Stacy, C. J.
The case is controlled by the decision in
Parker v. Trust Co.,
202 N. C., 230, 162 S. E., 564
(Newsom v. Mut. Life Asso.,
136 So. (Fla.), 389, likewise practically on all-fours), unless the circumstance, appearing here, but which did not appear there, that the account of the trust department with the commercial department was overdrawn at the time of the closing of the Central Bank and Trust Company, differentiates the two cases and reduces plaintiff’s claim from one of preference to one of commonalty.
It is the position of the plaintiff that the method of handling the account in question was a matter of internal bookkeeping, or of self-dealing, and is without material significance in the case
(Glidden v. Gutelius,
96 Fla., 834, 119 So., 140) ; that the Central Bank and Trust Company was authorized to do a trust business as well as a commercial business (C. S., 21?(a) ; that it had but one charter, and although its two departments may have been separate and distinct, together they comprized but a single business unit
(In re Prudential Trust Co.,
244 Mass., 64), rendering it inequitable to allow such an institution to change its status from trustee to debtor simply by shifting funds from its right hand to its left, or from one till to another
(Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott,
181 N. E. (Ind. App.), 369; Note 31 Mich. L. Rev., 532; 44 Harvard L. Revv 1281) ; that the general depositors knew, or should have known, that trust funds in the hands of such a banking institution, deposited for special purposes, were perforce received in a fiduciary capacity and would necessarily be held subject to the equitable principles existing between the parties to such fiduciary relationship
(Bank v. Corp. Com.,
201 N. C., 381, 160 S. E., 360;
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co.,
193 N. C., 696, 138 S. E., 22;
Glidden v. Gutelius, supra),
and that when an agent, bailee, or trustee, commingles funds with his own, and dissipates a portion of the commingled fund, he will be presumed to have dissipated his own funds first, and that the remainder of such commingled fund will be subject to distribution among his
cestui que trustent
according to their respective rights.
Myers v. Matusek,
98 Fla., 1126, 125 So., 360; Note, 82 A. L. R., 46
et seq.
The defendant, on the other hand, says that the rightfnlness of the deposit made by the trust department with the commercial department, whether legal or other, in the absence of statutory authorization, is not challenged; that it does appear by so depositing said funds they were thereby segregated or earmarked as belonging to a separate account; that this account was overdrawn to the extent of $21,000 at the time of the bank’s closing; that instead of augmenting the funds in the hands of the liquidating agent, they were apparently diminished to the extent of the overdraft; that to entitle a claimant to preferential payment from the assets of an insolvent bank in the hands of a liquidating agent, it must appear the funds demanded were in the bank’s possession as agent, bailee, or trustee; that such funds reached the hands of the liquidating agent in some form; that the assets brought under his control were larger by this amount than they otherwise would have been
(Tinsley v. Amos,
135 So. (Fla.), 397) ; and that plaintiff has failed to make out such a case.
McDonald v. Fulton,
125 Ohio, 507, 182. N. E., 504;
Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County,
194 Fed., 593, at p. 604.
In the liquidation of insolvent banks, the general depositors are entitled to no preference, and must share pro rata with the general creditors.
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co.,
194 N. C., 125, 138 S. E., 530;
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co., supra.
But where deposits are made with the distinct understanding that they are to be held by the bank for the purpose of furthering a transaction between the depositor and a third person, or where they are made under such circumstances as give rise to a necessary implication that they are made for such a purpose, the deposits become impressed with a trust which entitles the depositor to a preference over the general creditors of the bank in case the bank becomes insolvent while holding the deposits.
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co., supra; Hudspeth v. Union Trust & Savings Bank,
196 Iowa, 706, 195 N.
W.,
378, 31 A. L. R., 466, and note; 7 C. J., 631.
There are also certain statutory preferences (C. S:, 218(c) ;
Morecock v. Iiood, Comr.,
202 N. C., 321, 162 S. E., 730), as well as equitable ones
(Parker v. Trust Co., supra),
allowable in the liquidation of insolvent banks, but the present record deals only with the equitable right of priority.
In re Bank, ante,
143, 167 S. E., 561.
The argument of the defendant proceeds upon the premise that the trust and commercial departments of the Central Bank and Trust Company were two separate and distinct entities, whereas in truth and in fact they- were but component parts of a single unit. The fact that the trust department account was overdrawn at the time of the bank’s closing proves no more than that the Central Bank and Trust Company misused or misapplied plaintiff’s funds for its own purposes. It had various
other moneys all mingled in the same till, with those deposited by plaintiff, and the overdraft in the trust department account was but a bookkeeping: arrangement so far as the bank’s creditors are concerned. A corporate fiduciary will not be permitted to escape the responsibilities arising from such status by the simple expedient of self-dealing. Note, 31 Mich. L. Rev., 532.
