F.L. v. Superior Court CA1/2

Opinion

Filed 8/20/26 F.L. v. Superior Court CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

F.L. et al., Petitioners,

v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY, A176020

Respondent;

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN (Sonoma County Super. Ct. SERVICES DEPARTMENT et al., No. 24JD00117)

Real Parties in Interest.

L.L. (mother) and F.L. (father) petition for extraordinary relief to overturn an order entered at an 18-month review hearing terminating their reunification services concerning their nine-year-old autistic daughter G.L. and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 We will grant both writ petitions. We conclude the juvenile court erred in concluding that returning G.L. to father’s custody would be substantially detrimental to G.L. In addition, there is insufficient evidence that the parents were offered or provided reasonable reunification services during the

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2

18-month review period, including adequate visitation with their significantly disabled child. Despite the many services they received, there is not substantial evidence to support a finding by the clear and convincing standard that they were provided with access to services that were adequate in the circumstances of this case to assist them in meeting the unique and highly specialized needs of their daughter.

BACKGROUND

A. Case Initiation In June 2024, the Sonoma County Department of Human Services (the Department) filed a dependency petition alleging that seven-year-old G.L., her five-year-old sister P.L., and her three-year-old brother L.M. were at risk due to their parents’ failure to meet their basic needs, including as a result of mother’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b).) The petition alleged mother “has an unaddressed intellectual impairment and/or learning disability that appears to be impacting her ability to meet her children’s needs at this time and contributes to the mother feeling overwhelmed and unable to follow through with scheduling and getting the children to their essential appointments.” And it alleged that father “relies on the mother to manage the children’s medical, physical, and behavioral needs, despite being aware, and/or reasonably he should have been aware, that the mother has an unaddressed intellectual impairment and/or learning disability that impacts her ability to meet the children’s needs.”

The petition alleged the parents had not consistently ensured the children had proper hygiene and access to adequate nutrition.

The petition also alleged they had not adequately met G.L.’s medical needs, “which could result [in] irreversible harm, up to including death.” It

3

alleged G.L. had been diagnosed with “Failure to Thrive since approximately 2021” and currently measured at less than 1 percentile in weight and height for her age. It also alleged G.L. had been diagnosed with “Autism Spectrum Disorder,” as well as medical conditions that needed medical attention and follow-up: a rare spinal birth defect; a lung condition from premature birth that causes breathing problems; an eye disease from premature birth that causes the growth of abnormal retinal blood vessels; and possibly also a fluidfilled cyst in her spinal column that could cause pain, weakness, and stiffness as it grew.

The petition alleged the parents were currently “receiving intensive case management services through the LifeWorks program2 and previously participated in a Voluntary Preservation Case with the Department from approximately October of 2022 through November of 2023,” but the safety concerns persisted.

According to the detention report, the family had been the subject of numerous referrals for general neglect in the past seven years, including reports that the children were dirty and smelly at school and/or on the school bus (and at least once, one child had dirty feces caked to her bottom); the children were not being properly fed, clothed or cared for; and the parents had not followed through on referrals for various services including a nutritionist and occupational therapist. The most recent past referral had been a few months earlier, when G.L.’s pediatrician had reported she was still underweight; it was determined the parents were not buying or preparing food for the children and were relying exclusively on take-out food. Then in May 2024, the Department received another referral that the parents

2This was a reference to the LifeWorks program at the North Bay Regional Center (hereafter the Regional Center).

4

were still chronically neglecting to follow through on services and medical appointments for G.L., which precipitated this case. The detention report also noted that “[i]t has been reported that the mother often sends the children to school with unkept hair, dirty clothes, shoes that are too small, and soiled diapers. Although successfully becoming toilet trained during her first week of school, [P.L.] continues to wear diapers at home, to which the mother states is due to the child not wanting to use the restroom at home.”

As to G.L., the detention report explained that G.L. had been diagnosed with “failure to thrive” about three years earlier, in 2021, which was a sign of malnutrition and meant that she was not growing appropriately. Given her current height and weight (both less than 1 percentile for her age), medical professionals were concerned her condition could become life-threatening if her weight loss and her parents’ lack of follow-through persisted.

According to the detention report, “It is reported and confirmed with various professionals that the mother has a mild intellectual disability” and “requires a high level of assistance with basic everyday tasks. She becomes overwhelmed easily, often limits herself to one meeting a day with providers or stops calling people back because ‘it’s too much.’ ” It said she “relies entirely on her LifeWorks case manager to assist her in scheduling appointment[s], reminding her to meet the basic needs of her children, and for communication with other service professionals.” The Department reported that it was “worried that the mother’s own intellectual disability hinders her ability to recognize and provide the necessities for her children.”

As for father, the detention report said he relied “heavily” on mother to care for the children, did not acknowledge the concerns raised by service providers regarding mother’s inability to meet the children’s basic needs, was “not concerned for his children and does not appear to go out of his way to

5

make sure they have what they need . . . .” He told the Department he believed mother was able to adequately care for the children. The detention report noted he “has done well with direct instructions, although his engagement is very minimal.”

According to the detention report, the family had recently become unhoused “due to mismanagement of housing funding” they had been receiving, was living in a shelter, and had declined additional housing support. And the parents “continue to overlook concerns . . . regarding the children’s hygiene and basic needs.” Despite receiving services from various providers including voluntary case management services from the Department, the parents had failed to demonstrate an “ability to prioritize the planning and organization of appointments and services for the children” and “continue[d] to overlook concerns raised by service providers regarding the children’s hygiene, basic needs as well as their medical and behavioral health,” which put the children at continued risk of neglect. 3 The three children were detained, and father was elevated to presumed father status. Subsequently, at an uncontested jurisdiction/disposition hearing held on August 7, 2024, the juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered reunification services.

B. The Family’s Progress After 18 Months A year and a half later, in its December 10, 2025 report for the 18-

month review hearing, the Department recommended terminating reunification services for both parents concerning G.L. By contrast, it recommended reunifying father with P.L. with family maintenance services and “enhancement services” for mother. The Department recommended that

3 The detention report noted the youngest child, L.M., like G.M., had been diagnosed with autism too.

6

family maintenance services successfully conclude as to the youngest child L.M., who by then had been placed in the custody of a second man, J.T., who had been elevated to “secondary” presumed father status along with father. The court subsequently adopted these dispositions for the other children by agreement of the parties following a settlement conference.

By this point, eight-year-old G.L. was in her third placement (an emergency foster home), and no concurrent placement for her had been identified.4 She continued to receive an array of developmental, therapeutic and medical support services, including through school where she was in third grade and reportedly was doing well, having fewer tantrums and being more verbal and social. The Department reported she required “24/7 care,” minimally used words and phrases, and tended to whine, smile, and giggle a lot. Things like dancing and music put her in a better mood. Noise and crowds frequently overwhelmed and overstimulated her, and frequently she had meltdowns or wanted to isolate. She was not yet toilet trained despite some attempts to help her with this at school and continued to wear diapers. She had difficulty with social skills and with communication. She communicated using simple words, one-word sentences or by pointing. She

4 She had been placed initially with a non-relative extended family member, had been moved to an emergency foster home before the six-month review hearing, and had been moved to a second emergency foster home before the 12-month review hearing due to her very high needs and was still there.

The Department reported that G.L.’s maternal grandmother “could be a potential option” for concurrent planning, “but further evaluation is needed” and “was not previously an option due to [P.L.] living in the [maternal grandmother’s] home.” It reported that “[n]o other relatives have been a viable option for placement” for G.L., “nor have they expressed interest.” It wrote that it would “continue assessing and exploring alternative relative placement options” if G.L. “need[ed] to be moved for any reason.”

7

also had an electronic tablet to help her communicate, although it was difficult for her to use it consistently at school and at home. Although she continued to have difficulty gaining weight, G.L.’s pediatrician had lifted her diagnosis of failure to thrive.

By this point, mother had filed for divorce. She had found stable housing and was training to get a job as a health care assistant. Father was working two jobs, and he too had secured housing, although he was worried about his ability to pay the rent once his financial housing assistance was exhausted.

