Flanery v. Terry Farris Stores, Inc.

438 S.W.2d 864, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 2031
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 13, 1969
Docket452
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 438 S.W.2d 864 (Flanery v. Terry Farris Stores, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flanery v. Terry Farris Stores, Inc., 438 S.W.2d 864, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 2031 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969).

Opinion

OPINION

GREEN, Chief Justice.

Appeal is from a judgment rendered for defendants-appellees after the court had sustained their respective motions for an instructed verdict.

The suit was instituted by appellant Edward B. Flanery to recover damages allegedly sustained by his wife when she was struck and injured on December 17, 1960 while a customer in the store of appellee Terry Farris Stores, Inc., hereafter called Terry Farris, by some glass from a Hercu-lite tempered glass door manufactured by appellee Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, hereafter called Pittsburgh. When the case went to trial before the court and jury in May, 1968, the sole remaining defendants were appellees Terry Farris and Pittsburgh. Upon completion of the evidence the trial court granted motions for an instructed verdict filed by said two defendants, withdrew the case from the jury and, pursuant to a summary judgment previously granted defendant A. W. Dodson d/b/a Superior Glass Company, rendered a take-nothing judgment.

This appeal concerns only the plaintiff-appellant and the two defendants Terry Farris and Pittsburgh; appellant does not question the judgment favorable to Dodson.

APPEAL AS TO APPELLEE PITTSBURGH PLATE GLASS CO.

Appellant’s points concerning the alleged error in instructing a verdict for appellee Pittsburgh read as follows:

“FIRST POINT OF ERROR
“The Trial Court erred in instructing a verdict for the defendant, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, and failing to submit the case to the jury because the defendant, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, was negligent in failing to warn that the herculite tempered glass door in question had the tendency, after penetration or near penetration of the compression envelope by a chip or scratch, to disintegrate under what appears to be slight or no provocation, and such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages.
“SECOND POINT OF ERROR
“The Trial Court erred in instructing a verdict for the defendant, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, and failing to submit the case to the jury because the defendant, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, was negligent in marketing a glass door for use in a retail store that is subject to spontaneous disintegration and *866 such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages.
“THIRD POINT OF ERROR
“The Trial Court erred in instructing a verdict for the defendant, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, and failing to submit the case to the jury because there was a defect in the door at the time it was marketed by Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, and such defect was a producing-cause of plaintiff’s damages.”

The suit had been pending for six years prior to the trial. During that period a number of pre-trial hearings had occurred, and as a result of the trial court’s rulings at such hearings, amendments of the pleadings to allege more specifically the basis of the defendants’ liability had been required. Consequently, the case went to trial on plaintiff’s fifth amended petition, and Pittsburgh’s fourth amended answer.

It is apparent from the allegations in the pleading that plaintiff predicated his cause of action against Pittsburgh upon the alleged negligence of Pittsburgh in marketing the door without giving warning to the purchaser or the general public, including plaintiff, of the certain characteristics of the tempered glass alleged in the pleading, and upon his allegations that such negligence in failing to warn was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. 1

It is well settled that a party is entitled to go to the jury only on those issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence. Rule 277 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Harkey v. Texas Employers’ Insurance Ass’n, 146 Tex. 504, 208 S.W.2d 919; Parker v. Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co., Tex.Civ.App., 401 S.W.2d 265; Travelers Insurance Company v. Sides, Tex.Civ.App., 403 S.W.2d 519, wr. ref. n. r. e.; McPherson v. Billington, Tex.Civ.App., 399 S.W.2d 186, wr. ref. n. r. e.

In considering the matter of determining whether material fact issues as plead were raised by the evidence on the trial, we shall be governed by the principles of law applicable to an appeal from an instructed verdict. On such appeal, the evidence in the record supporting appellant’s position must be accepted as true, and *867 all conflicts and inconsistencies must be resolved in appellant’s favor. We must disregard all evidence and the inferences therefrom favorable to appellees, and interpret the evidence and all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom most favorable to appellant. Hart v. Van Zandt, Tex.Sup.Ct. 399 S.W.2d 791; Adams v. Slattery, 156 Tex. 433, 295 S.W.2d 859; Walter E. Heller & Company v. Allen, Tex.Civ.App., 412 S.W.2d 712, 716, wr. ref. n. r. e.

On December 17, 1960, Mrs. Flanery, wife of appellant, was Christmas shopping in the Terry Farris Store located in Mc-Allen, Texas. While standing about 5 to 7 feet from the door in question examining a display shelf, she heard what sounded like a big explosion, and felt a piece of glass from the door strike her leg above the ankle. She looked toward the direction of the front door of the store and saw that the glass from the door had disintegrated. At that time she noticed that no one was standing near the door, and that there were no rocks or other objects on the floor which could have struck the door. She testified that it was like an avalanche of glass — the glass broke into pieces of various sizes, and a large piece —she stated like a boulder — hit her on the leg. She suffered serious injuries therefrom, and on the date of the trial, over seven years later, she testified she was still in pain and felt adverse effects from her wound.

The door which “exploded” was a Hercu-lite tempered glass door manufactured by Pittsburgh and sold by it to Superior Glass Company (Dodson) in 1948. The glass was about ¾ of an inch thick, and the door weighed 200 pounds. This door and three other similar doors manufactured by Pittsburgh were installed in Terry Farris Store by Superior in 1948 as the entrance doors from the outside sidewalk into said store. 2 No copy of the manual (N-2) was furnished Terry Farris, its architect, or Dodson. The evidence reflects that about two months after the doors were installed in *868

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Related

Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
557 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Texas, 1983)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
438 S.W.2d 864, 1969 Tex. App. LEXIS 2031, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flanery-v-terry-farris-stores-inc-texapp-1969.