The plaintiff has shown that she deposited with the Central Bank and Trust Company certain funds for a specific purpose, which the bank received in trust, mingled them with other funds, and became insolvent before discharging the trust, with a portion of the commingled fund still on hand when the defendant, as liquidating agent, took charge of its affairs. Plaintiff’s funds were not only mingled with others in the general account of the trust department, but this account was likewise commingled with the general funds of the bank. It appears, therefore, that the general coffers of the bank were enriched to the extent of plaintiff’s deposits, and the assets coming into the hands of the defendant were accordingly increased or made larger. This entitles the plaintiff to a preference.
Peters v. Bain,
133 U. S., 670, 33 L. Ed., 696;
Brennan v. Tillinghast,
201 Fed., 609;
Schumacher v. Harriett,
52 Fed. (2d), 817;
Lusk v. Giinther,
32 Wyo., 294, 232 Pac., 518;
Andrew v. Hamilton County State Bank,
207 Iowa, 403, 223 N.
W.,
176; 30 Mich. L. Rev., 441.
The decisions in
Corp. Com. v. Bank,
137 N. C., 697, 50 S. E., 308, 2 Ann. Cas., 537,
Bank v. Davis,
114 N. C., 343, 19 S. E., 280, and
Chemical Co. v. Rogers,
172 N. C., 154, 90 S. E., 129, are not at variance with the conclusions reached in
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co.,
193 N. C., 696, 138 S. E., 22, nor in
Parker v. Trust Co.,
202 N. C., 230, 162 S.
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Stacy, C. J.
The case is controlled by the decision in
Parker v. Trust Co.,
202 N. C., 230, 162 S. E., 564
(Newsom v. Mut. Life Asso.,
136 So. (Fla.), 389, likewise practically on all-fours), unless the circumstance, appearing here, but which did not appear there, that the account of the trust department with the commercial department was overdrawn at the time of the closing of the Central Bank and Trust Company, differentiates the two cases and reduces plaintiff’s claim from one of preference to one of commonalty.
It is the position of the plaintiff that the method of handling the account in question was a matter of internal bookkeeping, or of self-dealing, and is without material significance in the case
(Glidden v. Gutelius,
96 Fla., 834, 119 So., 140) ; that the Central Bank and Trust Company was authorized to do a trust business as well as a commercial business (C. S., 21?(a) ; that it had but one charter, and although its two departments may have been separate and distinct, together they comprized but a single business unit
(In re Prudential Trust Co.,
244 Mass., 64), rendering it inequitable to allow such an institution to change its status from trustee to debtor simply by shifting funds from its right hand to its left, or from one till to another
(Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott,
181 N. E. (Ind. App.), 369; Note 31 Mich. L. Rev., 532; 44 Harvard L. Revv 1281) ; that the general depositors knew, or should have known, that trust funds in the hands of such a banking institution, deposited for special purposes, were perforce received in a fiduciary capacity and would necessarily be held subject to the equitable principles existing between the parties to such fiduciary relationship
(Bank v. Corp. Com.,
201 N. C., 381, 160 S. E., 360;
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co.,
193 N. C., 696, 138 S. E., 22;
Glidden v. Gutelius, supra),
and that when an agent, bailee, or trustee, commingles funds with his own, and dissipates a portion of the commingled fund, he will be presumed to have dissipated his own funds first, and that the remainder of such commingled fund will be subject to distribution among his
cestui que trustent
according to their respective rights.
Myers v. Matusek,
98 Fla., 1126, 125 So., 360; Note, 82 A. L. R., 46
et seq.
The defendant, on the other hand, says that the rightfnlness of the deposit made by the trust department with the commercial department, whether legal or other, in the absence of statutory authorization, is not challenged; that it does appear by so depositing said funds they were thereby segregated or earmarked as belonging to a separate account; that this account was overdrawn to the extent of $21,000 at the time of the bank’s closing; that instead of augmenting the funds in the hands of the liquidating agent, they were apparently diminished to the extent of the overdraft; that to entitle a claimant to preferential payment from the assets of an insolvent bank in the hands of a liquidating agent, it must appear the funds demanded were in the bank’s possession as agent, bailee, or trustee; that such funds reached the hands of the liquidating agent in some form; that the assets brought under his control were larger by this amount than they otherwise would have been
(Tinsley v. Amos,
135 So. (Fla.), 397) ; and that plaintiff has failed to make out such a case.
McDonald v. Fulton,
125 Ohio, 507, 182. N. E., 504;
Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County,
194 Fed., 593, at p. 604.
In the liquidation of insolvent banks, the general depositors are entitled to no preference, and must share pro rata with the general creditors.