Both parents also had undergone a psychological evaluation to determine whether they could safely parent their children, which had been discussed in the 12-month status report. As described in the 12-month report, the psychologist, Dr. Anglada-Figueroa, concluded that father was “ ‘a reliable, conscientious, and emotionally stable parent.’ ” He found “ ‘no evidence of mental illness, substance use, or cognitive impairment’ ” and suggested father “ ‘would benefit from therapeutic support focused on emotional flexibility and improved interpersonal attunement, especially in high-stress or ambiguous contexts.’ ”

As described in the 12-month report, the psychologist concluded that mother also possessed the capacity to parent effectively. He found that mother’s “ ‘execution’ ” was in the twelfth percentile, “ ‘which reveals a “Below Average level of Visual Motor Integration Maturity and general cognitive development” ’ ” and that her “age -equivalent” was that of a 9-year- old child. But he concluded that mother was “ ‘a psychologically resilient and emotionally invested mother whose past parenting difficulties are best explained by a combination of emotional overload, limited prior education,

8

and inadequate parental modeling,[5] rather than any severe mental illness or intellectual disability.’ ” He explained, “ ‘[c]ognitive testing reveals low average function with relative strengths in orientation, judgment, and emotional motivation’ ” and that mother’s “ ‘current functioning supports her capacity to parent effectively, particularly within a structured and supportive environment. Continued therapeutic work is encouraged to build on recent gains, support emotional expression, and maintain consistency in parenting.’ ”

The full, 22-page report would later be admitted into evidence at the subsequent contested hearing. Read in full, it flatly contradicted the notion that mother was suffering from a mental impairment that prevented her from effectively parenting. It concluded that while she had below-average cognitive functioning in many areas, she also had “solid judgment and the ability to make sound decisions in everyday situations” (ranking in the 58th percentile for that trait) which was “an important strength in the context of parenting and independent living,” and she exhibited “remarkable” motivation and effort, “resilience, a sincere commitment to self-betterment, and a notable degree of psychological insight.” It concluded that her past parenting challenges “are best understood in the context of prior educational disadvantages, emotional suppression, and difficulty navigating high-stakes systems—not due to any major psychopathology or cognitive impairment.” It described her as a “psychologically resilient and emotionally invested mother whose past parenting difficulties are best explained by a combination of emotional overload, limited prior education, and inadequate parenting

5 As a child, mother herself had been the subject of multiple child welfare investigations into possible physical abuse by her parents, including one incident involving unexplained broken bones and another that culminated with mother threatening to kill one of her parents with a knife.

9

modeling, rather than any severe mental illness or intellectual disability. Cognitive tests reveal low average functioning with relative strengths in orientation, judgment, and emotional motivation. She demonstrates substantial growth in emotional insight, parenting confidence, and service engagement.” Overall, it was extremely positive about her capacity and motivation for further growth and expressed no hesitation about her ability to do so “particularly within a structured and supportive environment.”

The social worker who authored the 12-month report disagreed with the psychologist’s conclusions. She wrote that the psychologist’s findings about some of mother’s below-average traits “call[] for concern in regard to how safely she would be able to parent [her three children] especially given that [G.L.] (8) and [L.M.] (4) have special needs. [Mother] has historically been in special education, has required support in all activities of daily living (ADL) equivalent to that 24/7 support care, and has slower reactive responses, creating an increase in concern for the children’s active daily lives.”

The 18-month report indicated that both parents had fully engaged in the reunification services that had been offered to them. It reported that mother “continues to engage and receive parenting support, including parenting classes and parent coaching from Child Parent Institute and through the Department” and continued to attend therapy; father continued to engage with his parent mentor, had recently completed a 12-hour class called “Armonia y bienestar” at the Child Parent Institute and was working with another provider on budgeting skills and creating a spending plan; and both parents had been staying in “constant communication” with the Department, caregivers, school staff, visitation staff, and all of their service providers.

10

According to the 18-month report, both parents also had been visiting regularly with G.L. twice a week for 50 minutes, fully supervised. Two months earlier, as of October 31, 2025, visitation staff had indicated that mother was ready to move to “lightly supervised” visits, but the report does not indicate why that change did not occur. The social worker wrote only that this “may indicate that mother continues to progress and learn skills that she is putting into practice” during her visits.

The Department reported that visits with G.L. often had been without G.L.’s siblings because G.L. would “becomes very over stimulated, begins to throw herself [on the ground] and have self-harm behaviors and becomes very dysregulated in visits.” It reported that joint visits with all siblings “tend to be overwhelming for all siblings, especially [G.L.], as she gets very overstimulated and dysregulated causing moments of instability and safety concerns.” But once a month, G.L. would have a 50-minute, fully supervised joint visit with her parents and siblings, which were reportedly “going well.” The social worker wrote that “[f]rom secondhand information . . . , the family visits at CPI [Child and Parent Institute] are going much better, although transitions are difficult for the children, especially [G.L.]. . . . The Undersigned has not had the opportunity to observe these visits and might not be able to as it is understood these visits can be overwhelming and overstimulating for the children when there are multiple adults present.”

The 18-month report provided minimal information about the parents’

visits with G.L. specifically, did not note any specific concerns with those visits, and generally reported favorably about visitation. It said that both parents “have . . . been working on creating a strong structure and routine during visits, engaging the children, understanding each child’s needs and managing their behaviors. This continues to be a place of growth as visits

11

with the children have been difficult as each requires a different type and level of support.” It said it was in the children’s best interests for consistent visitation with their parents and with each other to continue “as it is apparent their connection is strong.” It reported that father “brings specific toys he knows the children will like and asks the children how they are,” and “is affectionate towards the children” during visits. Regarding mother, it said that “During visitation with her children [mother] has demonstrated her ability to bring structure and routine to visits by having plans for visits, engaging the children and managing their behaviors. On some visits [mother] is observed to bring different meals for each child based on what they like to eat. [Mother] structures the visit to have the children wash their hands before they sit at the table to eat. Other visits are structured around going to a nearby community park and on these visits [mother] transports the children in a wagon. [Mother] has previously told the children she will set a timer on her phone and when the phone rings it’s time to get ready to walk back to the office.” It also reported that mother’s visits with her other two children “are going well” though noted a concern that in some visits she “can become passive and/or confrontational” in that she “remains sitting down with minimal engagement and redirection,” while at other times, would “positively redirect[] and validat[e] the children.”

The 18-month report was, on the whole, positive about the parents’

progress and did not identify any specific concerns about their ability to care for G.L. It said father had “demonstrated better attunement with the children’s needs” during visits, “engages in appropriate play and safety guards,” and also had “worked diligently to provide what is needed to meet the ongoing needs of the children.”

12

It said that mother had shown “tremendous improvements.” She exhibited “noticeable behavioral changes [she] has acknowledged and reflected on.” Specifically, she “can reflect back on her previous parenting behaviors and how she has made changes and learned to identify differences in each of her children’s behavioral cues,” “was able to reflect on how yelling and screaming at her children was something that she did in the past that she no longer does now because she understands how it impacts her children in a negative way,” and “[i]nstead of yelling, [she] will attempt to stay calm and ask questions to understand what the child’s needs are at that moment.” She also had bought a fish tank for her children because she knows they love fish and was able to explain to the social worker how she cares for the fish, replaces the water and feeds them. In addition, with the benefit of parenting coaching, she “has improved in her social interactions with others” and expanded her social connections. She understood the value of the parenting support she had been receiving, wanted to continue to engage with them, and also wanted a chance to demonstrate in visits the skills she’d learned and behavior changes she’d made.

Nevertheless, despite these favorable changes, the Department stated that “there continues to remain a lack of demonstrating a clear understanding of age and developmentally appropriate behaviors and expectations . . . especially around [G.L.’s] and [L.M.’s] diagnosis of autism and higher levels of care”6 and also, as to mother, “most recently with [P.L.’s] regression and inconsistency during lightly supervised visits.”7 The first was the only concern noted as to father.

6 By this point L.M. was four years old and had minimal verbal skills. 7 This was apparently a reference to some difficulties during visits with P.L. in late August and early September 2025 that the Department described during closing arguments at the subsequent contested hearing.

13

As to mother, it elaborated somewhat. The Department had not received an update from mother’s therapist. But it said that “Since the onset of this investigation, it has been observed that [mother] has a possible cognitive or intellectual delay, which often requires a high level of assistance from another adult with basic everyday tasks. She becomes overwhelmed easily, often limiting herself to one to two meetings a day with providers or visits with the children. The Undersigned has also observed [her] to stay quiet for a moment after information is given, needing some moments to process, and often needs prompting regarding questions and next steps. The Undersigned needs to ask clarifying questions.” It concluded, “At this moment it is unclear what [her] understanding of each child’s needs are and if they can be met, especially for [G.L.] who requires 24/7 care.” She “has acquired many practical skills; however, possible cognitive or intellectual delays appear to limit her ability to apply these skills reliably in the context of the children’s elevated behavioral and developmental needs, resulting in ongoing concerns regarding her ability to provide adequate care.”

The 18-month report included a section entitled “Danger Statement.”

In full it stated: “The Department, medical professionals, and service providers are worried that the children’s medical and basic needs will continue to be unmet due to the mother[’s] . . . and father[’s] inability to prioritize the planning and organization of appointments and services.”

C. The Hearing and Court’s Ruling A contested review hearing took place about three months later over two days in March 2026. Several hundred pages of documents were admitted

According to counsel’s argument, the visitation logs reflected three visits in that period in which P.L. was crying or screaming a great deal and mother was unable to handle the situation, and in one instance the visitation coach had to intervene.

14

into evidence in addition to the 18-month review report, and five witnesses testified: (1) the social worker who was assigned to the case for the first 14 months, from August 2024 to October 29, 2025, Noemi Villagomez (hereafter initial social worker); (2) the current social worker, Selene Cazares, who took over the case less than six months after receiving her master’s degree in social work, authored the 18-month report, and by the time of the hearing had handled the case for about four months (hereafter current social worker); (3) mother’s services coordinator from the Regional Center, Amber Gonzales, who testified about the services mother had been receiving from the center since her children had been removed from her custody, additional services mother might be able to access if any of her children were returned to her, as well as the extent to which the social workers assigned to the case had or had not engaged with Gonzales about mother’s services and needs; (4) a supervisor from the Regional Center, Reyna Lopez, who testified in lieu of G.L.’s service coordinator about the services G.L. was receiving through the Regional Center; and (5) mother.

