant. T h e r e a f t e r t h e Power Company f i l e d an answer, and b o t h t h e C i t y and t h e Power Company f i l e d motions f o r summary judgment. Both motions were denied. O February 22, 1972, p l a i n t i f f Mary M. F l e t c h e r moved n t h e s e p a r a t i o n of t h e t r i a l of F l e t c h e r v. C i t y of Helena from t h e t r i a l of C i t y of Helena v. Montana Power Company. The d i s - t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d h e r motion and, a f t e r t r i a l by j u r y , a judg- ment i n t h e amount of $25,000, p l u s c o s t s , was e n t e r e d i n f a v o r of Mary M. F l e t c h e r a g a i n s t t h e C i t y of Helena. The C i t y t h e n f i l e d and was g r a n t e d a motion t o amend i t s t h i r d p a r t y complaint a g a i n s t t h e Power Company. Thereafter b o t h t h e C i t y and t h e Power Company a g a i n f i l e d motions f o r sum- mary judgment. Hearing was h e l d on b o t h motions and on June 1 9 , 1972, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d summary judgment i n f a v o r of t h e Power Company o r d e r i n g t h e C i t y r e c o v e r n o t h i n g by way of indemnity. From t h a t o r d e r and judgment t h e C i t y a p p e a l s . The f a c t s g i v i n g r i s e t o t h i s c a u s e of a c t i o n , a s t h e y appear from t h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l , a r e : On January 1 8 , 1971, i n connection w i t h t h e C i t y ' s Urban

Renewal program Mary M. F l e t c h e r was r e l o c a t e d from h e r former r e s i d e n c e t o basement apartment #1, a t 16 112 South Park S t r e e t , owned by t h e C i t y of Helena. O o r about January 18, 1971, Lou E v e r e t t and Ed K i t t s , n employees of t h e C i t y ' s Urban Renewal department, were on t h e premises of 16 1 / 2 South Park and e n t e r e d t h e basement a r e a of apartment #1. They n o t i c e d an unusual odor and observed g r a y a s h and yellow flame i n t h e sidearm h e a t e r used t o h e a t apartment #1. I t appears t h a t E v e r e t t telephoned a r e q u e s t t o t h e Power Company t o check t h e h e a t e r . C i t y personnel d i d n o t n o t i f y t e n a n t s of t h e d e f e c t , nor f o l l o w up on t h e s e r v i c e r e q u e s t , n o r r e i n s p e c t t h e h e a t e r p r i o r t o January 25, 1971. Mrs. F l e t c h e r t e s t i f i e d by d e p o s i t i o n : that shortly a f t e r she moved i n t o apartment #1 she made a c a l l complaining of l a c k of h e a t ; t h a t she b e l i e v e d she c a l l e d t h e Power Company r a t h e r than t h e C i t y , b u t was u n c e r t a i n of t h i s f a c t and of t h e d a t e ; t h a t a f t e r t h e Power Company s e r v i c e man came t o "check t h e heat", she was warm and comfortable and n o t i c e d no gas fumes o r o t h e r p e c u l i a r odors i n h e r apartment. John Larson, a serviceman f o r t h e Power Company, t e s t i f i e d by d e p o s i t i o n t h a t he performed one s e r v i c e c a l l t o 16 112 South Park on January 19, 1971, a t approximately 11:30 a.m. There i s a ' c o n f l i c t between t h e l i t i g a n t s a s t o whether t h e s e r v i c e c a l l was made on January 19 o r 20, and whether i t was i n response t o t h e r e q u e s t of Mrs. F l e t c h e r o r M r . E v e r e t t , o r both. The c o n f l i c t i s immaterial t o t h e i s s u e on a p p e a l . Larson s t a t e d he i n q u i r e d a t apartment #1 and was t o l d by an e l d e r l y l a d y t h a t t h e r e was n o t enough h e a t . He then found t h e sidearm h e a t e r , and i n h i s words: "Well, I opened t h e h e a t e r door t o s e e what t h e problem was. The flame was b l u e b u t i t w a s n ' t a s t r u e a b l u e a s I l i k e t o s e e . The burner i t - s e l f had some w h i t e a s h -- I guess you'd s a y -- small w h i t e a s h on some of t h e c o i l s and on t h e b u r n e r , which accumulates over a p e r i o d of time from n a t u r a l g a s . I t ' s