Fitts v. HANKS ET UX

303 P.2d 220, 209 Or. 1, 1956 Ore. LEXIS 259
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 2, 1956
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 303 P.2d 220 (Fitts v. HANKS ET UX) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fitts v. HANKS ET UX, 303 P.2d 220, 209 Or. 1, 1956 Ore. LEXIS 259 (Or. 1956).

Opinion

TOOZE, J.

This is an action to recover rent pursuant to the terms of a written lease, brought by Robert J. Fitts, as plaintiff, against James Hanks and Helen L. Hanks, as defendants. A verdict was returned and judgment entered in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

On October 25,1950, defendants, as lessees, entered into a lease agreement with Herman Moritz and Myrtle Moritz, as lessors. The lease provides that lessees would rent for a term of four years certain real property which was a part of the Golden Gate Hop Ranch, located near Independence, in Polk county, Oregon, together with certain personal property. The real and personal property were leased primarily for the purpose of growing hops, the first hop crop to be harvested under the lease being that of 1951. Lessees were to pay to the lessors $13,832 per year in advance, $10,000 of which was payable on or before January 2 of each year, and $3,832 of which was payable on or before February 2 of each year. The lease provides, *3 among other things, that the lessors were to supply defendants with a “complete hop picking machine in good working order and ready for operation,” and that “lessees shall have the use of sufficient irrigation equipment at the proper time for the irrigation of his [sic] hop crop.” This equipment was vitally important to the successful operation of the leased hop ranch, and in particular, the irrigation equipment.

Defendants grew and harvested hops on the ranch during 1951 and paid the rental for that year. On December 30, 1951, the lessors sold the property to the plaintiff. Defendants abandoned and moved all their machinery and equipment off the leased property some time in late August and September, 1951. They did not pay the 1952 rental due on January 2, 1952, and on February 2, 1952, which rental was for the 1952 operation. It is to recover this 1952 rental that plaintiff brings this action. The lease provides that 30 days after the rent is due and unpaid, the lessors may re-enter upon the property. On February 7, 1952, the plaintiff leased the property to another tenant for a short period of time, and then later leased it to one Lewis P. Doney, who had formerly been the foreman of defendants’ operations on the premises.

If plaintiff or the original lessors surrendered the lease, or if defendants were constructively evicted prior to the dates on which the rent would have become due, plaintiff is not entitled to recover the 1952 rental. The pivotal questions raised by this appeal are: (1) whether the answer alleges facts sufficient to raise the defense of constructive eviction and (2) whether there is sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find a constructive eviction.

Plaintiff’s first assignment of error is that the *4 court erred in overruling plaintiff’s demurrer to defendants’ first, further and separate defense. This defense, as set forth in the answer, reads in part:

“II
“That the said Herman Moritz and Myrtle Moritz did not provide suitable irrigation equipment and did not provide a hop picking machine in good working order and therefore damaged the defendants and made it impossible for them to continue as lessees of the herein described property.” (Italics ours.)

In Hotel Marion Co. v. Waters, 77 Or 426, 433, 150 P 865, with respect to the subject matter of constructive eviction we said:

“As to the permanence of the acts complained of, there is an equally wide divergence of opinion; but we adopt the doctrine expressed by the court in the case of Edmison v. Lowry, 3 S. D. 77, at page 81 (52 N. W. 583, at page 584, 17 L.R.A. 275, at page 278, 44 Am. St. Rep. 774, at page 776), in which the following instruction is approved:
“ ‘As to the matter of eviction. It is not necessary there should be any act of a permanent character, but any act which has the effect of depriving a tenant of the free enjoyment of the premises, or any part thereof, or any appurtenances pertaining to these premises, must be treated as an eviction, and I charge you that any act of the plaintiffs which has deprived the defendant of the enjoyment of the .free right pertaining to and belonging to him as tenant may be treated as an eviction.’
“This doctrine has also been approved by the Supreme Court of Washington in the case of Wusthoff v. Schwarts, 32 Wash. 337 (73 Pac. 407).”

A breach of covenant to supply irrigation equipment might well deprive the tenants of a hop ranch such as that leased to defendants of their free right *5 to enjoyment of the premises and make it impossible for them to continue as lessees. The allegations of defendants’ first, further and separate defense are, therefore, sufficient to raise the defense of constructive eviction. Title & Trust Co. v. Durkheimer Co., 155 Or 427, 450, 63 P2d 209, 64 P2d 834.

The second assignment is that the court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict. The plaintiff argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict either on the theory of surrender or on the theory of constructive eviction.

We will examine some of the evidence in the record.

Plaintiff’s exhibit “7” was a letter of June 29, 1951, sent to the lessors by the defendants’ attorney. It read in part as follows:

“It has come to the attention of my clients, that you are not abiding by that certain lease executed on the 14th day of November, 1950. I particularly refer to condition No. 2, Paragraph D, concerning the use by Mr. and Mrs. Hanks of certain irrigation equipment. This is to inform you that if adequate irrigation equipment is not furnished immediately as called for in the lease, to Mr. and Mrs. Hanks, the lessees, as well as the George Segal Company, will hold you liable for any and all damage that might accrue.
“Within the aforementioned lease under condition No. 2, Paragraph B, might I draw your attention to your covenant that you will provide a hop picking machine in condition to pick hops. According to information given this office the machine intended for said use is not yet in picking condition, although the time for harvesting is but a few weeks away.
“Please consider this a demand that the mentioned conditions of the lease be met on your part; and, realize, if the same are not complied with, that you shall be held liable for all resultant damages.”

*6 Lewis Doney, defendants’ former foreman and the present lessee of the property under plaintiff, as a witness for plaintiff, testified on cross-examination as follows:

“Q It was over the irrigation system and the pumps that you had the fist encounter with Mr. Moritz?
“A Well, I will tell you. Mr. Moritz was going to use that pump, and we had two operating then, and most of them were haywire, burned up, and I guess Jim went to see him, and.

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Bluebook (online)
303 P.2d 220, 209 Or. 1, 1956 Ore. LEXIS 259, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fitts-v-hanks-et-ux-or-1956.