Fisher v. Koehler

718 F. Supp. 1111, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7986, 1989 WL 79792
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 14, 1989
Docket83 Civ. 2128(MEL)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 718 F. Supp. 1111 (Fisher v. Koehler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fisher v. Koehler, 718 F. Supp. 1111, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7986, 1989 WL 79792 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

Opinion

LASKER, District Judge.

In a decision of July 13, 1988 after a lengthy trial, I found that the plaintiff class of inmates confined at the New York City Correctional Institution for Men (“CIFM”) had established that violence at CIFM by both staff and inmates against inmates had “reached proportions that violate^] the Eighth Amendment.” Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F.Supp. 1519, 1521 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (footnote omitted). Specifically, it was concluded that

[systematic deficiencies in the operation of CIFM, most significantly, overcrowding, overreliance on open dormitory housing, lack of adequate classification, inadequate staffing and supervision, and inadequate systems for controlling, investigating and disciplining misuse of force, have led to a world where inmates suffer physical abuse, both by other inmates and by staff, in a chillingly routine and random fashion.

Id. Looking to the guidance of Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207 (2d Cir.1986), in which the court vacated the injunction adopted by the district court to address constitutional violations reflected in the state prison’s dental care system, I conclud *1113 ed that it would be inappropriate to fashion a decree without first giving the defendants “an opportunity to submit a reasonable plan for the court’s consideration.” Fisher, 692 F.Supp. at 1567.

The parties have since, consistent with that decision, submitted proposed orders, that have been increasingly refined in response to counter-proposals. In addition, the parties have articulated the rationale for their differences in the many hours of conferences held to discuss the general principles embodied in, as well as the specific language of, the proposed orders. Finally, in order to better evaluate the sufficiency of the defendants’ proposed order, particularly as it concerned staffing, the court revisited CIFM, to gain insight into the current context in which the proposals would be implemented.

The decree that is being filed today has been fashioned only after thorough consideration of the responsible proposals and argument of the parties. Consistent with Dean, it reflects many of the defendants’ proposals. The order proposed by the Department of Correction (“the Department”) was unquestionably “carefully and conscientiously formulated” and it represents a tremendous commitment of resources and creativity on behalf of the Department. Dean, 804 F.2d at 215. Accordingly, it is entitled to deference. As Dean cautions, the courts must “give the state a reasonable opportunity to remedy a constitutional deficiency, imposing upon it a court-devised solution only if the state plan proves to be unfeasible or inadequate” to eliminate the constitutional violations. Id. at 213.

Nevertheless, many of the proposals reflected in the plan are yet untested and accordingly their efficacy to cure the distressing and unconstitutional level of violence at CIFM remains subject to question. In some instances, plaintiffs, armored with this court’s factual findings, have persuasively argued that, while the defendants’ plan may provide the basis for relief, certain modifications are necessary to assure compliance with minimum constitutional requirements.

The issues presenting the most difficult questions as to the sufficiency of the defendants’ proposal and the reason for the adoption or modification of the defendants’ language are discussed below, both to provide an explanation for the nature of the remedy and as background and guidance for the future occasions in which the decree’s terms may be reviewed.

A. CLASSIFICATION

As stated in the factual findings of the decision of last year,

[tjhere is no dispute that lack of classification at CIFM has been a significant cause of violence there. Classification reduces violence because violent inmates are less likely to commit violent acts against others like themselves, and because, once violent inmates are identified and grouped, it is possible to take appropriate control measures such as putting them in single cells and making changes in staffing and programming.

Fisher, 692 F.Supp. at 1547. There is no question that the remedial decree must provide for adoption of a classification system that separates inmates based on their level of violence and needs for protection. During the period of discussion, the parties have reached agreement on many of the specific provisions of a classification system, including the information that will be recorded and reviewed to determine the inmate’s classification, the basic interview process, and the need to remove from dormitory housing those with a history of particularly violent and predatory behavior. However, two significant differences have required court decision and merit discussion at this time: the criteria by which to determine whether an inmate must be housed in a cell and the propriety of housing protective custody inmates in dormitories.

The parties agree that inmates with “significant histories of violence” must be housed in cells, rather than dormitories, to assure the safety of others, but disagree as to the nature and number of incidents that constitute a “significant history.” Whereas the plaintiffs have proposed that no *1114 inmate who has been convicted either once of assault or three times of fighting in the last three years shall be housed in a dormitory, defendants propose to exclude inmates from dormitory housing after one conviction for an assault or fight that results in serious physical injury, two that result in physical injury, or three such convictions regardless of the existence or level of a resulting injury. Thus, where plaintiffs' criterion rests on the distinction between assaults and fights, defendants’ emphasize the extent of injury.

It is true, as plaintiffs argue, that the extent of injury caused by a fight is “somewhat fortuitous” and that adoption of defendants’ criterion would permit, for example, an inmate who has been convicted of one fight that resulted in the need for sutures or hospitalization to remain in dormitory housing. However, I am not persuaded that the distinction between fighting and assault presents fewer difficulties. As plaintiffs themselves have argued, it is often not clear when and if an inmate is the aggressor and it is therefore difficult to distinguish between an assault, loosely defined as an attack without immediate provocation, and a fight, which is a less one-sided incident. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ criterion, like the defendants’, leaves open the possibility that an inmate whose violent behavior caused injury requiring hospitalization will remain in dormitory housing because the inmate’s violence was a response to provocation. Thus, the “climate of fear and intimidation” 1 that plaintiffs seek to redress may persist with adoption of either the plaintiffs’ or defendants’ criteria. Accordingly, under the standards of Dean, the defendants must be given an opportunity to demonstrate, if they can, that their criteria are adequate. 2

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Bluebook (online)
718 F. Supp. 1111, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7986, 1989 WL 79792, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fisher-v-koehler-nysd-1989.