common. I removed t h e burner -- I s h u t t h e gas o f f and removed t h e b u r n e r and cleaned t h e p o r t s out and I turned t h e a q u a s t a t up. I c o u l d n ' t s e e how many degrees o r anything. I t was u n l e g i b l e . And then a f t e r I r e p l a c e d t h e b u r n e r , I l i t i t , a d j u s t e d t h e flame, brought a w i r e up i n s i d e t h e v e n t u r i t o make s u r e e v e r y t h i n g was c l e a n , and i t looked good. So I c l o s e d t h e door and I h e l d a match toward t h e t o p of t h e h e a t e r around t h e b u r n e r . W do t h a t t o check t o s e e i f e t h e chimney i s drawing and t h e match remained l i g h t e d . I t d i d n ' t go o u t . Then I f e l t around i t v i t h my hands and t h e r e was no appearance of any blockage a t a l l s o t h e n I l e f t . 11 Larson s t a t e d he c o u l d smell no odor of burned o r un- burned gas i n t h e a r e a . Larson had no f u r t h e r c o n t a c t w i t h t h i s sidearm h e a t e r p r i o r t o January 25, 1971, n o r d i d anyone e l s e from t h e Power Company. O January 25, 1971, Mary M. F l e t c h e r and two persons n o t n p a r t i e s t o t h e b a s i c a c t i o n were found i n h e r apartment overcome by fumes from a n a t u r a l gas o p e r a t e d sidearm h e a t e r i n t h e basement of t h e apartment b u i l d i n g . Mary F l e t c h e r s u r v i v e d ; t h e two o t h e r persons d i d n o t . Subsequent t o t h e a c c i d e n t on January 25, 1971, t h e C i t y II procured two e x p e r t " i n s p e c t i o n s of t h e sidearm h e a t e r . Val Ketchum, an employee of a Helena f i r m which i n s t a l l s and r e p a i r s gas a p p l i a n c e s , t e s t i f i e d he found t h e v e n t p i p e from t h e h e a t e r r a n h o r i z o n t a l l y approximately 13 112 f e e t and was concealed i n the floor. He s t a t e d t h i s v i o l a t e d a c c e p t e d i n s t a l l a t i o n p r a c t i c e s , which he s a i d would permit a maximum l a t e r a l vent of two f e e t , for this particular installation. His i n s p e c t i o n r e v e a l e d t h e 11 f l u e pipe was n i n e t y p e r c e n t o r b e t t e r plugged", and t h e accumulation o r blockage had been b u i l d i n g up f o r an extended p e r i o d of time. He s t a t e d f l u e blockage would cause a back d r a f t , sending t h e p r o d u c t s of combustion back i n t o t h e f u r n a c e room and t h a t an open f l u e w i t h a proper d r a f t would t a k e t h e products of combustion o u t through t h e chimney, even i f t h e h e a t e r were

improperly a d j u s t e d o r m a l f u n c t i o n i n g . The e x p e r t testimony of John Knicely, a chemical e n g i n e e r , g e n e r a l l y concurred w i t h t h e f i n d i n g s and o p i n i o n s of Val Ketchum. Knicely t e s t i f i e d : t h a t t h e h e a t e r b u r n e r was improperly a d j u s t e d , g i v i n g o f f one thousand p a r t s per m i l l i o n carbon monoxide; t h a t t h e v e n t f l u e from t h e h e a t e r r a n h o r i z o n t a l l y about 1 f e e t more t h a n 1 s a f e t y p e r m i t t e d ; and t h a t f l u e blockage had taken p l a c e over a long period of time, which prevented the carbon monoxide from escaping into the atomosphere. On appeal the sole issue presented is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Power Company ordering the City recover nothing by way of indemnity. A definitive statement of the law of indemnity appears in the District Court opinion by the Hon. William J. Jameson in Great Northern Railway Company v. United States, D. Mont. 1960, 187 F. Supp. 690,693,694: I1 In the absence of any Montana cases in point, I assume that the Montana court will follow the common-law rule that joint tortfeasors are not entitled to contribution from each other. 'In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction have generally held that they cannot on their own initiative create an enforceable right of contribution as between tortfeasors. 