Fisher Ex Rel. Wakefield v. Deaton

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Fisher Ex Rel. Wakefield v. Deaton

146 S.E. 66, 196 N.C. 461, 1929 N.C. LEXIS 12

DecidedJanuary 2, 1929

StatusPublished

This text of 146 S.E. 66 (Fisher Ex Rel. Wakefield v. Deaton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Fisher Ex Rel. Wakefield v. Deaton, 146 S.E. 66, 196 N.C. 461, 1929 N.C. LEXIS 12 (N.C. 1929).

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Opinion

Pee Cueiam.

Calvin Eoad intersects St. Mary’s Street from tbe west and terminates at tbe intersection. Defendant’s car was being driven' northwardly by bis wife. Tbe plaintiff, according to tbe evidence, was on tbe east side of St. Mary’s Street opposite tbe intersection of Calvin Eoad and was running across tbe street toward tbe intersection. Had plaintiff been using tbe intersection of Calvin Eoad at tbe time of tbe injury, tbe failure of tbe car to slow down to 15 miles an hour might have been found to have been tbe proximate cause of tbe injury. However, as tbe plaintiff was not walking along tbe highway, but ran out from behind a car toward tbe intersection of Calvin Eoad, a different situation was presented, and for tbis reason tbe principle announced in Bowen v. Schnibben, 184 N. C., 248, 114 S. E., 170, does not apply.

Tbe trial judge charged: “Tbe driving of any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of tbe rights of others, or without due caution and circumspection, and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, is ‘reckless driving.’ ”

*462 Tbe judge further charged: “It is the duty of the driver of any vehicle to drive it at a careful and prudent rate of speed, not greater than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the surface and width of the highway, the traffic and other existing conditions; and so as not to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person.”

While the judge did not specifically call the attention of the jury to the provision of the statute requiring a motorist to reduce the speed to 15 miles an hour when approaching an intersection, there was no specific request for such instruction, and in our opinion the charge upon the question of negligence and the statutes applicable, constituted a substantial compliance with C. S., 564, in view of the facts disclosed in the present record.

Upon the face of the record we find no error of law warranting a new trial.

No error.

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Pee Cueiam.

Calvin Eoad intersects St. Mary’s Street from tbe west and terminates at tbe intersection. Defendant’s car was being driven' northwardly by bis wife. Tbe plaintiff, according to tbe evidence, was on tbe east side of St. Mary’s Street opposite tbe intersection of Calvin Eoad and was running across tbe street toward tbe intersection. Had plaintiff been using tbe intersection of Calvin Eoad at tbe time of tbe injury, tbe failure of tbe car to slow down to 15 miles an hour might have been found to have been tbe proximate cause of tbe injury. However, as tbe plaintiff was not walking along tbe highway, but ran out from behind a car toward tbe intersection of Calvin Eoad, a different situation was presented, and for tbis reason tbe principle announced in Bowen v. Schnibben, 184 N. C., 248, 114 S. E., 170, does not apply.

Tbe trial judge charged: “Tbe driving of any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of tbe rights of others, or without due caution and circumspection, and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, is ‘reckless driving.’ ”

*462 Tbe judge further charged: “It is the duty of the driver of any vehicle to drive it at a careful and prudent rate of speed, not greater than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the surface and width of the highway, the traffic and other existing conditions; and so as not to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person.”

While the judge did not specifically call the attention of the jury to the provision of the statute requiring a motorist to reduce the speed to 15 miles an hour when approaching an intersection, there was no specific request for such instruction, and in our opinion the charge upon the question of negligence and the statutes applicable, constituted a substantial compliance with C. S., 564, in view of the facts disclosed in the present record.

Upon the face of the record we find no error of law warranting a new trial.

No error.

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146 S.E. 66, 196 N.C. 461, 1929 N.C. LEXIS 12, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fisher-ex-rel-wakefield-v-deaton-nc-1929.

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