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co.,
194 N. C., 125, 138 S. E., 530;
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co., supra.
But where deposits are made with the distinct understanding that they are to be held by the bank for the purpose of furthering a transaction between the depositor and a third person, or where they are made under such circumstances as give rise to a necessary implication that they are made for such a purpose, the deposits become impressed with a trust which entitles the depositor to a preference over the general creditors of the bank in case the bank becomes insolvent while holding the deposits.
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co., supra; Hudspeth v. Union Trust & Savings Bank,
196 Iowa, 706, 195 N.
W.,
378, 31 A. L. R., 466, and note; 7 C. J., 631.
There are also certain statutory preferences (C. S:, 218(c) ;
Morecock v. Iiood, Comr.,
202 N. C., 321, 162 S. E., 730), as well as equitable ones
(Parker v. Trust Co., supra),
allowable in the liquidation of insolvent banks, but the present record deals only with the equitable right of priority.
In re Bank, ante,
143, 167 S. E., 561.
The argument of the defendant proceeds upon the premise that the trust and commercial departments of the Central Bank and Trust Company were two separate and distinct entities, whereas in truth and in fact they- were but component parts of a single unit. The fact that the trust department account was overdrawn at the time of the bank’s closing proves no more than that the Central Bank and Trust Company misused or misapplied plaintiff’s funds for its own purposes. It had various
other moneys all mingled in the same till, with those deposited by plaintiff, and the overdraft in the trust department account was but a bookkeeping: arrangement so far as the bank’s creditors are concerned. A corporate fiduciary will not be permitted to escape the responsibilities arising from such status by the simple expedient of self-dealing. Note, 31 Mich. L. Rev., 532.
The plaintiff has shown that she deposited with the Central Bank and Trust Company certain funds for a specific purpose, which the bank received in trust, mingled them with other funds, and became insolvent before discharging the trust, with a portion of the commingled fund still on hand when the defendant, as liquidating agent, took charge of its affairs. Plaintiff’s funds were not only mingled with others in the general account of the trust department, but this account was likewise commingled with the general funds of the bank. It appears, therefore, that the general coffers of the bank were enriched to the extent of plaintiff’s deposits, and the assets coming into the hands of the defendant were accordingly increased or made larger. This entitles the plaintiff to a preference.
Peters v. Bain,
133 U. S., 670, 33 L. Ed., 696;
Brennan v. Tillinghast,
201 Fed., 609;
Schumacher v. Harriett,
52 Fed. (2d), 817;
Lusk v. Giinther,
32 Wyo., 294, 232 Pac., 518;
Andrew v. Hamilton County State Bank,
207 Iowa, 403, 223 N.
W.,
176; 30 Mich. L. Rev., 441.
The decisions in
Corp. Com. v. Bank,
137 N. C., 697, 50 S. E., 308, 2 Ann. Cas., 537,
Bank v. Davis,
114 N. C., 343, 19 S. E., 280, and
Chemical Co. v. Rogers,
172 N. C., 154, 90 S. E., 129, are not at variance with the conclusions reached in
Corp. Com. v. Trust Co.,
193 N. C., 696, 138 S. E., 22, nor in
Parker v. Trust Co.,
202 N. C., 230, 162 S. E., 564, nor with anything said herein. The whole subject is elaborately discussed in a recent annotation, 82 A. L. R., 46,
et seq.,
from which it appears that many perplexing questions have lately arisen in connection with the liquidation of insolvent banks. The various courts have found it difficult with consistency to plot the line, sometimes shadowy, which separates the rights of preferential creditors from those of the general or common creditors. Much of the confusion apparently has come from a failure to distinguish between the right of preference, or equity of priority, and the right to have certain specific property returned to the creditor, as under claim and delivery, on the principle of fungible goods or because of direct ownership therein. And while it may not be possible to lay down a rule applicable in all cases, due to the manifold situations arising, equity will not forsake the pursuit, simply because of the difficulties presented, unless and until the legislative department shall preempt the field by enactment of statutory regulations covering the subject. Nor do we decide in advance
upon the effect or validity of sucb preemption should it be undertaken.
State, ex rel. Sorensen v. Farmers State Bank,
121 Neb., 532.
The precise question here presented is new in this jurisdiction, but the ruling appealed from is supported in tendency, at least, by a number of decisions, and will be upheld.
Affirmed.