Fisher v. Department of Financial Institutions

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided May 19, 2025·No. 3:22-cv-05991·Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT SEATTLE 6 BRIDGETT FISHER; CAROLYN 7 SABIN; KATRINA ROY; and BRIGITTE NORTON, 8 Plaintiffs, C22-5991 TSZ 9 v. ORDER 10 DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL 11 INSTITUTIONS, Defendant. 12

13 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment, 14 docket no. 37, brought by Defendant Department of Financial Institutions (“DFI”). 15 Having reviewed all papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the motion, the Court 16 enters the following order. 17 Background 18 On February 29, 2020, Washington Governor Jay Inslee issued Proclamation 20- 19 05, declaring a state of emergency for all counties throughout Washington State as a 20 result of the coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”) outbreak in the United States and the 21 confirmed person-to-person spread of COVID-19 in Washington State. Ex. E to Lynch 22 Decl. (docket no. 44-5 at 1–3). On August 9, 2021, Governor Inslee issued Proclamation 1 21-14. Lynch Decl. at ¶ 23 (docket no. 44). A second iteration identified as 2 Proclamation 21-14.1 was issued on August 20, 2021. Proclamation 21-14.1, Ex. O to

3 Lynch Decl. (docket no. 44-15). Proclamation 21-14.1 required, with certain exceptions, 4 all employees of designated state agencies to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 on or 5 before October 18, 2021. Id. at 4–7. Among the exemptions set forth in Proclamation 6 21-14.1 was a religious accommodation, which applied if the vaccine requirement would 7 conflict with state agency workers’ “sincerely held religious beliefs, practice, or 8 observance.” Id. at 5.

9 Following the issuance of Proclamation 21-14, all DFI employees received an 10 email from the Governor’s office notifying them that they would be required to comply 11 with the Proclamation. Davis Decl. at ¶ 7 (docket no. 39). In August 2021, DFI 12 developed forms for employees to submit requests for medical and religious exemptions 13 to the vaccination requirement. Id. at ¶ 8. DFI Human Resources (“HR”) Director Gerri

14 Davis and DFI HR Consultant Kaylene Wright established a “Vaccination Exemption 15 Review Team” (the “Team”) to examine submitted exemption request forms to determine 16 whether they provided sufficient information to support a medical disability or religious 17 objection to vaccination. Id. at ¶¶ 1–2 & 9. The Team did not scrutinize the claimed 18 religious beliefs of employees who submitted religious exemption requests and moved all

19 of them to the interactive accommodation process.1 Id. at ¶ 10. Based on guidance from 20

21 1 DFI’s subsequent letters explaining its denial of Plaintiffs’ religious exemption requests contained the following sentence: “We have determined your request for a religious exemption is based on a sincerely 22 held religious belief and that it prevents you from being vaccinated against COVID-19.” See e.g., Ex. E to Franklin Decl. (docket no. 55 at 80). DFI’s determination is not binding on this Court. See 1 the Centers for Disease Control, the Washington Department of Health, and the 2 Washington Department of Labor & Industries, the Team determined that mitigations

3 such as masking, COVID-19 testing, and physical distancing were insufficient to allow 4 an unvaccinated person to work in proximity to others without posing an “untenable 5 health and safety risk.” Id. at ¶ 11. Accordingly, DFI permitted employees to remain in 6 their role unvaccinated only if they could carry out the essential functions of their role 7 remotely. Id. at ¶ 12. 8 Plaintiffs Bridgett Fisher, Carolyn Sabin, Katrina Crews (née Roy)2, and Brigitte

9 Norton (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) were DFI employees at the time of Proclamation 21- 10 14. Davis Decl. at ¶¶ 15, 23, 34, & 39 (docket no. 39). Plaintiffs submitted religious 11 exemption request forms and DFI denied all four of them. Ex. 2 to 2d Am. Compl. 12 (docket no. 28-2). Plaintiffs did not submit proof that they were or would be fully 13 vaccinated against COVID-19 as of October 18, 2021, and DFI subsequently terminated

14 their employment. See Ex. 3 to 2d Am. Compl. (docket no. 28-3). 15 On December 20, 2022, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against DFI. Compl. (docket 16 no. 1). In May 2023, Plaintiffs amended their pleading. Am. Compl. (docket no. 10). 17 After the Court entered an Order, docket no. 26, granting in part and denying in part 18 DFI’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs filed a Second

20 Bartholomew v. Washington, 725 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1232 (W.D. Wash. 2024) (“Although DSHS ultimately found Bartholomew held a religious belief preventing him from complying with the vaccine 21 requirement, that determination does not bind this Court’s analysis.”). 22 2 Katrina Crews’s name before her marriage was Katrina Roy, and she appears in the record under that name. See Mot. for Summ. J. at 5 n.1 (docket no. 37 at 14); Crews Decl. at 1 (docket no. 53). To avoid 1 Amended Complaint, docket no. 28. With respect to the claims set forth in the Second 2 Amended Complaint, DFI now seeks summary judgment in its favor against all Plaintiffs.

3 Discussion 4 A. Summary Judgment Standard 5 The Court shall grant summary judgment if no genuine issue of material fact exists 6 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 7 The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue 8 of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is material if

9 it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty 10 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the 11 adverse party must present affirmative evidence, which “is to be believed” and from 12 which all “justifiable inferences” are to be favorably drawn. Id. at 255, 257. When the 13 record, however, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

14 non-moving party, summary judgment is warranted. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 15 529 (2006) (“Rule 56(c) ‘mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time 16 for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 17 establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 18 party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).

19 B. Plaintiffs’ Title VII and WLAD Claims 20 Plaintiffs allege religious discrimination under both Title VII of the Civil Rights 21 Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”). 22 See generally 2d Am. Compl. (docket no. 28). Under Title VII, a plaintiff may assert a 1 claim for religious discrimination based on theories including disparate treatment and 2 failure to accommodate religious observances or practices. See Peterson v. Hewlett-

3 Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs’ claims rely on only the theory 4 of failure to accommodate. 2d Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 30–45 (docket no. 28). The 5 requirements to state a religious discrimination claim under the WLAD closely mirror 6 those under Title VII. See Kumar v. Gate Gourmet Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 496 (2014). 7 Accordingly, the Court will analyze Plaintiffs’ Title VII and WLAD religious 8 discrimination claim concurrently.

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