We refrain from summarizing the testimony in full and will discuss it further as necessary below. The second social worker testified that she had been on the case for approximately nine weeks when she wrote the 18-month report and did not have a good grasp of the details of the case at that time. Generally stated, the social workers confirmed that both parents had fully complied with their case plans and that both had been eager to receive additional services. They also testified that all reunification services had been exhausted for both parents and there were no additional services to offer either parent beyond what had been provided to them. The first social worker testified she had safety concerns because neither parent had displayed sufficient understanding of G.L.’s “cues” to understand her needs,

15

avoid triggering her into an emotionally dysregulated state where she began flailing or throwing things, or how to help her when she did become that way. The second social worker testified that she generally had safety concerns around mother due to G.L.’s exceptionally high needs, and that it would be unsafe to return G.L. to father due to the presence of another child in his home who had exhibited sexualized behaviors in the past. They did not testify that either parent lacked the understanding or capacity to meet G.L.’s nutritional needs by this juncture.

As for mother, the initial social worker, who had authored the six and 12-month reports, stood by her disagreement with the psychologist’s assessment that mother could parent effectively with sufficient support, but the current social worker agreed with the psychologist’s assessment. She also testified that mother had developed a way to keep track of appointments and had never missed an appointment in the time she’d handled the case. There was a great deal of testimony about what kinds of additional services from the Regional Center might be available to support mother if G.L. were returned to her care, but none of those details had been evaluated. The first social worker never explored that subject with mother’s service coordinator at the Regional Center because the subject seemed premature; the current social worker inquired about this, but mother’s service coordinator had lacked sufficient lead time and information to evaluate what additional services might be available but stood ready, able, and willing to put the administrative wheels in motion to assess that question if and when asked to do so and given a hypothetical return home date. She testified the assessment hypothetically could have taken place earlier, “but there was no indication of [G.L.] coming back to the family home.” There was also a great deal of testimony about why neither parent ever received more than two

16

hours a week of visitation with G.L. in 18 months or, despite numerous recommendations from visitation monitors to do so, was permitted to move to lightly supervised rather than fully supervised visitation, a subject we address below.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled the Department had met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services had been provided, declined to return G.L. to either parent, terminated reunification services, and set the case for a hearing under section 366.26. It found that both parents had been “eager” to take advantage of the services provided to them and had done “a remarkable job of following through.” But it found that, “unlike with her siblings,” their “efforts here were not enough” to have [G.L.] returned to them, due to “a multitude of factors, including the parents’ needs as well as [G.L.’s].”8 The court also found that the services provided by the Regional Center could have been “better harmonized” with the Department and that the Department had not “push[ed] the Regional Center to create some kind of unique protocol or process to match the circumstances of this family” but that reasonable reunification services had nonetheless been provided, and that the decision not to reduce the level of supervision of visitation was reasonable “when considered against the backdrop of the totality of information before the court.” The decision “was not arbitrary but a considered choice made by those in the best position to make them.”

8 The court did not “specify the factual basis for its conclusion that return [of G.L. to parental custody] would be detrimental” as it was statutorily required to do (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(2)), an error that neither parent raises as independent basis for reversal.

17

DISCUSSION

I.

Return to Parental Custody.

Both parents assert that the juvenile court erred in finding there would be a substantial risk of detriment if G.L. were returned to their custody, because at a minimum any residual concerns for her well-being that remained by the time of the 18-month hearing could be addressed through an order for family maintenance services.

A. Legal Principles Until reunification services are terminated, family preservation is the dependency scheme’s legislatively mandated goal. (Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 870, 267 (Georgeanne G.); In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835, 839.) “ ‘[U]p until the time the section 366.26 hearing is set, the parent’s interest in reunification is given precedence over a child’s need for stability and permanency.’ ” (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 447, quoting In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 (Marilyn H.).) It is only after reunification services have been terminated that “the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.” (Marilyn H., at p. 309; accord, In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 420.)

Given the importance of family preservation, only if a parent poses a “substantial risk of detriment” to a child’s safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being may the state continue to deprive the parent of physical custody of their child during the reunification period (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1)) and thereby subordinate the constitutionally protected interests in a child’s care and companionship that parenthood otherwise entails. (See In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 419; Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 307.)

18

Put simply, the parent must pose a “substantial” danger to the child in some way.

In evaluating this issue, “ ‘the juvenile court must consider the extent to which the parent participated in reunification services. [Citations.] The court must also consider the efforts or progress the parent has made toward eliminating the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.’ ” (In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 966.) “The evidence must be viewed in light of the . . . parent’s response to services and demonstrated ability to safely care for the child,” despite the dangers the parent initially posed to the child. (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1417, 1425 (Tracy J.).)

The burden to show substantial danger is on the agency (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1)), and it is a high one. (Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 864.) “[T]he risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child to parental custody represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400.) It does not require perfection, including in compliance with services. (See ibid.; David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 789–790 (David B.); Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1343.) It does not “mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family member.” (David B., at p. 789.) “[T]here are times when we have to take a step back and make sure that we are not losing sight of our mandate. We are looking for passing grades here, not straight A’s.” (Id. at p. 790.)

A trial court does not defer to an agency’s recommendation that it is not safe to return a child to parental custody (including the opinions of a social

19

worker upon which it may be based). (See David B., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 796–797.) Rather, an agency has “the express burden of proving to the court that the conclusions it ha[s] reached [are] correct,” and courts “do not deprive parents of their children’s custody merely because [the agency] asks [them] to” do so. (Id. at p. 797.) Courts “do not presume that [the agency’s] judgments about the propriety or returning children to their parents’ custody are correct, even if we have previously found them to be correct in other cases. The final, and actual, judgment on this issue belongs to the court, not to [the agency]. And that judgment must be exercised independently, and in accordance with the proper standards of proof.” (Ibid.)

“We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment for substantial evidence by considering whether the evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the court’s finding.” (L.C. v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1034 (L.C.).) In doing so, “ ‘We resolve all conflicts in support of the determination, indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold the findings and may not substitute our deductions for those of the juvenile court.’ ” (Ibid.) The substantial evidence standard, although deferential, “is not toothless.” (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.) It does not mean “ ‘any’ ” evidence. (L.C., at p. 1034.) “It is well settled that the standard is not satisfied simply by pointing to ‘ “isolated evidence torn from the context of the whole record.” ’ ” (In re I.C., at p. 892; accord, People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577. Rather, substantial evidence “is ‘ “ ‘substantial’ proof of the essentials which the law requires.” ’ [Citations.] The focus is on the quality, rather than the quantity, of the evidence. . . . [Citation.] Inferences may constitute substantial evidence, but they must be the product of logic and reason.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.) “Opinion testimony which is conjectural or speculative ‘cannot rise to the

20

dignity of substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] [¶] The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.” (Roddenberry, at pp. 651–652.)

In the dependency context, “Perceptions of risk, rather than actual evidence of risk, do not suffice as substantial evidence.” (In re G.Z. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 857, 883.) Nor is the detriment standard satisfied by an agency’s “vague and nebulous concerns that [are] not supported by evidence.” (M.G. v. Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 646, 662.) Although social workers play a vital role in our dependency scheme, not every opinion of a child welfare worker rises to the level of substantial evidence. (See, e.g., In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941, 953–954 [social worker and agency assertions that reasonable services were provided and children should be placed for adoption]; In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 284–285 [social worker opinion that parents had not sufficiently internalized proper parenting skills was not substantial evidence of detriment]; Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1751 [opinion of social worker and therapist that mother had not internalized what she learned in parenting classes insufficient to establish detriment]; In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1226–1230 (Heather P.)9 [social worker’s report insufficient to support finding that return of child to mother would create substantial risk of detriment].)

B. Father In light of the entire record, we agree with father the Department failed to meet its burden to prove there was a substantial risk of detriment if G.L. were returned to him. The Department and the court acknowledged

9 Heather P. was disapproved on unrelated grounds in In re Richard S.

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 857, 866, footnote 5.

21

that he had fully complied with his case plan and fully engaged in all services offered to him, and as described above, the 18-month report reported favorably about his progress and his visits. It reported he had “demonstrated better attunement with the children’s needs” during visits, “engages in appropriate play and safety guards,” and had “worked diligently to provide what is needed to meet the ongoing needs of the children.” The visitation logs reflect uniformly positive interactions between father and his children and show that G.L. routinely allowed father to feed her and play with her, frequently allowed him to change her diaper, and frequently displayed physical closeness and affection toward him, allowing him to hug her, hold her hand, and even carry her.10 He had progressed sufficiently to regain custody of his other child, P.L. And the Department no longer expressed any concern for his ability to appreciate G.L.’s nutritional needs or keep her clean; the concerns for her malnutrition and poor hygiene that precipitated this case appear to have been resolved. The report did not identify any specific detrimental effects that would result from returning G.L. to father and failed to satisfy the basic mandate of section 366.21, that a status report not recommending the return of the child to the parent “specify why the return of the child would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (c), italics added.)11

10 The social worker who wrote the 18-month report hadn’t read the most recent visitation notes from January 2026, was last in contact with visitation staff in December 2025 (which was several months before the hearing), and didn’t know if the parents’ visits with G.L. had since progressed.