1 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp. 1952, 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 279, 96 L.Ed. 318. The common law rule was followed by the California Court in Forsythe v. Los Angeles Railway Co., 1906, 149 Cal. 572, 87 P. 24. If the parties here were in pari delicto, there is no right of recovery on the part of the plaintiff. I I Footnote 7 following the above quoted paragraph in that case states : 11 This rule is stated in Restatement, Restitution $ 102: IWhere two persons acting independently or jointly, have negligently injured a third person or his property for which injury both became liable in tort to the third person, one of them who has made expenditures in the discharge of their liability is not entitled to contribution from the other. I I1 [See also 42 C.J.S. Indemnity $27, p. 6051 Judge Jameson then went on to say: II The rule permitting indemnity against the I princi- pal offender' has been recognized in a variety of circumstances, and varied terminology has been used in describing the nature of the relationship of the respective parties. This is well expressed in United States v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 4 Cir., 1953, 209 F.2d 442,446, 44 A.L.R.2d 984, where the court said: t In the infinite variety of circumstances where in- demnity has been sought the courts have used various terms to distinguish between the grade of fault at- tributable to the participating wrongdoers so as to justify the imposition of the entire loss on the one who is regarded as the principal offender. The acts of the parties are variously contrasted as positive or negative * * 7k and as active and passive * 9~ or as primary and secondary * 9; *; and sometimes one p a r t y i s s a i d t o have been merely c o n s t r u c t i v e l y l i a b l e and t h e r e f o r e e n t i t l e d t o indemnity from t h e a c t u a l wrongdoer 9 ; ** I h a t e v e r t h e terminology, t h e i n q u i r y i s always whether t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e g r a v i t y of t h e f a u l t s of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i s s o g r e a t a s t o throw t h e whole l o s s upon one. I n such e v e n t t h e r e i s c o n t r i b u t i o n i n t h e extreme form of indemnity. "' The C i t y contends t h a t t h e r e was evidence b e f o r e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t upon which a j u r y might w e l l b a s e a f a c t u a l d e t e r - mination t h a t t h e Power Company was n e g l i g e n t i n i t s performance of i t s s e r v i c e c a l l on t h e sidearm h e a t e r . This point i s not well taken. As was s t a t e d i n I n r e Standard O i l Company of C a l i f o r n i a , N.D. Cal. 1971, 325 F.Supp. 388, 391: 1l The u n i v e r s a l r u l e i s t h a t , when two o r more c o n t r i b u t e by t h e i r wrongdoing t o t h e i n j u r y of a n o t h e r , t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y may r e c o v e r from a l l of them i n a j o i n t a c t i o n o r he may pursue any one of them and r e c o v e r from him, i n which c a s e t h e l a t t e r i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o indemnity from t h o s e who, w i t h him, caused t h e i n j u r y . F i d e l i t y & C a s u a l t y Co. of N.Y. v. J. A. Jones Const. Co., 325 F.2d 605, 611 ( 8 t h C i r . 1963) ," T h e r e f o r e t h e i s s u e b e f o r e us i s n o t whether t h e Power Company was n e g l i g e n t ; b u t whether o r n o t t h e C i t y was n e g l i g e n t and, i f s o , whether o r n o t t h e n e g l i g e n c e of t h e C i t y d i d a s a m a t t e r of law c o n s t i t u t e a c t i v e n e g l i g e n c e . S e c t i o n 42-201, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s t h a t a l e s s o r of a b u i l d i n g f o r human o c c u p a t i o n must "put i t i n t o a c o n d i t i o n f i t f o r such o c c u p a t i o n , and r e p a i r a l l subsequent d i l a p i d a t i o n s * * *" t o so maintain i t . The municipal code of t h e C i