Flatow v. Islamic Republic

202 F.R.D. 35, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11795, 2001 WL 912748
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 13, 2001
DocketC.A. No. 97-396 (RCL)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 202 F.R.D. 35 (Flatow v. Islamic Republic) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flatow v. Islamic Republic, 202 F.R.D. 35, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11795, 2001 WL 912748 (D.D.C. 2001).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAMBERTH, District Judge.

Now before the Court is the Department of the Treasury’s motion for a protective order. On June 5, 2001, the Court ordered the plaintiff to show cause why the protective order should not be granted. See Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.R.D. 5 (D.D.C.2001). The plaintiff submitted a brief pursuant to that Order, and the Treasury Department responded to that brief. After a full consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the applicable law, and for the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Treasury Department’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In an effort to satisfy a several hundred million dollar judgment against the defendants, the plaintiff sought from the Treasury Department information pertaining to the defendants’ assets. To this end, the plaintiff issued a subpoena on June 5, 1998. Since then, the Treasury Department has searched its records and produced certain information. With respect to future searching and production however, the Treasury Department seeks a protective order to relieve it of “any further obligation to produce documents under the plaintiffs June 5, 1998 subpoena, as modified by the Court.” See Brief for Department of Treasury, June 26, 2001, at 4. The Department argues that such production would be unduly burdensome. The Court now considers this issue.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

A court may issue a protective order to protect an individual from discovery if the discovery “subjects [the individual] to [an] undue burden.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3). In identifying an “undue burden”, a court is to look at several factors, such as

“[the] relevance [of the materials sought], the need of the party for the documents, the breadth of the document request, the time period covered by it, the particularity with which the documents are described and the burden imposed.”

Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 21, 34 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing United States v. International Bus. Machines, Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 104 (S.D.N.Y.1979)). See also Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 180 F.R.D. 168, 173 (D.D.C. 1998). When the burdensomeness of a subpoena is at issue, the onus is on the party alleging the burden to prove that the subpoena violates Rule 45. See Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 403 (D.C.Cir.1984).

B. The Instant Protective Orders

In the case at hand, the Treasury Department seeks protective orders for four different Treasury divisions: (1) the Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) and OFAC Chief Counsel’s Office, (2) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, (3) the United States Customs Service, and (4) various Departmental Offices having information on the Lend Lease programs. The Court finds protective orders to be merited in each instance.

Before explaining why protective orders are merited in each case, the Court notes that today’s decision is predicated heavily on the plaintiffs utter failure to present a meaningful challenge to Treasury’s motion. Treasury’s motion for a protective order was made on February 1, 2001, and supported by over 30 pages of detailed explanation concerning the nature of the information sought and the burdens of producing such information. As of this date, over six months later, [37]*37the plaintiff has only filed 3 pages on the issue, and those pages were only filed after the Court ordered the plaintiff to show cause why the protective orders should not be entered. In short, the Court considers the Treasury Department’s motion virtually uncontested. However, should the plaintiff, subsequent to this Memorandum and Order, come forward with detailed arguments why protective orders should not be in place, the Court, in the exercise of its broad discretion, see Northrop Corp., 751 F.2d at 403, will consider such arguments.

1. OFAC and OFAC Chief Counsel’s Office

Under the June 5, 1998 subpoena, as modified by this Court on June 5, 2001, only two categories of information within OFAC and OFAC Chief Counsel’s Office would be responsive to the subpoena: (1) documents that pertain to Iranian property that is outside the jurisdiction of the United States and not in the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and (2) documents that pertain to Iranian property that falls within the narrow exceptions to the President’s regulatory authority under IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b). It is very unlikely that a search of either category of information will yield information useful to the plaintiff.

With respect to the first category of information, the information will not likely be useful because foreign countries rarely enforce punitive damages awards against foreign states. See International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, and Commentary, 2(2) Y.B.I.L.C. 13 (1991), Article 12, at 102-06. With respect to the second category, OFAC records will not likely be useful because information not covered by the President’s IEEPA regulatory authority is not required to be reported to OFAC. Thus, although such information might theoretically exist, it is unlikely it would be in the possession of OFAC.

Although the modified June 5, 1998 subpoena thus seeks information of relatively little use from OFAC and OFAC Chief Counsel’s office, it does not therefore follow that the offices are relieved from searching for and producing the information. Rather, the Court must balance this with other factors attendant to the production of documents. In this case, the Treasury Department has proffered affidavits estimating the likely search times for each category of information. The Department estimates that OF AC’s search under the narrowed subpoena would take approximately 885 person-hours (111 eight-hour days), and OFAC Chief Counsel’s search would take approximately 335 person-hours (42 eight-hour days). Further, the estimate for the Chief Counsel’s office would inevitably be augmented by the time necessary to conduct privilege reviews.

Thus, not only would the information sought by the plaintiff be of relatively little use, the production of it would entail extensive labor by OFAC and the OFAC Chief Counsel’s office. The Treasury Department’s motion for a protective order with respect to these offices is therefore merited.

2. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) has broad authority over the chartering, supervision, and regulation of our national banks. Thus, it has an extensive store of “bank examination reports”, 363 of which the OCC has turned over to the plaintiff for his review. These 363 reports are from 1980 and 1981, years in which national banks were specifically ordered to report to the OCC their financial connections with Iran or Iranian banks. Beyond these particular reports, almost 6000 reports have yet to be reviewed to determine if any of them are responsive to the June 5, 1998 subpoena. The Court finds that the review of these reports is unduly burdensome.

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Bluebook (online)
202 F.R.D. 35, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11795, 2001 WL 912748, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flatow-v-islamic-republic-dcd-2001.