Fishman v. Solomon

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Fishman v. Solomon

2017 NY Slip Op 5581, 152 A.D.3d 570, 55 N.Y.S.3d 670

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 12, 2017

Docket2015-03934

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 5581 (Fishman v. Solomon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fishman v. Solomon, 2017 NY Slip Op 5581, 152 A.D.3d 570, 55 N.Y.S.3d 670 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

Appeal from an order of the Supreme *571 Court, Westchester County (Paul I. Marx, J.), dated February 24, 2015. The order granted the defendant’s application for an award of an attorney’s fee in the sum of $46,138.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, he waived his right to a hearing on the defendant’s application for an award of an attorney’s fee by agreeing that, although “each party retains the right to appeal any order of this court with respect to counsel fees,” the parties’ respective applications for an award of an attorney’s fee would be “done simultaneously without a right to oppose or reply” (see Dow v Dow, 80 AD3d 848 [2011]; Stricos v Stricos, 263 AD2d 659 [1999]; Brodsky v Brodsky, 214 AD2d 599 [1995]; see also Matter of Zaydenverg v Zaydenverg, 151 AD3d 871 [2d Dept 2017]; Bengard v Bengard, 5 AD3d 340 [2004]).

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant’s application for an award of an attorney’s fee in the sum of $46,138 (see Domestic Relations Law § 238; Mollah v Mollah, 136 AD3d 992, 994 [2016]; Le v Le, 82 AD3d 846 [2011]). The detailed billing records submitted by the defendant’s attorney established that the fees were reasonable, and the amount of the award did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion (see Mons Pinto v Pinto, 151 AD3d 715 [2d Dept 2017]; Pelgrim v Pelgrim, 127 AD3d 710 [2015]).

Dillon, J.P., Cohen, Duffy and Barros, JJ., concur.

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Appeal from an order of the Supreme *571 Court, Westchester County (Paul I. Marx, J.), dated February 24, 2015. The order granted the defendant’s application for an award of an attorney’s fee in the sum of $46,138.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, he waived his right to a hearing on the defendant’s application for an award of an attorney’s fee by agreeing that, although “each party retains the right to appeal any order of this court with respect to counsel fees,” the parties’ respective applications for an award of an attorney’s fee would be “done simultaneously without a right to oppose or reply” (see Dow v Dow, 80 AD3d 848 [2011]; Stricos v Stricos, 263 AD2d 659 [1999]; Brodsky v Brodsky, 214 AD2d 599 [1995]; see also Matter of Zaydenverg v Zaydenverg, 151 AD3d 871 [2d Dept 2017]; Bengard v Bengard, 5 AD3d 340 [2004]).

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant’s application for an award of an attorney’s fee in the sum of $46,138 (see Domestic Relations Law § 238; Mollah v Mollah, 136 AD3d 992, 994 [2016]; Le v Le, 82 AD3d 846 [2011]). The detailed billing records submitted by the defendant’s attorney established that the fees were reasonable, and the amount of the award did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion (see Mons Pinto v Pinto, 151 AD3d 715 [2d Dept 2017]; Pelgrim v Pelgrim, 127 AD3d 710 [2015]).

Dillon, J.P., Cohen, Duffy and Barros, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 5581, 152 A.D.3d 570, 55 N.Y.S.3d 670, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fishman-v-solomon-nyappdiv-2017.

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