Fleming v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 237, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LEROY D. FLEMING, § § No. 237, 2025 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 2209010479 (K) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §

Submitted: October 24, 2025 Decided: January 15, 2026

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Leroy Fleming appeals the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for

postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on

the ground that it is manifest on the face of Fleming’s opening brief that his appeal

is without merit. We agree and affirm.

(2) In December 2022, a Superior Court grand jury indicted Fleming for

one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”),

two counts of possession of firearm by person prohibited, one count of drug dealing,

one count of carrying a concealed deadly weapon, one count of receiving a stolen firearm, one count of possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, one count

of drug possession, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and two motor

vehicle offenses. On February 28, 2024, Fleming pleaded guilty to one count of

PFDCF. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State dismissed the remaining charges

in the indictment and agreed to cap its sentencing recommendation at five years of

unsuspended incarceration. The Superior Court immediately sentenced Fleming to

25 years of incarceration, suspended after 5 years followed by decreasing levels of

community supervision. Fleming’s direct appeal was dismissed as untimely.1

(3) In April 2024, Fleming moved for postconviction relief under Superior

Court Criminal Rule 61, raising various ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.

The Superior Court referred Fleming’s motion to a Superior Court commissioner.

After expanding the record with briefing and an affidavit from trial counsel, the

commissioner recommended that Fleming’s motion for postconviction relief be

denied. Fleming did not file any objections to the commissioner’s report, and the

Superior Court thereafter adopted the commissioner’s report and recommendation

in its entirety. This appeal followed.

(4) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for

abuse of discretion.2 We review de novo claims of constitutional violations,

1 Fleming v. State, 2024 WL 2737472 (Del. May 24, 2024). 2 Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019). 2 including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.3 In order to prevail on a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (i) trial

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,4 and (ii)

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.5 In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant

must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”6

(5) In his opening brief on appeal, Fleming argues, as he did below, that:

(i) trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to investigate his case, file a

motion to suppress, or review the State’s evidence with him; and (ii) he pleaded

guilty under duress because of his “failing health.”7 After careful review, we find

Fleming’s arguments to be unavailing.

(6) Trial counsel squarely addressed Fleming’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel in her affidavit filed in response to Fleming’s motion for

postconviction relief. Trial counsel advised the court that, after consulting with

colleagues and researching the applicable law, she concluded that a motion to

suppress would likely be unsuccessful. Instead of filing what she determined would

3 Id. 4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 5 Id. at 694. 6 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). 7 Opening Br. at 6. 3 be a fruitless motion, counsel focused her efforts on securing a favorable plea deal

for Fleming. Trial counsel also averred that she reviewed all of the discovery that

she received from the State with Fleming. We agree with the Superior Court that

Fleming has failed to establish that counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.

(7) We also agree with the Superior Court that Fleming has failed to

establish that his guilty plea was involuntary. To the extent that Fleming couches

this claim as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel opined that, in her

professional opinion and despite Fleming’s physical discomfort at the time of the

plea colloquy, he was legally competent to plead guilty and his plea was knowing

and voluntary. Moreover, the plea colloquy belies Fleming’s argument that he was

dissatisfied with counsel’s performance or that he was under medical duress when

he pleaded guilty. Before the court accepted Fleming’s guilty plea, Fleming

acknowledged that: (i) he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty to PFDCF;

(ii) he was, in fact, guilty of PFDCF; (iii) he faced a maximum penalty of 25 years

in prison; and (iv) he was satisfied with trial counsel’s advocacy on his behalf. Upon

questioning by the Superior Court judge, Fleming admitted that he was in some

physical discomfort because of “some blood pressure issues,” but that, as the judge

observed, he was nevertheless able to understand the plea colloquy.8 Absent clear

8 Mot. to Affirm, Ex. E. 4 and convincing evidence to the contrary, which he has not shown, Fleming “is bound

by his answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and by his sworn

testimony prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea.”9 We also note that Fleming

exercised his opportunity to address the court directly before sentencing and asked

for leniency in light of the recent deaths of his mother and father-in-law; he did not,

however, inform the court that he was unable to enter his plea voluntarily because

of his ongoing health problems. Finally, we would be remiss if we did not observe,

as the Superior Court did, that Fleming received a substantial benefit by pleading

guilty.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice

9 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 5