FITCH v. GIANT EAGLE, INC.

District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania·Decided September 22, 2020·No. 2:18-cv-01534·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA PITTSBURGH JORDAN JONES, INDIVIDUALLY AND ) ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS ) SIMILIARLY SITUATED; ) 2:18-CV-00282-DSC-CRE ) Plaintiff, ) ) ) vs. )

) GIANT EAGLE, INC., ) ) Defendant. ) ) ) ) A NDREW FITCH, ) ) ) ) 2:18 2- :c 1v 8- -0 C1 V5 -3 04 1- 5D 3S 4C -D-C SR CE Plaintiff, ) ) ) ) vs. ) ) ) ) GIANT EAGLE INC, ) )

) ) Defendant. ) ) )

MEMORANDUM ORDER1

Presently before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for protective order (ECF No. 99) which seeks to bar Defendant Giant Eagle from using an “Executive Exemption Acknowledgment” (“EEA”) form with its employees who are current and potential collective and class members to these overtime wage violation lawsuits.2 These cases were filed on March 6, 2018 and November 15, 2018 respectively against

1 Discovery matters are non-dispositive under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992).

2 While separate motions were filed under each case caption because the filing of the motions predated the court’s consolidation order, the motion and attendant briefing are identical in substance in each case and will be decided together. The parties are reminded to consolidate all future motions and filings in this case per the court’s prior consolidation order. Giant Eagle alleging that it is in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and multiple state laws for failing to pay overtime by improperly classifying certain employees as exempt under the Act. Plaintiffs seek to certify a collective/class under the FLSA and a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Specifically, the putative class alleges that Giant Eagle misclassified Team Leaders and Senior Team Leaders (collectively “S/TLs”) as exempt from overtime compensation

for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a work week, including during the period they were required to complete mandatory training. Giant Eagle maintains that some S/TLs “are paid by the hour and are eligible for overtime pay, while some but not all others that qualify under applicable law are paid a salary.” Colarik Dec. (ECF No. 106-1) at p. 8. Turning to the discovery dispute presently at issue, Giant Eagle engages in bi-annual performance reviews of its S/TLs to, inter alia, praise S/TLs for successes, identify and improve on weaknesses, address questions or concerns raised by S/TLs and as an “opportunity for [it] to have a conversation with [S/TLs] to confirm that they are properly compensated.” Colarik Dec. (ECF No. 106-1) at p. 10. Historically during these reviews, store and regional leaders evaluated,

and S/TLs self-evaluated, the S/TLs’ management skills and assessed whether S/TLs met expectations with respect to management duties. Id. at p. 11. If there was any discrepancy between an S/TL’s expected and actual duties which would affect the S/TL’s exemption status, Giant Eagle would make appropriate adjustments to the S/TL’s training or exemption status. Id. Beginning in February 2018, Giant Eagle started using the EEA form as part of their semi- annual employee performance review. See Exhibit A; Dec of Jean Colarik (ECF No. 106-1) at p. 2; 12. The form requires S/TLs as part of their performance review to acknowledge in accordance with the form, if the employees believe their employment duties “meet the requirements” for continuing to be a “salaried, exempt [employee].” Court Ex. A; Tr. at 48-49. The form sets forth a number of job requirements that the S/TLs must review in making their decision as to whether they are “properly classified as a salaried, exempt leader[.]” Id. The form includes two signature lines at the bottom in which the S/TLs are required to affix their signature acknowledging that they either “believe” or “do not believe” that they meet the requirements for a salaried, exempt leader. Id. The form only includes job duties that correspond with an exempt status.

The EEA form is sent to every store with instructions for Store Leaders to administer the form as “one component” of the S/TL’s bi-annual review. Colarik Dec. (ECF No. 106-1) at p. 12. The reviews generally occur in February and August. Id. Giant Eagle emphasizes that no attorneys are involved in the review process, this litigation is not discussed, and the form is introduced to the S/TLs in a “neutral manner.” Id. at p. 12. Nine hundred eighteen S/TLs completed the form. Tr. at 70-71. Plaintiffs contend that through its counsel, it contacted Giant Eagle about these claims as early as October 2017 prior to filing suit and therefore Giant Eagle was on notice of the overtime wage violations. Plaintiffs contend that the form requires a lay person to come to a legal conclusion

concerning the legal status of their employment and has a propensity for chilling participation in the class. The present motion followed. The motion is fully briefed, an evidentiary hearing was held on the matter and this issue is ripe for consideration. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d) gives the court “the duty and broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981). Rule 23(d) states that in conducting a class action, the “court may issues orders that” may be required “to protect the class members and fairly conduct the action – giving appropriate notice to some or all class members of any step in the action[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(B)(i); and to “impose conditions on the representative parties[.]” Fed. R Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(C). “[D]istrict courts must closely monitor the notice process and take steps to safeguard class members from unauthorized and misleading communications from the parties or their counsel.” In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 310 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). This duty and authority applies equally to collective actions, where the district court must “oversee the joinder of additional parties to ensure

that the task is accomplished in an efficient and proper way” especially in instances where “employees receiving accurate and timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective action” affects whether they “can make informed decisions about whether to participate” in the action. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1989). Any order prohibiting communication must be “based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 104, n. 21. See also Weller v. Dollar Gen. Corp., CV 17-2292, 2019 WL 1045960, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2019). “An acceptable limitation on communication between parties and putative class members is that which is ‘grounded in good cause and issued with a

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

FITCH v. GIANT EAGLE, INC., (W.D. Pa. 2020).

FITCH v. GIANT EAGLE, INC. (FITCH v. GIANT EAGLE, INC.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard
452 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling
493 U.S. 165 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Katz v. DNC Services Corp.
275 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2017)
Kleiner v. First National Bank
751 F.2d 1193 (Eleventh Circuit, 1985)