t y p r o v i d e s i n s e c t i o n 4-5-2 e t seq. t h a t t h e c i t y e n g i n e e r i s a gas i n s p e c t o r empowered t o i n s p e c t a l l g a s equipment; t h a t a l l gas consuming a p p l i a n c e s must be p r o p e r l y vented t o a s u i t a b l e f l u e ; and, t h a t upon d i s c o v e r y of a dangerous c o n d i t i o n t h e g a s must be o r d e r e d t u r n e d o f f u n t i l t h e consumer c o r r e c t s t h e dangerous c o n d i t i o n . W hold t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t upon t h e undisputed f a c t s b e f o r e e 1l i t made t h e only d e t e r m i n a t i o n p o s s i b l e . Perhaps t h e term active n e g l i g e n c e " i s c o n f u s i n g i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e because t h e C i t y ' s a c t i v e n e g l i g e n c e i s p r e d i c a t e d on a c t s of omission. A concise s t a t e m e n t of t h e law a p p l i c a b l e i n an analogous indemnity s i t u a t i o n i s found i n Bush Terminal Bldgs. Co. v. Luckenbach Steamship

IIThe c u l p a b i l i t y of t h e person seeking indemnity determines whether recovery w i l l be allowed a g a i n s t a j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r , A r i g h t t o implied indemnity does n o t e x i s t i f a d e f e n d a n t ' s conduct was --t i v e . ac [Citing cases] 1I Acts of omission c o n s t i t u t e a c t i v e n e g l i g e n c e a s w e l l a s a c t s of commission [ C i t i n g c a s e s ] and where defendant i s a l l e g e d t o have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n o r 1 concurred i n t h e wrong which caused t h e damages' - t h e r e i s no r i g h t t o recovery over [ C i t i n g c a s e ] . Moreover, where t h e r e i s a charge of n o t i c e , a f a i l u r e t o perform t h e duty t o i n s p e c t may n o t be deemed mere p a s s i v e negligence. 11 Here, t h e C i t y , a f t e r a c t u a l n o t i c e of a d e f e c t i n t h e sidearm h e a t e r , took no s t e p s : t o a s c e r t a i n what d e f e c t s e x i s t e d ; t o inform t h e Power Company of t h e n a t u r e of t h e d e f e c t s i t was aware o f ; t o warn t h e t e n a n t s of t h e dangerous c o n d i t i o n ; o r even, t o follow-up i n determining whether o r when a s e r v i c e c a l l had been made. The testimony of t h e C i t y ' s e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s Knicely and Icetchum e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t "but f o r " t h e blocked f l u e t h e asphyxia- t i o n would n o t have occurred. There was no evidence b e f o r e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o c o n t r a d i c t o r r e f u t e t h i s testimony. This was s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h proximate c a u s a t i o n a s a m a t t e r of law. DeVerniero v. Eby, - .- -* Mont 496 P.2d 290, 29 St.Rep. 273. The C i t y ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t proximate c a u s a t i o n was a d i s p u t e d f a c t n o t proper f o r summary judgment i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . 65 C.J.S. Negligence 5 110, provides: "The negligence of t h e defendant need n o t be t h e s o l e cause of t h e i n j u r y , i t b e i n g s u f f i - c i e n t t h a t i t was one of t h e e f f i c i e n t causes t h e r e o f , w i t h o u t which t h e i n j u r y would n o t have r e s u l t e d ; b u t i t must appear t h a t t h e neg- l i g e n c e of t h e person sought t o be charged was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a t l e a s t one of the causes re- s u l t i n g i n t h e i n j u r y . * + 9; :

