Flathead Class of 1973 v. LaRose
This text of 2025 MT 50N (Flathead Class of 1973 v. LaRose) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
03/11/2025 DA 24-0401
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA Case Number: DA 24-0401
2025 MT 50N
FLATHEAD HIGH SCHOOL CLASS OF 1973 REUNION COMMITTEE,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
DEBORA STANDLEY LAROSE and KENNETH PETERS,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV 24-238(A) Honorable Amy Eddy, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Debora A. LaRose, Self-Represented, Kalispell, Montana
Kenneth Peters, Self-Represented, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellees:
Flathead High School Class of 1973 Reunion Committee, Self-Represented, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 2, 2025
Decided: March 11, 2025
Filed:
q.,-6.--,f __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Debora LaRose and Kenneth Peters appeal the Eleventh Judicial District Court’s
order affirming the Flathead County Justice Court’s judgment in favor of the Flathead High
School Class of 1973 Reunion Committee (Reunion Committee). We affirm.
¶3 The parties dispute funds and expenses from planning their 50th high school class
reunion in the summer of 2023. LaRose, a Reunion Committee volunteer, formed her own
“Dinner Events Committee” during the planning and began incurring expenses for the
dinner event and silent auction. About a month after the reunion events concluded, the
Reunion Committee filed a claim against LaRose and Peters, alleging that they improperly
kept proceeds from the silent auction.1 LaRose and Peters then counterclaimed, alleging
the Reunion Committee owed them money for expenses incurred.
¶4 The Justice Court held a two-day bench trial. The court listened to both parties’
arguments, received evidence, and heard testimony lasting approximately seven hours.
The evidence included disputes regarding a Mark Ogle print donated for the silent auction.
Following trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the Reunion Committee for
1 The Reunion Committee originally filed the case in the small claims division. LaRose and Peters moved to remove the case to justice court, which was granted pursuant to § 25-35-605, MCA. 2 $1,153.67, ordered LaRose and Peters to return the Mark Ogle print, dismissed LaRose and
Peters’s counterclaim with prejudice, and ordered the parties to bear their own fees and
costs. On appeal by LaRose and Peters, the District Court affirmed the Justice Court’s
order. LaRose and Peters appeal.
¶5 “On appeal from a justice court of record, district courts function as intermediate
appellate courts with review confined to the record and questions of law.” State v.
Thibeault, 2021 MT 162, ¶ 6, 404 Mont. 476, 490 P.3d 105 (citing §§ 3-5-303, 3-10-115(1),
MCA; Stanley v. Lemire, 2006 MT 304, ¶¶ 24-25, 334 Mont. 489, 148 P.3d 643).
Functioning as an appellate court, the district court reviews “findings of fact only for clear
error” and conclusions of law for correctness. Thibeault, ¶ 6 (citing Stanley, ¶ 25). We
apply this same standard on appeal from the District Court’s order to this Court. Thibeault,
¶ 6 (citing Stanley, ¶ 26).
¶6 LaRose and Peters disagree with the Justice Court’s calculations regarding the
expenses and amount owed. As appellants, they bear the burden of establishing error on
appeal. State v. Deshaw, 2012 MT 284, ¶ 30, 367 Mont. 218, 291 P.3d 561. This Court
received the audio recording of the trial with the Justice Court and District Court record.
It is the appealing party’s responsibility to show error by the Justice Court, including record
citations and referencing the time location on the CD recording of the trial. M. R. App.
P. 8(2), 8(9)(b), 12(1)(d). LaRose and Peters raise numerous arguments about evidence in
the record but provide no citations to the record to substantiate a claim that any of the
Justice Court’s findings were clearly erroneous. “[I]t is not an appellate court’s
3 responsibility to comb the record to determine whether the trial court erred.” In re
Marriage of Taylor, 2016 MT 342, ¶ 14, 386 Mont. 44, 386 P.3d 599 (citations and internal
quotations omitted). The Justice Court reviewed the evidence, heard the parties’
testimonies at trial, made extensive findings of fact, determined legitimate expenses,
awarded a balance, and explained its calculations. LaRose and Peters have not met their
burden to demonstrate with record evidence clear error by the Justice Court regarding its
calculations.
¶7 LaRose and Peters also allege error in the order to return the Ogle print to the
Reunion Committee. They assert in part that the auction proceeds include money from sale
of the print. The Justice Court weighed the affidavits and testimony, found the Reunion
Committee witnesses to be more credible than LaRose and Peters, and found that LaRose
testified she currently holds the Ogle print. This dispute involves a factual finding by the
Justice Court based on a credibility determination and conflicting evidence. “Where
conflicting evidence is presented and the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given
their testimony is at issue, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.”
Burns v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 268 Mont. 82, 84, 885 P.2d 508, 509 (1994) (citation
omitted). We will not disturb the Justice Court’s credibility determination and factual
finding.2
2 LaRose and Peters also discuss the “right to dissociate” on appeal, which the District Court found they had not presented to the Justice Court and thus could not argue on appeal. LaRose and Peters do not cite where in the hearings they argued this issue. They provide no legal authority why this would change the outcome as a matter of law or how the law governs “dissociation” from a group of volunteers. We generally afford pro se litigants a measure of leniency; nonetheless, it “is not this Court’s job to conduct legal research on the [parties’] behalf” or to “develop legal analysis” 4 ¶8 Finally, LaRose and Peters allege impropriety and conflicts of interest by the Justice
of the Peace. The District Court was correct in refusing to address this issue when it
concluded that LaRose and Peters did not follow the proper procedure to disqualify a
Justice of the Peace under § 3-1-805, MCA.
¶9 In their response to LaRose and Peters’s opening brief, the Reunion Committee
argues that they are entitled to a different judgment amount from the Justice Court order
and assert various factual disputes in support of this contention. “A responding party
seek[ing] to change any part of the judgment below must raise the issue by cross-appeal.”
Bucy v. Edward Jones & Co., L.P., 2019 MT 173, ¶ 23, 396 Mont. 408, 445 P.3d 812
(citation and internal quotations omitted). The Reunion Committee did not cross-appeal,
and we do not consider their arguments requesting this Court to change the judgment.
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