3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT SEATTLE
6 7 LEE FITZGERALD, individually and on Case No. C23-1435RSM behalf of all others similarly situated,
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 DISMISS v. 10
11 THE SHADE STORE, LLC,
12 Defendant.
14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant The Shade Store, LLC’s Motion to 16 Dismiss, Dkt. #30. The Shade Store argues that Plaintiff Lee Fitzgerald’s claims should be 17 dismissed for failing to adequately allege damages and for other certain reasons, and that 18 Plaintiff’s nationwide class allegations should be dismissed for lack of standing. Plaintiff has 19 20 filed an opposition, Dkt. #37. The Court has determined that it can rule without the need of 21 oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES The Shade Store’s Motion. 22 II. BACKGROUND 23 For purposes of this 12(b)(6) Motion, the Court will accept all facts in the First 24 25 Amended Complaint, Dkt. #29, as true. The Court will briefly summarize the relevant facts. 26 Defendant The Shade Store is a Delaware company that makes, sells, and markets 27 blinds, shades, and other window covering products through its website, 28 www.theshadestore.com. On February 27, 2022, Plaintiff Fitzgerald purchased a set of cellular shades from 1 2 Defendant’s website. She made this purchase while living in Seattle, Washington. 3 This purchase occurred during an advertised sale. On February 18, 2022, Defendant 4 stated on its website that a “20% OFF ALL ORDERS” sale was running through the date of 5 Ms. Fitzgerald’s purchase until “3/2.” Defendant represented that the list price of the Product 6 that Ms. Fitzgerald purchased was $640.00 and that Ms. Fitzgerald was receiving a discount of 7 8 $128.00. Defendant confirmed this in an email it sent to Ms. Fitzgerald after she made her 9 purchase. Ms. Fitzgerald includes screenshots of all of this in her Complaint. 10 Ms. Fitzgerald alleges she read and relied on the above representations from the website 11 and email confirmation, specifically that her shades were being offered at a discount for a 12 13 limited time and had a higher regular price, and that she would be receiving a price reduction. 14 Plaintiff alleges that The Shade Store “creates an illusion” that customers are receiving 15 a limited-time discount “by advertising fake limited-time sales, fake regular prices, and fake 16 discounts based on the fake regular prices.” Dkt. #29 at 8. These discounts are advertised as 17 available for a limited time, however immediately after each sale ends Defendant generates 18 19 another similar or identical discount, with a new expiration date. Examples screenshots 20 showing a 20% off sale continuing after the end date are included in the Amended Complaint. 21 See id. at 17. According to the allegations, the shades are never sold at non-sale prices. 22 Plaintiff alleges that the above is deceptive and unfair and induced her to make a 23 purchase that she would not otherwise have made. She alleges that she and others in the 24 25 proposed class “received Products with market values lower than the promised market values.” 26 Id. at ¶ 84. 27
28 The Amended Complaint brings claims for: violation of the Washington Consumer 1 2 Protection Act (“CPA”); breach of contract; breach of express warranty; quasi-contract/unjust 3 enrichment; and intentional misrepresentation. Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages. 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 A. Legal Standard under Rule 12(b)(6) 6 In making a 12(b)(6) assessment, the court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as 7 8 true, and makes all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. 9 Riverside County Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 10 However, the court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual 11 allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 12 13 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 14 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678. This requirement is met 15 when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 16 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint need not include 17 detailed allegations, but it must have “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 18 19 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Absent 20 facial plausibility, a plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. Id. at 570. 21 B. Analysis 22 As an initial matter, the Court notes that the legal theories at issue here are familiar to 23 the Court and to this Defendant in particular. The Shade Store has been sued in California by a 24 25 different consumer for essentially the same conduct at issue. That lawsuit asserts materially 26 identical claims both in common law and under a similar state statute, Defendant moved to 27 dismiss, and the Court denied that Motion in part. See Crowder v. Shade Store, LLC, 2024 U.S. 28 Dist. LEXIS 41896 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2024). Plaintiffs in that case amended the complaint, 1 2 Defendant again moved to dismiss, and the Court denied the motion to dismiss the state 3 statutory claims, intentional misrepresentation, and punitive damages claims, but dismissed the 4 quasi-contract/unjust enrichment and negligent misrepresentation claims. Crowder v. The 5 Shade Store, LLC, Case No. 23-cv-02331-NC, Dkt. #69 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2024). 6 This type of “fake discount” case has also been tried here as a violation of 7 8 Washington’s CPA. “Inducing a plaintiff into spending money she otherwise would not have 9 spent, based on a misrepresentation, is clearly a cognizable injury” under the CPA. Nemykina 10 v. Old Navy, LLC, 461 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1061 (W.D. Wash. 2020). 11 Considering the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are generally plausible 12 13 where sufficient facts have been alleged. The Court will go through the facts of each claim 14 below. 15 1. CPA Claim 16 The Shade Store first moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s CPA claim for failure to adequately 17 allege a cognizable injury or that it engaged in an unfair act or deceptive practice. A CPA 18 19 claim requires a plaintiff to allege “(1) ... an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in trade or 20 commerce, (3) that impacts the public interest, (4) resulting in injury to business or property, 21 and (5) a causal link between the unfair or deceptive practice and the injury suffered.” RCW 22 19.86.020; Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 784- 23 85, 719 P.2d 531 (1986). 24 25 The Amended Complaint is fairly detailed and specific as to the circumstances of 26 Plaintiff’s shades purchase. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant’s advertisements harm consumers 27 by inducing them to make purchases they otherwise would not have made, based on false 28 information,” Dkt. #29 at ¶ 49, and that she herself “would not have made the purchase if she 1 2 had known that the Product was not discounted as advertised, and that she was not receiving 3 the advertised discount,” id. at ¶ 54. She also alleges that “due to Defendant’s 4 misrepresentations, [she] and the class paid more for the Products they bought than they 5 otherwise would have.” Id. at ¶ 49.
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT SEATTLE
6 7 LEE FITZGERALD, individually and on Case No. C23-1435RSM behalf of all others similarly situated,
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 DISMISS v. 10
11 THE SHADE STORE, LLC,
12 Defendant.
14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant The Shade Store, LLC’s Motion to 16 Dismiss, Dkt. #30. The Shade Store argues that Plaintiff Lee Fitzgerald’s claims should be 17 dismissed for failing to adequately allege damages and for other certain reasons, and that 18 Plaintiff’s nationwide class allegations should be dismissed for lack of standing. Plaintiff has 19 20 filed an opposition, Dkt. #37. The Court has determined that it can rule without the need of 21 oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES The Shade Store’s Motion. 22 II. BACKGROUND 23 For purposes of this 12(b)(6) Motion, the Court will accept all facts in the First 24 25 Amended Complaint, Dkt. #29, as true. The Court will briefly summarize the relevant facts. 26 Defendant The Shade Store is a Delaware company that makes, sells, and markets 27 blinds, shades, and other window covering products through its website, 28 www.theshadestore.com. On February 27, 2022, Plaintiff Fitzgerald purchased a set of cellular shades from 1 2 Defendant’s website. She made this purchase while living in Seattle, Washington. 3 This purchase occurred during an advertised sale. On February 18, 2022, Defendant 4 stated on its website that a “20% OFF ALL ORDERS” sale was running through the date of 5 Ms. Fitzgerald’s purchase until “3/2.” Defendant represented that the list price of the Product 6 that Ms. Fitzgerald purchased was $640.00 and that Ms. Fitzgerald was receiving a discount of 7 8 $128.00. Defendant confirmed this in an email it sent to Ms. Fitzgerald after she made her 9 purchase. Ms. Fitzgerald includes screenshots of all of this in her Complaint. 10 Ms. Fitzgerald alleges she read and relied on the above representations from the website 11 and email confirmation, specifically that her shades were being offered at a discount for a 12 13 limited time and had a higher regular price, and that she would be receiving a price reduction. 14 Plaintiff alleges that The Shade Store “creates an illusion” that customers are receiving 15 a limited-time discount “by advertising fake limited-time sales, fake regular prices, and fake 16 discounts based on the fake regular prices.” Dkt. #29 at 8. These discounts are advertised as 17 available for a limited time, however immediately after each sale ends Defendant generates 18 19 another similar or identical discount, with a new expiration date. Examples screenshots 20 showing a 20% off sale continuing after the end date are included in the Amended Complaint. 21 See id. at 17. According to the allegations, the shades are never sold at non-sale prices. 22 Plaintiff alleges that the above is deceptive and unfair and induced her to make a 23 purchase that she would not otherwise have made. She alleges that she and others in the 24 25 proposed class “received Products with market values lower than the promised market values.” 26 Id. at ¶ 84. 27
28 The Amended Complaint brings claims for: violation of the Washington Consumer 1 2 Protection Act (“CPA”); breach of contract; breach of express warranty; quasi-contract/unjust 3 enrichment; and intentional misrepresentation. Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages. 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 A. Legal Standard under Rule 12(b)(6) 6 In making a 12(b)(6) assessment, the court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as 7 8 true, and makes all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. 9 Riverside County Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 10 However, the court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual 11 allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 12 13 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 14 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678. This requirement is met 15 when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 16 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint need not include 17 detailed allegations, but it must have “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 18 19 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Absent 20 facial plausibility, a plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. Id. at 570. 21 B. Analysis 22 As an initial matter, the Court notes that the legal theories at issue here are familiar to 23 the Court and to this Defendant in particular. The Shade Store has been sued in California by a 24 25 different consumer for essentially the same conduct at issue. That lawsuit asserts materially 26 identical claims both in common law and under a similar state statute, Defendant moved to 27 dismiss, and the Court denied that Motion in part. See Crowder v. Shade Store, LLC, 2024 U.S. 28 Dist. LEXIS 41896 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2024). Plaintiffs in that case amended the complaint, 1 2 Defendant again moved to dismiss, and the Court denied the motion to dismiss the state 3 statutory claims, intentional misrepresentation, and punitive damages claims, but dismissed the 4 quasi-contract/unjust enrichment and negligent misrepresentation claims. Crowder v. The 5 Shade Store, LLC, Case No. 23-cv-02331-NC, Dkt. #69 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2024). 6 This type of “fake discount” case has also been tried here as a violation of 7 8 Washington’s CPA. “Inducing a plaintiff into spending money she otherwise would not have 9 spent, based on a misrepresentation, is clearly a cognizable injury” under the CPA. Nemykina 10 v. Old Navy, LLC, 461 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1061 (W.D. Wash. 2020). 11 Considering the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are generally plausible 12 13 where sufficient facts have been alleged. The Court will go through the facts of each claim 14 below. 15 1. CPA Claim 16 The Shade Store first moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s CPA claim for failure to adequately 17 allege a cognizable injury or that it engaged in an unfair act or deceptive practice. A CPA 18 19 claim requires a plaintiff to allege “(1) ... an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in trade or 20 commerce, (3) that impacts the public interest, (4) resulting in injury to business or property, 21 and (5) a causal link between the unfair or deceptive practice and the injury suffered.” RCW 22 19.86.020; Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 784- 23 85, 719 P.2d 531 (1986). 24 25 The Amended Complaint is fairly detailed and specific as to the circumstances of 26 Plaintiff’s shades purchase. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant’s advertisements harm consumers 27 by inducing them to make purchases they otherwise would not have made, based on false 28 information,” Dkt. #29 at ¶ 49, and that she herself “would not have made the purchase if she 1 2 had known that the Product was not discounted as advertised, and that she was not receiving 3 the advertised discount,” id. at ¶ 54. She also alleges that “due to Defendant’s 4 misrepresentations, [she] and the class paid more for the Products they bought than they 5 otherwise would have.” Id. at ¶ 49. Plaintiff includes detailed factual allegations explaining 6 why this is. See id. (“Defendant’s advertisements artificially increase consumer demand for 7 8 Defendant’s Products. This puts upward pressure on the prices that Defendant can charge for its 9 Products. As a result, Defendant can charge a price premium for its Products, that it would not 10 be able to charge absent the misrepresentations”). This is all that is required to adequately 11 plead the injury element of a CPA claim. The Court further finds that the Amended Complaint 12 13 adequately alleges an unfair act or deceptive practice. The Amended Complaint identifies with 14 particularity the advertisements Plaintiff claims are deceptive, with screenshots. It explains in 15 detail why and how the advertisements are false. Defendant should have no trouble responding 16 to these allegations. Further arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence can be dealt with 17 at a later stage in this litigation. 18 19 Defendant argues that the CPA claim should be dismissed under the reasoning in 20 Kinney v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35162 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2024), and 21 Montes v. Sparc Grp. LLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108379 (E.D. Wash. June 22, 2023). 22 Plaintiff explains in her Response brief how the pleading in those cases falls short of the 23 pleading in the instant case. See Dkt. #37 at 10–11. Despite the outcomes in those cases, the 24 25 pleading here states a plausible claim. 26 // 27 // 28 2. Intentional Misrepresentation Claim 1 2 Defendant’s arguments for dismissal of this claim based on a lack of injury are properly 3 denied for the reasons articulated above. Defendant also argues that this claim is barred by the 4 economic loss rule because Plaintiff is simultaneously pursuing contractual claims, citing 5 Poulsbo Grp., LLC v. Talon Dev., LLC, 229 P.3d 906 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). Dkt. #30 at 17. 6 Plaintiff responds by citing Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation, Inc., 241 P.3d 1256 (Wash. 7 8 2010) and Jackowski v. Borchelt, 278 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Wash. 2012) for the proposition that 9 this claim can proceed if it sounds in fraud, “because the independent duty doctrine permits a 10 party to pursue a fraud claim regardless of whether a contract exists.” Dkt. #37 at 18. The 11 Court agrees with Plaintiff’s reasoning and the parties seem to agree that this claim sounds in 12 13 fraud. Dismissal is not warranted. 