11 It mentioned, in connection with P.L.’s return, that father continued to work “two different jobs,” expressing concern as to who would be able to care for P.L. on the nights father works, other than her maternal grandmother. That concern did not lead to a recommendation that P.L. not be returned to father. The report also noted that P.L. did not require as high

22

In addition, neither social worker articulated any specific criticism of father’s parenting capabilities or identified any concrete safety issue he presented to G.L.

The initial social worker, who had not been involved in the case for almost six months by the time of the contested hearing, identified no such concerns. She testified, “There are times that dad is a bit aloof and appears to not also be engaged into what is being said in regards to, like, [G.L.’s] medical needs. [¶] And I’m unsure if dad really comprehends what’s happening or if this might be like a cultural thing, where a lot of the times the female partner is the one that takes care of all the household and child duties and the male is like a breadwinner of that dynamic. [¶] He would either awkwardly smile or laugh, and so I don’t know if that was some type of like anxiety of him in those certain circumstances or if he didn’t know what else to do and that was kind of his response.”

Speculation about possible “cultural” dynamics or other explanations for father’s affect is not substantial evidence that G.L. would be at risk of detriment in father’s care. Our courts have held that social workers’ “subjective beliefs,” “fuzzy” and “nebulous ideas” are insufficient to support a detriment finding. (In re Jasmine G., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 289–291 [“subjective beliefs”]; Blanca P. v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1751–1752 [“fuzzy” and “nebulous ideas”].) Instead, the focus of the court, and therefore of the agency, must be on “the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent or guardian and the extent to which he or she

a level of care as G.L. But it did not conclude that father would be unable to arrange appropriate care for either child or describe any effort on the agency’s part to address that issue with father.

23

cooperated and availed himself or herself of services provided.” (Heather P., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1229–1230.)

There was testimony by the social workers about visits. The earlier social worker testified G.L. had engaged in self-harming behavior during visits with her parents when she became over-stimulated such as by hitting herself in the face with books and shoes or throwing things. But she acknowledged that G.L. was able to be controlled “a lot more” by father than mother, and that although “it was just difficult anytime mom would attempt to step in at moments,” those behaviors with mother had decreased over time. She also testified that the only reasons father’s visits were not increased beyond two hours a week were G.L.’s caregiver’s availability and “capacity,” not any conduct of father.

The only specific safety concern the current social worker articulated about father was that previously, when she was in foster care, P.L. had reportedly exhibited some “sexualized behaviors” toward the foster family’s seven- and 10-year-old daughters, such as kissing their bottoms and looking under their towels. Now that P.L. was back with father, the social worker expressed concern that P.L.’s behaviors would pose a risk to G.L. if she was returned to father’s custody because of G.L.’s limited ability to communicate. But, as father points out, these behaviors had occurred in October 2024 when P.L. was six years old. Her maternal grandmother had agreed to talk with P.L. about inappropriate touching and body parts, and no new incidents or concerns had been observed by the time of the 18-month hearing, more than a year and a half later. There is no evidence such behaviors had ever occurred while P.L. was in father’s custody, that P.L. had ever directed such behaviors toward G.L., or that father was likely to be unresponsive if P.L. ever began exhibiting such behaviors again toward G.L. or anyone else. In short, the

24

social worker’s concern, although well-intentioned, was vague and speculative.

The only other comment the current social worker made about father was in the 18-month review report, when she had only recently begun working on the case. She wrote that “there continues to remain a lack of demonstrating a clear understanding of age and developmentally appropriate behaviors and expectations . . . around G.L.[’s] . . . diagnosis of autism and higher level[] of care.” No explanation or examples were provided. Such “vague and nebulous concerns” are not substantial evidence of danger. (M.G. v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 662.) This is especially true given the specific descriptions of father’s engagement in the services offered and interactions with the children during visits, including G.L., and improvements in managing the children during visits, all of which we have described. Further, the comment reflects a misunderstanding of the burden of proof, which is on the social worker when she recommends removal, and requires her to “ ‘demonstrate with specificity how the minor has been or will be harmed’ ” if returned to parent’s care. (Heather P., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1229.) Where, as here, the evidence shows the parent has fully engaged in the elements of the reunification plan and demonstrated substantial progress, “more [is required] than the mere conclusion[s]” and vague concerns on the part of the social worker that there may be risk of some unspecified detriment. (Id. at p. 1228.)

Finally, there were at least two potential sources of in-home services that could be made available to father if G.L. were returned to his custody: (i) Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) therapy—a resource we discuss below that the social workers testified is intended to provide G.L.’s caregivers with behavioral support services in the home; and (ii) additional services for G.L.

25

provided through the Regional Center if needed, such as respite services for her caregiver “so that the parents don’t get caregiver fatigue”; and transportation to medical appointments. The evidence shows these services could be used to assist father in caring for the needs of both of his young daughters if it turned out that he needed such help. (See, e.g., David B., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 797 [evidence insufficient to demonstrate that agency’s safety concerns “could not have been addressed through less drastic means” than declining to return child to parental custody].)

Nor is it clear why an order for family maintenance could not have filled any such gaps, such as by providing father with continued parent coaching, additional parenting classes specific to autism, referrals to any resources the Department felt would be helpful for him to become educated about preventing a recurrence of P.L.’s past sexualized behaviors, and/or other more general forms of support. (See Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 316 [juvenile court has discretion to return child to parental custody, retain jurisdiction, and order family maintenance services]; see, e.g., Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 868–869.) The Department does not explain why any concerns it still harbored about him could not be addressed through less drastic measures such as these. It only says family maintenance services “would not be appropriate,” which is not the law. Father argues that “[t]he court has the authority to return G.L. to [father’s] custody and order family maintenance services. Such an order would achieve the legislative goal of family preservation, while also allowing for additional safeguards to be in place to ensure G.L.’s care in the home.” We agree.12

12The question of whether father can safely care for G.L. under continued juvenile court supervision, with or without an order for family

26

We are not persuaded by any of the Department’s other arguments either. In addition to the concerns we have already discussed, the Department stresses that father posed a danger to G.L. because of the reasons that precipitated its intervention; but this generalized claim ignores the progress that the Department itself reported father having made over the ensuing 18 months. The Department also asserts, again generally and without any record citation, that neither parent’s visitation had ever progressed from fully supervised, that G.L. sometimes engaged in self-harm behavior and tantrums, and that she “often refused to allow them to change her diapers.” We will address the subject of supervised visitation below, but for present purposes it is enough to say that there is no evidence the Department’s failure to permit father’s visits with G.L. to progress from supervised to unsupervised reflects any risks he presented to G.L. during visitation or otherwise. As for the remaining points, as explained above, the first social worker testified the concerns about G.L.’s self-harm or outbursts during visits largely concerned mother, and in any event, had improved over time. And while G.L. occasionally wouldn’t allow her parents to change her diaper during their short visits with her, that is not evidence of substantial danger. G.L. frequently did allow father to change her. To infer that when she didn’t, it was because she was uncomfortable with father is speculative and, indeed, unreasonable in light of the other evidence we have discussed, including evidence of his bond with her by the time of the 18-month review hearing and the physical affection she routinely exhibited towards him.

maintenance, is distinct from the question of whether the court should have returned G.L. to father’s custody and terminated its jurisdiction over G.L. No party asserts the latter disposition was warranted on the record before us, and the question is premature.

27

Again, the standard is not perfection. G.L. had exceptionally high needs, to be sure. And the Department was reasonably concerned that her caregiver be able to read her cues, help her regulate, and protect her from tantrums and self-harm. But father had demonstrated during the interactions he was permitted to have with G.L. over 18 months that he could largely read her cues. Nobody who cared for her could guarantee she would not experience behavioral issues from time to time, which presumably is one reason G.L. continued to receive supportive services. The second social worker acknowledged that G.L. exhibited quite a few behavioral problems in the resource parents’ home too,13 and she had sometimes encountered tantrums while visiting G.L. in the caregiver’s home “and sometimes [G.L.] would hurt herself.” And as noted, G.L. had moved placements several times, and no concurrent planning option yet existed for her due to her high needs. Expecting father to prevent G.L.’s behavioral issues from ever recurring held him to an unexplained standard of perfection for which there was no evidentiary support.14 And as already noted, the Department does not address why in-home services and family maintenance would be insufficient to address any of its remaining safety concerns regarding father’s parenting capabilities.

In short, there was no substantial evidence for the juvenile court’s finding that father poses a substantial danger to G.L. The court should have

13 During three separate visits, mother also observed G.L. with “tiny bruises” during a diaper change, a long scratch on one of her legs, and a bump on her forehead.

14 For example, no medical professional or expert with specialty in autism testified that G.L. could reasonably be expected never to throw another tantrum, sometimes refuse a diaper change, or attempt to hit herself ever again if she lived with an appropriate caregiver who was attentive and knowledgeable about her needs and cues.

28

returned G.L. to his custody, including with an order for family maintenance services if the court, in its discretion, concluded such an order was appropriate.

