Flack v. Condict

49 A. 508, 66 N.J.L. 351, 1901 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 83
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedJune 10, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 49 A. 508 (Flack v. Condict) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flack v. Condict, 49 A. 508, 66 N.J.L. 351, 1901 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 83 (N.J. 1901).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Depue, Chief Justice.

The defendant was a manufacturer of machinery, and especially of a refrigerating machine, carrying on business at Jersey City. The plaintiff entered the defendant’s employ September 1st, 1898, on terms that he was to receive a stated salary of $100 a month, and he be paid commissions at the rate of three per cent, on the amount of certain sales. The monthly salary has been paid. The litigation is over the plaintiff’s claim for commissions. The [353]*353suit relates to the claim for commissions on three contracts, referred to in the case as follows: First, contract with the Pabst Brewing Company, called the “Parker House Contract,” to put an ice machine in the Parker House in New York for the sum of $2,000; second, contract with Thomas J. Butler for installing a refrigerating plant in the buildings at Sixty-ninth and Seventieth streets and the Boulevard, New York City, called “The Butler Contract,”, for $13,561.50; third, contract with the United States Government for .putting in an ice-making apparatus at West Point, for the sum of $7,336.

The jury found that the plaintiff was entitled to commissions on all three of these contracts, and the verdict was for $731.63, being the amount of such commissions, with interest.

The controversy in this ease relates to the terms and conditions under which these commissions were by the contract to be paid. With respect to the Parker House contract and the Butler contract, no question was made that they came under the agreement of the parties as to commissions. With regard to these claims for commissions, the contention of the defendant was that the plaintiff had waived his commissions.

With respect to the Parker House contract,- the defendant testified: “The plaintiff called me up on the telephone and stated that the Pabst people had offered $1,800. I said, ‘Day’ (that is Elack’s name) ‘there is no use.’ “Well,’ he- says, ‘I may be able to get $2,000.’ ‘Well,’ I says, ‘If you can get $2,000 and waive your commission we will attempt it, but I. don’t think we can get out whole.’ ”

Mr. Lee Oondiet, the defendant’s manager, testified that the price the defendant asked for the work was between $2,900 and $3,000. “Mr. Slipe, the agent of the Pabst Brewing Company, said he wouldn’t pay that amount, and I said, ‘All right; we won’t take it for any less.’” He also testified that “Mr. Elack was present at that interview, and when we got outside I told him that we might make a slight concession on that job if we could get it; if we could get it for $100 or $200 less we would rather have it than lose it. The plaintiff was to see' these parties later in the day, and I told [354]*354him under no circumstances to take a contract for less than $3,600; that was the limit, and he understood it; he said it was all right. The next morning my father told me they had taken the job for $3,000; that we would lose money on it, and that he (Mack) had disobeyed my instructions. The plaintiff was present at this interview, and I said to him, We will lose money on the job; it has- been accepted, and as honorable business men we will have to stand by our acceptance of the contract for $3,000, but I want you to understand now and here that you will have to waive your commission/ and he said he would.” The plaintiff does not contradict the testimony of the defendant on this subject. When asked about the Parker _ House contract, the plaintiff testified that he had never disputed that, because Mr. Condict had said that they hadn’t made any money on that. As I understand his admission, his claim on that subject was out of this suit. In the brief of plaintiff’s counsel it is admitted that the plaintiff agreed to waive the commission if the defendant lost money on that particular job. He admits that the claim on the part of the defendant was that he did not make any money and that he lost some. On the cross-examination of Lee Condict he is asked by counsel for plaintiff the question whether the defendant kept books, and whether the books showed what the defendant lost.on that job, and his answer was, “Yes, sir.” Then the question was asked of him, “What did you lose on it?” That was objected to and excluded by the court on the ground that it was not material. It is insisted on the part of plaintiff’s counsel that the jury inferred from the non-production of the books that they would not show any loss on that job, and concluded that a loss had not been proved. The court having considered the amount of loss unimportant, the non-production of the defendant’s books was comparatively not of much importance in the case. It will also be observed that the testimony is_ that the agreement of the plaintiff to waive his commission was made on the condition that the price of $3,000 would be accepted. I think that is the clear weight of the testimony on that subject. The plaintiff testified that the next morning after the [355]*355price of $2,000 was accepted, “Mr. Lee Oondict was rather angry that his father had accepted $2,000, and then he said I would have to waive my commission if they lost money on that job, rather forcing me to accept the waiver.”

“Q. He forced you to accept the waiver ?
“A. He said I would have to do it. I assented. What else could I do ?”

The proof of waiver is decisive, and the clear weight of the evidence is that it was unqualified and without condition. In that view of the case the production of the books to show the amount of loss was wholly unnecessary.

. The next consideration is the Butler contract. The price asked by the defendant for that machine was $13,000. Lee Oondict testified that an offer was made by Butler “that if we would take that for $12,008 we could go on with the work.” He testified that the negotiation with Butler was by telephone, and that the plaintiff was present. The witness testified that he said to the plaintiff, “If wé accept that price, your commission must be waived,” and that the plaintiff agreed to it. The plaintiff admits that he was present at that negotiation, and that he was asked by the defendant to waive his commission.

”Q. Eor what reason ?
“A. That I had better leave it to him to take care of me. I stated that was the second time that that thing had been done, and the only condition I would agree to was that in case they lost any money on the job I would waive my commission.” •

With regard to this contract, there was admittedly a waiver. The' only question is whether that waiver depended upon the condition that the defendant lost on the contract. There was no proof of a loss on this contract; but, as has already been said, the clear weight of the evidence is that the waiver was unconditional in both instances.

In addition to the other evidence on this subject, the letters written by the plaintiff are of considerable importance. He left the employment of the defendant on the 1st of November, 1899. December 27th, 1899, he wrote a letter to the defend[356]*356ant in which he demanded commissions upon the West Point contract. This letter was sent, but is unsigned. It was followed' by another letter, dated January 9th, 1900, demanding commissions on the West Point transaction. That letter is signed by the plaintiff.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
49 A. 508, 66 N.J.L. 351, 1901 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 83, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flack-v-condict-nj-1901.