"It i s g e n e r a l l y considered t h a t t h e r e may be more than one proximate cause of an a c c i d e n t o r i n j u r y , t h a t each of t h e c o n c u r r e n t e f f i c i e n t causes c o n t r i b u t i n g d i r e c t l y t o t h e a c c i d e n t o r i n j u r y i s a proximate cause t h e r e o f , and t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of one proximate cause of an a c c i d e n t o r i n j u r y does n o t excuse a n o t h e r proximate cause. There i s , however, some a u t h o r i t y r e j e c t i n g t h e t h e o r y t h a t t h e r e may be two o r more proximate c a u s e s of an i n j u r y and h o l d i n g t h a t t h e r e can be b u t one proximate c a u s e . I n any e v e n t , two o r more s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t a c t s of n e g l i g e n c e o p e r a t i n g c o n c u r r e n t l y may c o n s t i t u t e t h e p r o x i - mate cause of an i n j u r y . I I The second paragraph of t h e above q u o t a t i o n amounts t o a d i s t i n c - t i o n w i t h o u t a d i f f e r e n c e s i n c e under e i t h e r t h e o r y l i a b i l i t y results. 65 C. J . S . Negligence § 1 1( I ) , p r o v i d e s : 1 11 A i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e which brealcs t h e c h a i n of n c a u s a t i o n from t h e o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n t a c t o r omission w i l l be regarded a s t h e proximate c a u s e r e l i e v i n g t h e o r i g i n a l wrongdoer of l i a b i l i t y ; b u t t h e mere f a c t t h a t o t h e r f o r c e s have i n t e r - vened between t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s n e g l i g e n c e and t h e lai in tiff's i n j u r y does n o t a b s o l v e t h e defendant where t h e i n j u r y was t h e n a t u r a l and probable consequence of t h e o r i g i n a l wrong and might r e a - sonably have been f o r e s e e n .

11 N n e g l i g e n c e i s i n s u l a t e d a s long a s i t p l a y s o a s u b s t a n t i a l and proximate p a r t i n t h e i n j u r y . I f t h e o r i g i n a l a c t i s wrongful and would n a t u r a l l y , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e of e v e n t s , prove i n j u r i o u s t o o t h e r s , and does r e s u l t i n i n j u r y through t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of o t h e r c a u s e s n o t wrong- f u l , t h e i n j u r y w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e wrongful c a u s e , p a s s i n g through t h o s e which were i n n o c e n t . Moreover, a wrongdoer may n o t r i d himself of respon- s i b i l i t y f o r i n j u r y h i s own f a u l t was enough t o c a u s e merely by s u g g e s t i n g a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e f a u l t of someone e l s e might have i n t e r v e n e d . I n o t h e r words, an i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e w i l l n o t r e l i e v e from l i a b i l i t y where t h e p r i o r n e g l i g e n c e was t h e e f f i c i e n t c a u s e of t h e i n j u r y . 11 I n p o i n t of f a c t , t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s determining a c t i v e v e r s u s p a s s i v e n e g l i g e n c e a r e analogous and i n t e r r e l a t e d t o t h o s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which a r e d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h e e x i s t e n c e of i n t e r - vening s u p e r s e d i n g c a u s e . 2 Restatement of T o r t s 2d, $ $ 440-443. I n d e m n i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e s t h e would be indemnitee be f r e e from any a c t i v e negligence contributing t o t h e i n j u r y causing accident. Smith v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore L i n e s , 355 F.Supp. 1176. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , on t h e u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s b e f o r e t h e d i s i : r i c t c o u r t , r e a s o n a b l e minds could n o t d i f f e r on t h e f a c t t h e C i t y was a c t i v e l y n e g l i g e n t and t h a t a c t i v e n e g l i g e n c e c o n t r i b u t e d d i r e c t l y and proximately t o t h e a c c i d e n t c a u s i n g Mary ~ l e t c h e r ' s injury . The judgment and o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a r e affirmed.

Justice

Hon. Paul G. atf field, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison.