Fisher v. Cho Pyung Choi

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Fisher v. Cho Pyung Choi

289 A.D.2d 523, 735 N.Y.S.2d 784, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13090

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 31, 2001

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 289 A.D.2d 523 (Fisher v. Cho Pyung Choi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fisher v. Cho Pyung Choi, 289 A.D.2d 523, 735 N.Y.S.2d 784, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13090 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the [524]*524Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jonas, J.), dated March 26, 2001, which granted the motion of the defendant Cho Pyung Choi, in which the defendant Roy A. Campbell joined, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs payable to the respondent Cho Pyung Choi.

The defendants made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Thus, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955). The plaintiff failed to do so (see, Monette v Keller, 281 AD2d 523; Grossman v Wright, 268 AD2d 79, 84). O’Brien, J. P., S. Miller, McGinity, Schmidt and Townes, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the [524]*524Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jonas, J.), dated March 26, 2001, which granted the motion of the defendant Cho Pyung Choi, in which the defendant Roy A. Campbell joined, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs payable to the respondent Cho Pyung Choi.

The defendants made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Thus, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955). The plaintiff failed to do so (see, Monette v Keller, 281 AD2d 523; Grossman v Wright, 268 AD2d 79, 84). O’Brien, J. P., S. Miller, McGinity, Schmidt and Townes, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

289 A.D.2d 523, 735 N.Y.S.2d 784, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13090, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fisher-v-cho-pyung-choi-nyappdiv-2001.

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