C. Mother. Mother presents a closer question. Mother made substantial and commendable progress over the course of the case, and we applaud her for her hard work, obvious personal growth, and dedication. Even if, on this record, the juvenile court could have made a finding in her favor on the detriment issue, it did not, and on appeal we are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for the juvenile court’s judgment. (L.C., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1034.) Although not overwhelming, there is substantial evidence that mother continued to pose a safety risk to G.L.

Mother offers a relatively one-sided argument, supported by few specifics, as to why the court’s danger finding as to her did not have sufficient evidentiary support. Such as it is, her argument largely ignores the evidence that was unfavorable to her, such as the initial social worker’s testimony that the self-harming behaviors during visits tended to occur with mother rather than father and the current social worker’s testimony that some of mother’s visits with G.L. went well but others did not. And, visits aside, the initial social worker testified that “a lot of the times” when mother went to medical appointments “there was a lack of understanding of what was really occurring for [G.L.’s] medical needs; and that was super concerning.”15

15 There was also a conflict in the opinion evidence as to whether mother could ever safely parent within a structured, supportive environment: the psychologist who examined her concluded that she could, and the current social worker agreed with that assessment, but the initial social worker disagreed.

29

In addition, the most recent visitation logs (from roughly December 2025 until the end of January 2026) reflect many positive moments between mother and G.L. (including many diaper changes, feeding, and frequent hair brushing) but also reflect that G.L. was less physically comfortable with and responsive to mother than she was to father, that mother was less consistently engaged with G.L. than father was, and that mother sometimes acted detached, disassociated or even intemperate.16 Every case is unique and decisions such as these can be difficult, but we cannot say the court erred in assessing the risk of returning G.L. to mother. Any number of injuries or harms could befall G.L. if mother failed to attend to her needs or failed to appreciate her medical needs. (Cf. Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425 [affirming finding that it would be unsafe

16 For example, during the December 20, 2025 visit, mother yelled at

G.L. when she tossed a toy and told her, “ ‘Don’t do that!’ ” and then put on her backpack and said she was ready to go despite 10 minutes remaining; it took two reminders from the monitor about the time remaining before mother sat back down, whereupon she “called out for [G.L.] repeatedly” without success, scorned P.L., complained to father about P.L., “stared into space,” did not react when her son bumped his head and fell, scorned him for trying to get back on his tricycle, and ended up “grabbing” him and taking him to the restroom for a diaper change where she stayed for the rest of the visit. Another time, on January 3, 2026, mother came to the visit not feeling well, lay on the floor while father interacted with the children, fell asleep, and didn’t wake up even after one of the other children threw himself on her. At another visit with G.L., on January 22, 2026, mother remained seated “look[ing] straight at the wall in front of her” for much of the time and “would occasionally turn her sight to see the child and then return her sight to the wall in front of her,” while G.L. ate or played with father. This bewildering behavior, which was at odds with the way she had comported herself during previous visits, was unexplained. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that if mother were to detach this way during one of G.L.’s many medical appointments or while G.L. was at home in her care, it could jeopardize G.L.’s physical or mental health.

30

to return asthmatic child to custody of physically disabled mother and developmentally impaired father despite their “demonstrated ability to provide basic care to [him], the positive nature of their interactions with him [in visits] and available [regional service center] services to assist them” where, inter alia, they were not trained to treat his asthma and regional center was not providing 24-hour services; “[u]nder these circumstances, it is reasonable to infer [child] might suffer serious harm if he had an asthma attack while in the sole care of his parents”].)

As for whether such concerns could be ameliorated by the provision of family maintenance services, mother also stands in a different posture than father. The first social worker opined that mother would need 24/7 support with G.L., and although she testified the Regional Center said they could provide services to support mother, “I don’t think that there would be any type of care out there that can do 24/7 care that would help support [G.L.] being in the care of mom.” Mother does not address that testimony or develop an argument supported by citations to the record showing it does not constitute substantial evidence in light of the entire record.

Mother clearly loves G.L., has taken impressive steps to improve her understanding of G.L.’s needs and cues, and has made commendable progress in becoming a responsive, dedicated parent. But she came into this case presenting with more serious parenting challenges than father, and as the primary caretaking parent, she was more directly responsible for the neglect G.L. suffered. She has not demonstrated the court’s danger finding at the 18- month review hearing is unsupported by substantial evidence.

31

II.

Reunification Services

Both parents also assert there is no clear and convincing evidence they were provided reasonable reunification services and, as a result, ask that we order additional reunification services for them. However, because we have determined G.L. should have been returned to father’s custody, the question whether he should have received further reunification services would appear to be moot—a question no party has addressed. (See generally In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 [addressing mootness in dependency context]; see also Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 671 [court in writ proceeding must consider “facts that arise after pleading which render the dispute moot or make the remedy useless”].) In addition, we note that the maximum statutory time limits for providing reunification services has now passed, raising a question as to whether any effective relief could now be granted to either father or mother.17 Nonetheless, it is possible the adequacy of

17 Reunification services can be extended “up to a maximum time period not to exceed 24 months after the date the child was originally removed from physical custody of the child’s parent or guardian” if reasonable services have not been provided. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4)(A); see also 366.22, subd. (b)(2)(B) [mandatory six-month extension of reunification services at 18-month review hearing where reasonable services have not been provided unless “court finds by clear and convincing evidence based on competent evidence from a mental health professional that extending the time period for reunification services would be detrimental to the child”]; In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1060 (A.O.) [“In 2024, the Legislature clarified that reunification services can even be extended to 24 months if, among other findings, the court finds ‘reasonable services have not been provided to the parent’ ”].)

G.L. was ordered detained on June 27, 2024, and so the juvenile court’s authority to extend reunification services up to the 24-month statutory maximum expired on June 27, 2026. (See, e.g., In re Damian L. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 357, 369 [expiration of 24-month statutory maximum period for

32

reunification services could become relevant for either parent if G.L. were removed from father’s custody again on a supplemental petition, and/or, regardless whether she is removed a second time, if mother were to ask the juvenile court for discretionary relief to extend her services.18 Therefore, we will address this issue.

A. Legal Principles At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court may not set a hearing under section 366.26 unless the social services agency proves by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were provided. (§ 366.22, subds. (a)(3), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(c)(iii).) The agency must prove that it made “a good faith effort to provide reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of each family, and the plan must be ‘ “ ‘specifically tailored to fit the circumstances of each family’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘designed to eliminate those conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Specifically, the record must show the agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the duration of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents when

reunification services rendered appeal moot because juvenile court “is no longer capable of ordering reunification services” but appellate court exercised discretion to reach the merits].)

18 When the statutory maximum period of services has expired, the juvenile court retains discretion to order additional reunification services in exceptional circumstances. (See generally Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 632–635; § 352.) “If reasonable services have not been provided, a court may use that finding when considering whether to exercise its discretionary authority to grant a parent’s request under section 352 for further reunification services. Therefore, an erroneous reasonable services finding could impede the court’s ability to fully and accurately evaluate that parent’s request.” (A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060.)

33

compliance was difficult. [Citation.] The adequacy of the plan and the agency’s efforts are judged according to the specific circumstances of each case.” ’ ” (Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 397, 420 (Patricia W.).)

“ ‘ “[T]he effort must be made to provide reasonable reunification services in spite of difficulties in doing so or the prospects of success.” ’ ” (Patricia W., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 420.) At the same time, however, courts must be careful not to judge an agency’s efforts too harshly. “ ‘In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” (A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1063.)

“ ‘Visitation is a critical component, probably the most critical component, of a reunification plan.’ (In re Lauren Z. [(2008)]158 Cal.App.4th [1102,] 1113–1114.) ‘Without visitation of some sort, it is virtually impossible for a parent to achieve reunification.’ (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491–1492.) ‘The absence of visitation will not only prejudice a parent’s interests at a section 366.26 hearing but may “virtually assure[] the erosion (and termination) of any meaningful relationship” between [parent] and child.’ (In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 307.) [¶] To promote reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Visitation requirements exist ‘[i]n order to maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of his or her parent.’ (Id., subd. (a).)” (Serena M. v. Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 673 (Serena M.).)

34

We review the adequacy of reunification services, including visitation, under the substantial evidence standard, bearing in mind the clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile court must apply in determining whether reunification services were adequate. (Serena M., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 674; accord, A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.) “ ‘Under this burden of proof, “evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’ ” ’ ” (Serena M., at p. 674; In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 245.) While less rigorous a standard than beyond a reasonable doubt, “[t]his intermediate standard ‘requires a finding of high probability’ ” that the asserted fact is true. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998 (O.B.); see In re L.O., at p. 245.) On appeal, “the question before [this] court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that” adequate services were provided. (O.B., at p. 995.)

B. Analysis As a preliminary matter, we will consider the adequacy of reunification services only as it pertains to the final review period, after the 12-month review hearing which was held on August 21, 2025. We agree with the Department that the parents forfeited objections to the court’s reasonable services findings made at the six-month and 12-month review hearings. Those reasonable services findings were appealable (A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1058–1061), yet no appeal was taken. “ ‘ “[A]n unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” [Citation.] An appeal from the most recent order in a dependency matter may not challenge earlier orders for which the time for filing an appeal has passed.’ ” (In re Isaiah W.

