Fisher v. Hertzfeld

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedNovember 21, 2025
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-3236
StatusPublished

This text of Fisher v. Hertzfeld (Fisher v. Hertzfeld) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fisher v. Hertzfeld, (D.D.C. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FELICIA ANTIONETTE FISHER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03236 (UNA) ) ) ANDREA L. HERTZFELD, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The

Court grants the in forma pauperis Application, and for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses

this case without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of the District, sues several Defendants, all of whom appear to be

associated with criminal proceedings filed against her in D.C. Superior Court, see U.S. v. Fisher,

No. 2025 CF2 000131 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 4, 2025) (“Fisher I”); 1 see Compl. at 1–3.

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants––who include the presiding judge, a Superior Court clerk,

Plaintiff’s public defender, investigating and arresting police officers, and other unnamed mental

health professionals and prosecutors––conspired against her, in violation of the constitution,

federal criminal statutes, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, to execute

an unlawful warrantless search without probable cause and arrest her, and to conduct mental health

evaluations throughout the course of Fisher I without her consent, thus resulting in her unlawful

1 A court may take judicial notice of the docket and facts on the public record in other court proceedings. See Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005). incarceration and tainting her criminal proceedings, which she also alleges suffered from bias. See

id. She demands injunctive relief and damages. See id. at 3.

Notably, shortly after filing this matter, on October 16, 2025, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to

two counts in Fisher I, and she was also sentenced on the same date. See Fisher I at Change of

Plea to Guilty (The defendant plead guilty and was sentenced by Judge Hertzfeld) (Oct. 16, 2025);

Judgment and Commitment Order Filed (Oct. 16, 2025); Sentence for Charge #1, #2 (Oct. 16,

2025).

Relevant here, the Supreme Court has stated that

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid . . . plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Here, if judgment were to be granted in

Plaintiff’s favor in this case, it “would necessarily imply the invalidity of h[er] conviction.” Id. at

487. Therefore, because there is no indication that Plaintiff’s convictions have been set aside, she

cannot recover damages for the actions of those who allegedly brought about her conviction. See

Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).

More, insofar as Plaintiff seeks equitable relief, this Court also lacks jurisdiction. Federal

district courts generally lack jurisdiction to intervene or review actions before the Superior Court.

See Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923)), aff’d, No. 94-5079, 1994 WL 474995 (D.C. Cir. July

27, 1994). And, relevant here, “[w]here the proceedings begin in Superior Court, the defendant can raise any constitutional claims in that court, appeal an adverse decision to the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals, and if still dissatisfied seek review in the United States Supreme

Court.” JMM Corp. v. Dist. of Columbia, 378 F.3d 1117, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

For these reasons, the Court dismisses this action without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 4, asking this Court to issue “an injunction to stay and halt

proceedings” in Fisher I is denied for the same reasons, and her Motion for CM/ECF Password,

ECF No. 5, is denied as moot. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued

separately.

TREVOR N. McFADDEN Date: November 20, 2025 United States District Judge

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.
263 U.S. 413 (Supreme Court, 1924)
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman
460 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
JMM Corp. v. District of Columbia
378 F.3d 1117 (D.C. Circuit, 2004)
Robert L. Williams v. Leo C. Hill
74 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Circuit, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Fisher v. Hertzfeld, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fisher-v-hertzfeld-dcd-2025.