14 3. Breach of Contract Claim 15 Defendant argues that this claim fails to adequately allege breach or damages. Dkt. #30 16 at 17. For the same reasons stated above, the Court has already found that Plaintiff has 17 adequately pleaded damages. Breach of contract is also alleged in sufficient detail. For 18 19 example, Plaintiff alleges that a contract imposes a duty on Defendant “to provide Products 20 having a particular listed regular price and market value, and to provide those Products at the 21 discounted price advertised.” Dkt. #29 at ¶ 56; see also ¶¶ 57-58 (explaining how the contract 22 was formed and setting forth the material terms of the contract); ¶¶ 87-89. Plaintiff alleges a 23 breach of that duty: “Defendant breached its contracts by failing to provide Ms. Fitzgerald and 24 25 other members of the putative class with Products that have a regular price and market value 26 equal to the regular price displayed, and by failing to provide the discount it promised.” Id. at ¶ 27 60 and ¶ 91. Whether or not Plaintiff can prove these allegations remains to be seen. 28 4. Breach of Express Warranty Claim 1 2 Plaintiff alleges Defendant “issued material, written warranties by advertising that the 3 Products had a prevailing market value equal to the advertised regular price” and that “the 4 Products were being sold at an advertised discounted price.” Dkt. #29 at ¶¶ 96-97. She alleges 5 that these were “affirmation[s] of fact about the Products” and “promise[s] relating to the 6 goods.” Id. ¶ 96. 7 8 Defendant argues that “[g]enerally, to constitute an express warranty, a statement must 9 relate to the quality of the good.” Dkt. #30 at 19 (citing Innovative Sols. Int’l, Inc. v. Houlihan 10 Trading Co., 2024 WL 324530, slip op. at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2024) and Flooring 11 Assocs., Inc. v. Design Mfg. Int’l., LLC, 2021 WL 1551473, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2021). 12 13 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that these two cases involved statements relating to the quality 14 of the goods but do not limit express warranties to such statements. Instead, Defendant’s more 15 accurate statement of law is that an express warranty is “any affirmation of fact or promise, any 16 description, or any sample or model by a seller relating to or describing the goods when such 17 representation forms the basis of the bargain.” Id. (citing Innovative Sols. Int’l, supra). 18 19 Plaintiff cites to numerous fake discount cases from California where express warranty claims 20 were allowed to proceed. Dkt. #37 at 21. Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss this claim at 21 this time. 22 5. Quasi-Contract/Unjust Enrichment Claim 23 Although this claim cannot proceed to trial at the same time as a contract claim, 24 25 Plaintiff alleges it in the alternative, as she is permitted to do. See Arthur v. United States by 26 and Through Veterans Admin., 45 F.3d 292, 296 (9th Cir. 1995). She adequately alleges facts 27 that could render the alleged contract void or voidable. See Dkt. #29 at ¶ 106. The Court 28 further finds that she has adequately alleged how Defendant has received an unjust benefit 1 2 given the above. The Court sees no reason to dismiss this claim at this stage. 3 6. Punitive Damages 4 Plaintiff states that the only “punitive” damages she is seeking are the treble damages 5 expressly authorized by the CPA and characterizes Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim as 6 “semantic.” Dkt. #37 at 19. On Reply, Defendant points outs that Plaintiff seeks “[d]amages, 7 8 treble damages, and punitive damages where applicable.” Dkt. #38 at 15 (citing Dkt. #29 at ¶ 9 118). The Court finds that the parties essentially agree on what damages are available. No 10 further ruling is needed from the Court at this time, however this may be the subject of a 11 motion in limine later. 12 13 7. Lack of Standing for Nationwide Class Allegations 14 Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to assert breach of contract, 15 breach of express warranty and quasi-contract/unjust enrichment on behalf of a nationwide 16 class because different states have different laws as to those claims. Dkt. #30 at 21–22. 17 The parties disagree about whether this issue needs to be addressed now or at the class 18 19 certification stage, each citing cases to support their positions. See id. (citing Brenner v. Vizio, 20 Inc., 2018 WL 2229274, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 16, 2018) and Hamilton v. NuWest Grp. 21 Holdings LLC, 2023 WL 130485, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2023)); Dkt. #37 at 24 (citing 22 Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015); Sultanis v. Champion Petfoods United 23 States Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145293, at *20-21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2021); Patterson v. 24 25 RW Direct, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198887, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2018); and Healy v. 26 Milliman, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65701, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2022)). Given the 27 28 facts and legal claims of this case, the Court finds that Defendants’ standing arguments are 1 2 better suited for determination at the class certification stage and will defer a ruling at this time. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Having reviewed the relevant pleadings and the remainder of the record, the Court 5 hereby finds and ORDERS that Defendant The Shade Store’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. #30, is 6 DENIED. 7 8 DATED this 25th day of July, 2024. 9 A 10 11 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13
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