FirstBank de Puerto Rico v. Primitivo Vargas Carrion

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2

4 IN RE: CASE NO. 19-00227 BKT 5 6 PRIMITIVO VARGAS CARRION Chapter 7

7 Adversary No. 19-00036 8 9 Debtor(s)

10 FIRSTBANK DE PUERTO RICO 11

12 Plaintiff 13 vs.

14 PRIMITIVO VARGAS CARRION 15 Defendant(s) 16 FILED & ENTERED ON 07/17/2019 17 18 19 OPINION & ORDER 20 Before the court is Defendant/Debtor Primitivo Vargas Carrion’s (hereinafter “Vargas” or 21 “Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss Complaint in Adversary Proceeding [Dkt. No. 6], and Plaintiff 22 23 FirstBank Puerto Rico’s (hereinafter “Firstbank” or “Plaintiff”) Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 24 [Dkt. No. 8]. Vargas’ request for dismissal was filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)1, and states 25 that “the Complaint [Dkt. No. 1] fails to state a plausible claim for relief and should be

1 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b) applies Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to adversary proceedings. 1 dismissed….” Said Complaint, argues Vargas, attempts to use his alleged willful and malicious 2 conduct, and an injury deriving from such conduct, as the basis for its claim. Plaintiff’s allegations of 3 malice and injury are baseless and implausible. 4 5 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 6 as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 7 (2009) (citing Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility 8 9 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 10 the defendant is liable.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint challenged by a Rule 11 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need to contain detailed factual allegations, but only “‘a short 12 13 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 14 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Id. 15 However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ 16 17 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 18 action will not do.” Bell A. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555-556. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise 19 a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint 20 21 are true,” even when their veracity is doubtful. Id. at 555. “A well-pleaded complaint may survive a 22 motion to dismiss even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and 23 that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Bell A. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556. On a motion to dismiss, 24 25 however, courts are “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 1 Following 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks the denial of Debtor’s 2 dischargeability rights as to his debt to Firstbank. Its objection to the dischargeability of the debt, is 3 based on Plaintiff’s reliance, upon representations made by the Debtor, that he was the owner of the 4 5 property.2 Further, the Debtor, with the actual intent to cause injury, has never recorded his title over 6 said property at the Property Registry of Puerto Rico. In resolving a motion to dismiss, the court 7 must “credit the plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the 8 9 plaintiff’s favor.” Sanchez ex rel. D.R.-S. v. United States, 671 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2012). “The 10 make-or-break standard . . . is that the combined allegations, taken as true, must state a plausible, not 11 a merely conceivable, case for relief.” Sepulveda–Villarini v. Dept. of Education of Puerto Rico, 628 12 13 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010). 14 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim admits the facts alleged in the complaint but 15 challenges the plaintiff's right to any relief based on those facts. Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 203 (5th 16 17 Cir.1995). The issue is whether the plaintiffs will be able to offer evidence to support their claims. Gorski 18 v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 473 (1st Cir.2002). In re Figueroa, 2016 WL 1412176, 19 at *2 (Bkrtcy. D. Puerto Rico, 2016, Adversary No. 15-084). In this matter, the allegations stated in the 20 Complaint do not meet the standards required to defeat a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) challenge. Taking the 21 22 combined alleged facts as true, does not result in a plausible legal argument. "Mere conclusions, 23 conjectures, and suppositions or suspicions are not in and of themselves sufficient to substantiate an 24 allegation of fraud." Serrano v. Torres, 61 P.R.R. 157, 161 (1942)) (internal quotations omitted). 25

2 The real property is identified as property number No. 29695, recorded at page 230 of volume 650 of the Arecibo Registry of Property, First Section of Arecibo, and consists of a parcel of land of one thousand thirty four point thirty one (1034.31) square meters of land and a single family dwelling. See POC No. 3, at p. 39 in related legal case 19-00227. 1 || Wadsworth vs. Schwarz, 951 F. Supp. 314, 323 (D.P.R. 1996). The court in Bell A. Corp. 2 established that the “the pleading must contain something more... than ...a statement of facts tha 3 4 merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.” 5 In sum, the Plaintiff failed to present a legally sufficient and plausible cause of action agains 6 the Defendant. The complaint recites numerous factual and legal conclusions peppered with th 7 g || words “deliberate” and the phrase “actual intent to cause injury” in an apparent attempt to pass the 9 |) off as factual allegations. That is not sufficient to survive a challenge under FRBP 7012. Therefore 10 the Complaint is dismissed against the Defendant. 11 12 SO ORDERED 13 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 17th day of July, 2019. 14 15 . aD

17 Brian K. Tester U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

3 Bell A. Corp, 550 U.S. at 555-556; Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, 235-236 (3d ed. 2004).