35

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10; see also, e.g., Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811–812.)

Mother makes numerous arguments, all captioned under the vague heading that the Department failed to offer her “fruitful” reunification services. Many concern her own intellectual or cognitive limitations; others concern G.L.’s specialized needs. To the extent she challenges the adequacy of services offered and provided to her to overcome the parenting challenges posed by her own intellectual or cognitive limitations, we do not agree, and extended discussion is unnecessary.19

19 The record discloses mother was offered and timely received a broad array of supportive services specifically tailored to address her intellectual limitations, and both social workers testified they had exhausted every resource that was available. (See, e.g., B.D. v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1153–1154 [parent with developmental delays provided reasonable services where agency “appropriately recognized [her] need for Regional Center services” and assisted her in seeking them out; “Regional centers are specifically designed to provide services to persons with developmental disabilities”]; T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1241 [rejecting challenge to adequacy of case plan for developmentally disabled mother that provided for counseling, parenting support, in-home support services, anger management services, individual therapy, and referral to regional center programming].)

In particular, her contention that the Department failed to incorporate the results of her psychological examination into the case plan is forfeited for the reasons we have already discussed, and it also is unsupported by the record. In arguing otherwise, she cites only to the first social worker’s testimony that the social worker didn’t agree with the psychologist’s evaluation that mother could appropriately parent within a structured environment. Both social workers testified that mother was provided with all the services the psychologist recommended and mother points to none that she was not. At most, our review of the record suggests there might have been one: a “level 5 Triple P” parenting class. On top of all the other parenting classes mother had completed, the initial social worker was unsure whether mother had taken this one.

36

This brings us to the other two issues that both parents raise. They assert the Department failed to provide them with reasonable services designed to educate them on how to appropriately care for G.L. given her specialized needs and unreasonably limited them to supervised visitation two hours a week. Here, we agree.

Both parents received a great number of services. Without being exhaustive, they included many parenting classes, access to G.L.’s medical appointments, regular case meetings with the social worker, information about G.L.’s needs through the resource parents with whom they had a good relationship, and individualized parenting coaching with real-time feedback during visits with G.L.20 Mother also received individualized therapy and continued to receive independent living services and other assistance from the Regional Center to support her.

In addition, the parents received some services specifically intended to educate them about G.L.’s autism and the behavioral issues it presented. They both took a parenting class called “Understanding Autism: respect, support and empowerment.” Mother also took a parenting class called “Matrix Parenting Network,” which provided support for families of children with disabilities more generally in which she gained some basic tools for addressing G.L.’s tantrums.21 She also took a “level 4 Triple P” parenting

20 We have been directed to no evidence indicating their parent coach was trained in children with high needs generally, much less autism specifically, and the current social worker testified the parents received no “professional support” during visits.

21 In closing argument, the Department relied on an entry in the delivered services log describing it this way: “Matrix Parent Network provides training and support to families of children and young adults with disabilities. Our trainings provide information and expertise to parents involved in our regimen. Thank you for Participating in a Matrix training

37

class called “Stepping Stones” that the psychologist recommended because it was designed for children with autism and other developmental/intellectual disabilities.

But quantity is not necessarily quality, and we are concerned by two aspects of their case plans that raise at least some doubt, if not “substantial” doubt (Serena M., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 674), as to whether they were afforded services that were reasonable under the circumstances of this case. That is because, despite the many services they were offered, their case plans required them to access two resources specifically relating to autism and/or G.L.’s special needs that the record does not show were made available to them.

One was ABA therapy, which we have already briefly touched upon.

Their case plans required them to “work[] with the ABA therapist and other service providers to help [them understand G.L.’s] needs and how to best support her development.” Although the precise details of ABA therapy are unclear, there is evidence it is a form of behavioral services funded by private

event. This is to certify that [mother] has completed the Matrix Parent Network’s . . . training on Transition to Preschool.”

Mother testified that the class taught her G.L. would throw herself on the ground during tantrums because G.L. “felt protected by doing that” and it was G.L.’s “way of calming down”; that she would have to stay calm when G.L. did this, give G.L. space and learn how to better communicate with G.L.; and that the teacher told her she would have to take more classes to learn how to manage G.L.’s tantrums. She also testified that another parent of an autistic child told her, apparently at the class, she would have to take classes “specifically about my daughter’s needs because they . . . couldn’t offer a whole lot of classes specifically for autism-disability needs.” Mother testified that from the Matrix classes, “I’ve learned how to calm her down, hugging her whenever she gets angry. I’ve noticed she likes that a lot” and that “when she hits herself, I try as a mother to explain that what she’s doing is . . . not right, it’s not good.”

38

insurance. The current social worker described an ABA therapist’s role as “work[ing] with the parents and the child . . . in supporting the child’s needs . . . at that specific moment in terms of their behaviors and . . . what is coming up during . . . their time together.” The initial social worker testified similarly, describing their role as “go[ing] into the caregiver’s home and . . . observ[ing] what the child is doing and help[ing] support the caregiver.” Neither parent was given access to this resource, in part it seems due to vaguely described logistical issues.22 In addition, though, the current social worker testified—contrary to the clear directive of the parents’ case plans, and contrary to her testimony that some effort had been made to provide this resource to them during visits—that ABA therapy is an “additional” support service made available only to in-home caregivers and not to parents whose children have been removed from their custody. So, she testified, the parents could never fulfill that aspect of their case plan.

22 The first social worker testified that there was “a lot of difficulty”

lining up an ABA therapist due to the multiple changes of placement G.L. experienced, and that by the time she left the case, there was still no ABA therapist in place. The current social worker testified that G.L.’s school and team of providers had tried unsuccessfully to get an ABA therapist at school, and the social worker even talked with mother about volunteering at school in order to be able work with the ABA therapist, “but it sounded like it could not happen” at school. By the time of the hearing, ABA therapy was still not in place, and the Department was still trying to evaluate other options and settings for that to happen.

In addition, the social worker testified that one possibility they considered was having an ABA therapist attend visits. She also testified that it was her understanding from some notes by the previous social worker that an ABA therapist had attended some visits in September, October, or November of 2025 but was not certain as to the exact date or whether that was accurate. Other than that possible exception, she testified neither mother nor father had any opportunity to work with an ABA therapist.

39

Asked whether the parents could learn how to effectively meet G.L.’s behavioral needs without the assistance of an ABA therapist, the current social worker answered equivocally: “Yes and no.” She explained that although they had access to other service providers such as the Regional Center, Matrix class and parenting classes, “ABA therapy would also be an additional support . . . that they would benefit from.”

It is troubling that there is a specialized professional resource that provides individualized, hands-on support and education about attending to the specific behavioral needs and cues of a particular autistic child—the very thing the Department identified as its primary source of concern about mother and father—and yet neither parent was able to access it. All the more troubling, because the Department specifically identified this resource as part of both parents’ case plans, implying both that it could be provided to them and that it was important. There is no evidence or explanation in the record as to why ABA therapy was not, or could not have been, made available to either parent while G.L. was not in their custody; the Department essentially just took the position that it’s not done that way. Such murky explanations do not meet the test of “substantial evidence,” taking into account the “ ‘high probability’ ” threshold that the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof requires the agency to meet. (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 997–998.)

Furthermore, to suggest that services were nonetheless reasonable because the parents were provided with other, more generalized resources is not particularly satisfactory. Had the Department not specifically included ABA therapy in the case plans, we might take a different view. But it did require this and apparently for good reason. ABA therapy appears to be highly specialized and targeted to the very safety issues that lay at the heart

40

of this case: understanding and being responsive to G.L.’s specific needs and managing the behavioral challenges posed by her autism. It is clear the Department was trying to arrange for this resource to be provided to G.L.’s foster family, but it made little or no effort to arrange for the parents to benefit from it, too. And, as noted, the social worker could not rule out the possibility that the parents would be unable to progress sufficiently without it.

A second concern, as father notes, is that the parents’ case plans required them to “communicat[e] with [G.L.’s Regional Center] coordinator Elizabeth Mendoza” and “[a]dvocat[e] for appropriate services and participat[e] when appropriate.” This didn’t happen in the final review period either; indeed, it appears to have happened only once during the entire case.23 The Department does not explain why. Given that concerns about the parents’ ability to care for G.L.’s highly specialized needs were at the crux of this case, it is again difficult to conclude that it was reasonable for the Department to make apparently no effort during the final review period to assist them in communicating with one of the professionals tasked with coordinating G.L.’s services.24

23Meetings with G.L.’s service coordinator took place only once a year, and the most recent one took place about a year before the 18-month review hearing. And G.L.’s coordinator never attended any of the monthly team meetings with the Department and the family, even though mother’s Regional Center coordinator, who did attend the meetings, urged the Department to make that happen.

24 There was testimony that Mendoza had been out on medical leave for an unspecified amount of time. There is no evidence any effort was made to assist the parents in communicating either with the service coordinator who handled G.L.’s case during her absence and/or with Mendoza’s supervisor, Reyna Lopez.

41

Whether or not, standing alone, one or both of these omissions would lead us to conclude the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that services provided were adequate, for as we have said, services need not be perfect (see In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 973 [“the mere fact that more services could have been provided does not render the Department’s efforts unreasonable”]), they diminish our confidence that a reasonable factfinder could find it “ ‘highly probable’ ” (as opposed to merely “ ‘probable’ ”—or even just “ ‘ “possible” ’ ”) the parents received adequate services. (See O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 998 [distinguishing between clear and convincing and preponderance of the evidence standards].)

This brings us to the issue of visitation, which further diminishes our confidence. “Visitation is an essential component of a reunification plan.” (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426.) “To promote reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (Ibid.) “When the Agency limits visitation in the absence of evidence showing the parents’ behavior has jeopardized or will jeopardize the child’s safety, it unreasonably forecloses family reunification on the basis of the parents’ labeled diagnoses, and [this] does not constitute reasonable services.” (Id. at p. 1427; accord, Patricia W., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 428, fn. 19.) A parent’s lack of sufficient progress in court-ordered services, while an important consideration, cannot be the deciding factor in restricting visitation where there is no evidence that expanding visitation “would be detrimental to the child and where there are no prospects for reunification without it.” (Serena M., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 678.)

So, for example, the appellate court in Tracy J. addressed a more liberal visitation schedule than was permitted here and held it was not enough. It held that restricting visitation for a physically disabled mother

42

and a developmentally disabled father to only four hours a week of supervised visitation with their child, rather than advance them to unsupervised visitation, was “clearly unreasonable,” even though the child had special medical needs neither parent was trained to treat or recognize (asthma). (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1425, 1427.) As in this case, there were favorable reports about the parents’ conduct, attitude, and ability to care for the child during visits. (Id. at p. 1426; see also id. at pp. 1422–1423.) But two social workers expressed safety concerns about moving to unsupervised visitation. One of them cited as an example a very recent visit to a mall after which the foster parent reported concerns; she asserted (contrary to the account of another witness) that the mother had not known how to react to the child’s tantrum; the father had told the child to “stay” on a changing table and walked away to throw away a diaper; he also had briefly left the child in a stroller in the middle of the mall to get a nearby high chair; and neither parent had checked the child for injuries after the tantrum. (Id. at p. 1421.) In addition, the second social worker said she would not feel “comfortable” leaving the child alone with them, but the only potentially dangerous situation she had observed in more than a year was the child falling and bumping his head once in a visit while learning to walk. (Id. at pp. 1422, 1426.) The appellate court noted that, in that instance, “[t]he record shows [father] picked his son up, wiped away his tears and followed [the social worker’s] advice to put ice on a small lump on [the child’s] head.” (Id. at p. 1426.)

Although the appellate court upheld the juvenile court’s decision not to return the child to the parents’ custody (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425 [concluding “the evidence barely sustains the detriment finding”]), restricting their visitation in these circumstances was held to be

43

unreasonable. It reasoned the parents had “fully cooperated with the Agency, made substantial progress with their court-ordered case plans and had demonstrated their abilities to feed, soothe, protect and care for” their child during visits. (Id. at p. 1427.) Further, it noted, one of the providers of father’s independent living skills services said father parented “fairly independently,” and both the coordinator of his regional center services and another provider of his independent living skills services “emphasized the parents’ ability to work as a team and the complementary nature of their skills.” (Ibid.; see also id. at p. 1422.) The appellate court explained that the agency should have taken other measures to address its safety concerns rather than unduly limit the parents’ visitation in this manner. “The Agency’s concerns about unsupervised visitation,” it said, “could have been alleviated by scheduling services from [the regional center] and the public health nurse and implementing in-home parenting skills training during a portion of the unsupervised visits, and providing initial drop-in checks by the social worker.” (Id. at p. 1427.) “Under the circumstances,” it concluded, “the visitation services provided to reunify this family were clearly unreasonable.” (Ibid.) It issued a writ that, among other relief, ordered the agency to “expand the parent’s visitation . . . including unsupervised visitation as appropriate.” (Id. at p. 1428.)

We reach a similar conclusion here. In this case, the level of supervision of the parents’ visits with G.L. was never reduced from fully supervised in the period following the August 21, 2025 12-month review hearing nor increased beyond two hours a week for either parent.25 Yet, as

25 As we have noted, some visits with G.L. were alone and some were with her siblings together. None of the parties have quantified precisely how many were with her alone versus jointly with her siblings, nor have they separately identified and analyzed the quality of the parents’ visits with G.L.

44

we have discussed, the parents’ inability to demonstrate to the Department’s satisfaction that they could understand G.L.’s cues and needs was the chief reason the Department recommended terminating services and setting the case for a permanency hearing. The parents were never even allowed to visit with G.L. on a “lightly” supervised basis which, according to the current social worker, would entail the visitation monitor entering the visitation room periodically to check in rather than remain in the room for the entire visit.

As in Tracy J., the Department points to no instances during any visits with G.L.—neither in their visits alone with her nor in their visits with G.L. and her siblings together—in which either parent jeopardized G.L.’s safety, and no instances in which a monitor had to intervene or correct either parent to avoid a dangerous situation. (See Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.) In addition, the visitation logs in evidence, which span the last four months of the review period (from October 2025 through the end of January 2026), reflect no indication during visits that G.L. was ever remotely in danger. Father’s conduct appears to have been uniformly appropriate, and mother also displayed appropriate parenting skills at most junctures. With the exception of her behaviors we have already noted (see fn. 16, ante), both parents were consistently attentive to G.L.; they frequently fed her, played with her, and changed her diaper; and they were able to manage her behaviors safely and appropriately, even at times when G.L. displayed frustration. Further, the Department praised both parents in its 18-month report prepared at the end of December 2025: father, for having

alone as compared to visits that her siblings also attended. Thus, our discussion of visits that follows encompasses both situations, without distinction.

45

“demonstrated better attunement with the children’s needs, during visits he comes prepared with food items, toys, diapers, and engages in appropriate play and safety guards,” and mother, for having “demonstrated her ability to bring structure and routine to visits . . . , engaging the children and managing their behaviors.” Such comments are not consistent with limiting them to two hours of fully supervised visitation a week.

Also striking to us is that the people most directly charged with monitoring visitation saw progress too. There were long stretches of time during multiple junctures in this final review period since August 21, 2025, that the visitation logs reflected entries recommending that the level of supervision be reduced to lightly supervised. In addition, a CPI staff member named Daisy Bravo26 affirmatively reached out to the Department to recommend this on October 7, 2025, in an e-mail that was extremely complimentary, and particularly so of mother;27 and Bravo did so again in another e-mail three weeks later (on October 31). Several months later, on

26 The record is unclear as to Bravo’s exact role. There was testimony she is was the CPI “coach,” and it appears from some of the testimony and delivered service logs that she was the social workers’ primary point of contact with CPI about visitation. Other individuals created most of the entries in the visitation logs, presumably the visitation monitors.

27 She wrote that the parents “are using tools and strategies more effectively, allowing [G.L.] to approach them on her own terms, offering appropriate praises and communicating in ways that align more closely with her needs and comfort level. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] We’ve noticed a stronger bond forming between mom and [G.L.], with mom showing a better understanding of [G.L.]’s nonverbal cues and emotional needs. Mom is also giving [G.L.] space when needed, which has helped foster more genuine and relaxed interactions during play, such as with the dollhouses and kitchenette. Mom has been engaging in a way that supports connection while respecting [G.L.’s] . . . lead. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] It’s also lovely to see that [G.L.] appears genuinely excited to see both mom and dad during visits, which speaks to the growing trust and emotional connection.”

46

December 23, Bravo backed off the recommendation for lightly supervised visitation but only partially: she e-mailed the social worker to say that “Although the family ha[s] previously been ready for lightly supervised visits, based on the past two months, I cannot confidently recommend lightly supervised visits at this time.” But she nevertheless suggested trying it on a trial basis “to assess how things progress” and suggested “reviewing the reports on Apricot to make the best judgment.” Yet throughout the entire review period it was never even tried once. As said, all that lightly supervised visitation would have required would have been some periods of unsupervised visitation combined with periodic “check ins” from a visitation monitor throughout the visit.

The first social worker attributed the Department’s non-action in the October timeframe only to the fact that she was transitioning off the case. After she left, the current social worker consulted with her supervisor, was in favor of stepping down the level of supervision to lightly supervised at least on a trial basis but testified that “it was concluded that was not appropriate.” At the time of the contested 18-month review hearing months later, she was still in favor of conducting a trial run of lightly supervised visitation. She also testified that G.L. is uncomfortable with strangers and at times even with people she knows, and that G.L.’s lack of opportunity to visit more frequently with her parents may have contributed to some of the outbursts and tantrums she had during visits with them.

On this record, the Department’s failure to allow father to have more liberalized visitation was just as “clearly unreasonable” as in Tracy J. Indeed, the initial social worker testified that father’s conduct never played any role in the decision not to expand his visitation. The only reasons she gave for not allowing him more liberal opportunities to visit with G.L. was

47

the “availability” and “capacity” of G.L.’s foster parent. At least in the absence of some showing the Department tried to address those obstacles, that was unreasonable. (See, e.g., In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972–974 [reasonable services not provided where caregiver’s schedule and other constraints interfered with access to visitation and there was “no evidence with regard to any follow-up by the Department . . . or to assist the overwhelmed [caregiver] in any respect”].) Although father’s petition is not entirely clear, we understand him to contend that his visitation should have been increased in duration, he should have been allowed to visit G.L. separately from mother, and/or the level of supervision should have been reduced to unsupervised. It is enough to say that had the Department allowed him to have unsupervised visitation in a timely fashion, he likely also would have received more than two hours of visitation over time and/or potentially progressed to overnight visits to show he could safely care for G.L. Doing so potentially could have changed the outcome for him at the 18-month review hearing in the juvenile court’s estimation, rendering his petition (and our reversal of the court’s detriment finding) unnecessary.

As with the custody issue, mother’s circumstances are not precisely the same as father’s. Her conduct in visitation was not as uniformly consistent or protective toward G.L. as father’s and that of the parents in Tracy J., and we have noted some erratic conduct she displayed in January 2026. Nevertheless, these differences do not detract from our conclusion she was not afforded reasonable visitation, either. Although we are affirming the detriment finding as to mother, assessing whether G.L. would be safe in her custody 24 hours a day given the concerns that were noted about mother and the behaviors mother displayed during visits presents a different question than whether mother displayed enough judgment, responsiveness, and

48

concerns for G.L.’s needs and welfare during visits to warrant an opportunity for her to step up modestly from visits that were completely supervised 100 percent of the time. (Indeed, as noted, Tracy J. affirmed a detriment finding yet concluded visitation had been unreasonably curtailed.) Unlike father, and unlike in Tracy J., mother makes a very limited argument concerning visitation. She does not argue she progressed enough to proceed to visitation on a completely unsupervised basis (which was the issue in Tracy J.). She argues only that her visits should have been stepped up to lightly supervised. We perceive no basis in this record to conclude she should not have been given that opportunity during the final review period.

We are not persuaded by the Department’s arguments to the contrary concerning either parent’s visitation.

In defending the limited visitation that was afforded both parents, the Department stresses testimony from the initial social worker that it was important for the parents to be able to read G.L.’s cues and that mother in particular was not always able to do so. That concern is certainly well- intentioned and valid. But even if either parent did not perfectly read every one of G.L.’s cues every time, that was precisely why maximum opportunities for visitation could have been beneficial to them and to G.L. Lack of “cue” reading is not automatically synonymous with danger. The only specific example the Department cites of misreading cues during this latest review period is one visit in January 2026 during which G.L. initially would not allow mother to brush her hair but then did so. By contrast, there are many instances in the visitation logs from this review period where the parents did read G.L.’s cues effectively and backed off to give her space when she

49

appeared to need it.28 In addition, the second social worker also testified that they frequently did so (“for the most part”). And the visitation logs also reflect that when G.L. occasionally vented frustration physically, they were appropriately protective of her.29

28 For example, at a visit on November 6, 2025, G.L. “started yelling and throwing toys” when asked if she wanted a diaper change, and so mother “asked [her] to look at her eyes and got closer” and “asked what was wrong,” and when G.L. said “no,” “mom said okay and backed off.” G.L. continued to say “ ‘no, no, no, no, no, no,’ ” and so “[b]oth parents sat back and watched [her] play.”

29 For example, during a visit on October 9, 2025, mother and father fed G.L. and watched her play, mother brushed her hair, and father changed her diaper. At one point, G.L. “threw herself on the floor” and kicked a toy but mother told her, “ ‘Be nice’ ” and she stopped. At another point, she began kicking a chair but calmed down when father gave her some gummies. There was no intervention and no hint of possible injury or danger during this visit. Any possible risk of self-harm was completely averted.

Likewise, in a visit on November 5, 2025, mother brushed her hair but stopped when G.L. “tugged her head away” and then resumed when G.L. was ready. At the end of the visit, G.L. started kicking and grunting, and “[t]hey gave her space and watched that she didn’t hurt herself.”

In a visit on December 3, 2025, G.L. “threw herself to the ground and dad went over to make sure she was ok,” and later mother “asked that they end early because [G.L.] seemed tired.”

Another time, on December 11, 2025, G.L. started slamming the door of some toy furniture, they “told the child to be careful” and she stopped; later during the same visit when mother asked if she wanted to eat, she “reacted by hitting herself on the head,” but mother told her, “We don’t do that. That’s a big no, no,” father told her, “[G.L.], be gentle,” and she stopped.

During one of the most recent visits, on January 22, 2026, G.L. briefly kicked the wall in frustration at one point and, at another juncture, became upset and started to hit her head with her hands and kick toys. But each time, the parents effectively defused her behavior without incident or injury, the monitor again did not step in to intervene, and the visit ended with G.L. taking father’s hand and allowing him to carry her out of the room while mother packed their things and cleaned up after the visit.

50

We do not minimize the importance of being able to judge the nonverbal cues of a child who has limited verbal skills and is prone to dysregulation, sometimes to the point of self-harming behaviors such as hitting herself. But absent evidence that missed cue-reading during visits or brief moments of emotional dysregulation caused or risked injury to G.L. during visits (or emotional distress beyond that which G.L. might experience in the ordinary course with caretakers she trusts and with whom she is comfortable), such concerns should not take precedence over affording the parents maximum opportunities for visitation with the child to learn, and demonstrate they are able, to attend to her needs.

The Department also points out that entries in the visitation logs fluctuated in their recommendations as to whether the level of supervision should be reduced, and that the logs recommended that visits remain fully supervised in four visits during October 2025, and in 21 visits from November 5, 2025, to January 31, 2026. But it is substance not form that matters, and a mere entry in a visitation log stating “continue visits at the same level” is not in and of itself a reliable indicator of either parent’s conduct. For example, in October 2025, despite entries in the visitation logs by monitors that consistently recommended “continue visits at the same level,” CPI staff member Bravo was, as we have said, extremely complimentary of both parents and recommended moving the visits to lightly supervised (in an e- mail on October 23).

The Agency was required to exercise its own judgment on this issue in light of all of the information available to it which, as said, was on the whole relatively positive about the parents’ progress and their conduct during visitation, even at times when G.L. became momentarily frustrated and

51

began to kick or throw a toy.30 The current social worker, who was handling the case by this juncture, could not recall any details about the behaviors that prompted the visitation monitors to change their recommendations back to fully supervised visits in this period. She just testified that after she consulted with her supervisor, a decision was made not to try lightly supervised visions for unspecified reasons. It is illogical for the Department to justify its determination about visitation on the basis of a visitation monitor’s recommendation only when the monitor recommends against reducing the level of supervision. For these reasons, the lack of consistent recommendations from the visitation monitors to reduce the level of supervision is not proof by clear and convincing evidence that it was reasonable in the circumstances for the Department to allow no more than two hours of fully supervised visitation.

Like the parents in Tracy J., both parents here were unreasonably denied adequate visitation with G.L. Combined with the Department’s failure to prove it was reasonable not to provide either parent access to ABA therapy or assistance in communicating with G.L.’s Regional Center coordinator as called for in their case plans, we conclude the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence it provided the parents with reasonable services during the 18-month review period.

We do not doubt the Department’s dedication and good faith efforts in this case to reunify a family that faced very complicated challenges. In addition, we appreciate the complexity of assessing the available services and coordinating the many service providers involved in this case, complexities

30 The initial social worker seemed to recognize this. She testified that she considers factors other than just the visitation recommendation in considering whether to reduce the level of visitation, which she described as “the totality of what visitation looks like.”

52

compounded by the fact that multiple children were involved and also by the fact that G.L.’s high needs no doubt required a particularly high degree of attention to and coordination with her caregivers.31 We suspect that this case might tax the abilities of even the most experienced child welfare professional. But a reasonable fact finder could not find by clear and convincing evidence that either parent was provided with reasonable reunification services during the 18-month review period. The court erred when it found to the contrary.

DISPOSITION

The petitions for writ of mandate are granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the juvenile court to: (1) vacate its order setting a hearing for G.L. under section 366.26; (2) vacate its finding reasonable services were offered or provided to the parents; and (3) set a continued 18- month permanency review hearing at the earliest date consistent with the rights of the parties to prepare their case. At the new hearing, in addition to the evidence previously presented, the court shall consider any evidence of developments since March 20, 2026, that are relevant to the question of G.L.’s safe return to father. If at the continued 18-month review hearing there are no new developments that would warrant otherwise, G.L. should be returned to father’s custody, including, if the juvenile court in its discretion deems it appropriate, with an order for family maintenance services. If the court does find that new developments warrant a different conclusion, the

31 Not only did G.L. change placements several times as we have noted, but the delivered service logs indicate that in late November and early December 2025, G.L.’s current caregiver began pressing the Department to find G.L. another placement “immediately” and resisting entreaties to become a concurrent planning option.

53

court can make whatever orders are appropriate in light of that finding and then address any other issues raised by the parties.

In the interest of justice, this decision shall become final as to this court five days from the date it is filed. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

The temporary stay previously granted is hereby vacated.

54

STEWART, P. J.

We concur:

RICHMAN, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

F.L. et al. v. Sonoma County Superior Court; Sonoma County Human Services Department et al., RPI (A176020)