Fleitmann v. John M. Stone Cotton Mills

186 F. 466, 108 C.C.A. 444, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4134
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedApril 4, 1911
DocketNo. 2,088
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 186 F. 466 (Fleitmann v. John M. Stone Cotton Mills) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fleitmann v. John M. Stone Cotton Mills, 186 F. 466, 108 C.C.A. 444, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4134 (5th Cir. 1911).

Opinion

McCORMICK, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a decree oi the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Mississippi, entered the 7th day of April, 1910, dismissing the original bill of appellants (complainants below), and granting the relief sought in the cross-bill of the appellee (respondent below), and adjudging that the respondent recover of the complainants $2,531.05, with interest from April 1, 1905.

The appellants compose the firm of Fleitmann & Co., commission merchants, citizens of the state of New York, residing and doing busi[468]*468ness in New York City. The appellee is a corporation of the state of Mississippi, which hereafter in this opinion we will designate as the “Cotton Mills,” a citizen and resident thereof, operating a mill for the manufacture of cotton cloth at Starkville, Miss. The bill alleges, in substance: That for the purpose of enlarging its commission business the complainants (appellants) on April 28, 1902, made a proposition in the form of a letter to the respondent (appellee), whereby the complainants were to take stock in respondents’ corporation, and become its exclusive selling agents. That the proposition was understood to contemplate a more-precise definition. This proposition was not then accepted. Thereafter, on September 18, 1902, the complainants submitted to the respondent a proposed agreement in more detail, set out at length. This agreement was duly executed by both parties, and in reliance upon it the complainants paid $15,000 for 150 shares of capital stock of the respondent. Under this contract, the selling agency continued down to about April, 1905. At that time the respondent purported to repudiate the agreement, and refused to make further consignments of its goods to complainants, thus terminating the agency, but refusing to repay the $15,000 and receive a surrender of the shares of stock, as required by the contract. That the complainants fully performed all conditions of the contract on their part, except that after and because of the breach by the respondents they retained $2,-531.05, which, otherwise, would have been remitted in April, 1905. The complainants further allege that they held the certificate for said stock and the money retained subject to the decree of the court; .that, whether said contract be valid or invalid, it would be grossly inequitable to allow the respondents to retain the $15,000 paid thereunder, and they prayed that it be decreed that said sum be repaid with interest, less the $2,531.05, with interest from April 8, 1905, the date of its receipt. The answer to the bill sets forth that the letter of April 28th was a confirmation of a definite agreement previously made by an authorized agent of the complainants, and that thei-eafter the complainants acted as and were treated as stockholders; that the contract of September 18th was entered into by Arthur Whittam, president of tffe respondent, without authority, through fraud and collusion with the complainants; that Whittam withheld all knowledge of the contract from the directors for over a year; that it was accidentally discovered; and was repudiated on March 30, 1905, as ultra vires, without consideration, unauthorized, and void. The answer admits the refusal to consign goods to the complainants, and alleges the refusal to pay for goods consigned constituted a breach- of the terms of agency on the complainants’ part; that it was on the faith of the unconditional subscription of the complainants that the mill was.built; that the $15,000 was paid under negotiations, partly verbal, culminating in the letter of April 28, 1902; that bondholders have protested against payment of $15,000 to the complainants; that at the time repayment was demanded the respondent was in danger of insolvency, and that1 complainants have no right to retain the $2,531.05, and prays that bill be dismissed. The replication to the answer alleges the answer to be insufficient, and denies all material allegations therein. The cross-[469]*469bill prays for payment of the $2,531.05 by Fleitmann & Co. to the Mills. The answer to the cross-bill denies all the allegations of improper conduct on the part of Fleitmann & Co. as agents, and other material allegations in the cross-bill, and alleges that the said $2,-531.05 is claimed on account of the greater indebtedness claimed in the bill to be due from the Mills to Fleitmann & Co. All the testimony was taken by deposition de bene esse. In the case of the witnesses called by the respondent, counsel agreed that all objections to competency and relevancy of evidence were considered as reserved and properly taken.

One of the branches of the business of Fleitmann & Co. was to act as selling agents of cotton mills. This they did through various “departments,” one of which in 1902 was the firm of Dickson & Hanna, who had their own salesrooms apart from the place of business of Fleitmann & Co. Mr. Hanna in the spring of 1902, before the respondent had commenced building its mill, was traveling in the South, apparently on his own affairs, and the testimony does not show that he was sent by or corresponding with Fleitmann & Co., but tends ío show the contrary. He arranged with Mr. Whittam, who was then acting president of the respondent, for a meeting of the board of directors of the Mills, which took place on April 16, 1902. At this meeting Mr. Hanna proposed that his “house” should become stockholders and selling agents of the Mills. After the meeting, on request of some of the directors, he reduced his proposition to letter form, and signed it “Dickson & Hanna.” Mr. Whittam, the president of respondent, was with Mr. Hanna when this letter was written, and asked that the letter provide for his presidency of the mill. Mr. Whittam also at the same time said that a letter from Fleitmann & Co. would be preferable. A minute of the action of the board of directors was made by the secretary in these words:

“At a meeting ot the board to-day only iwo members were absent, Seales and Krvin. According to agreement Mr. Hanna was present and made an in-foresting talk and answered verbal questions. Mr. Hanna stated that his house would take fifteen thousand dollars in stock, provided they were made selling agents, and subscriptions to be paid when mill was completed, lie also stated that the mill would not bo bound in any way to them, but that they were to have a preference as long as they gave satisfaction.”

The letter form into which Mr. Hanna reduced his interesting talk, was in these words:

“People’s Savings Bank.
“W. W. Scales, President.
“M. If. Ames, Vice President.
“A. C. Krvin. Cashier.
“C. K. Gay, Asst. Cashier.
“Starkville, Miss.
“Starkville, Miss., April 16, 1902.
“Mr. Arthur Whittam, Prest. Pro Tern. The John M. Stone Cotton Mills, Starkville, Mississippi.
“Dear Sir: We hereby agree to take up to fifteen thousand dollars stock in your proposed mill, with the understanding that you are to place as much of this stock with your own people as you possibly can, thus relieving us from taking the full amount unless necessary.
[470]*470“It is also understood that you are to be president of this enterprise and that we are to act as your selling agents, disposing of your product.

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Bluebook (online)
186 F. 466, 108 C.C.A. 444, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fleitmann-v-john-m-stone-cotton-mills-ca5-1911.