First Union National Bank of North Carolina v. Brendle's Stores, Inc. (In Re Brendle's Stores, Inc.)

165 B.R. 811, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 450, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20077, 1993 WL 639402
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. North Carolina
DecidedNovember 24, 1993
Docket2:93CV00432
StatusPublished

This text of 165 B.R. 811 (First Union National Bank of North Carolina v. Brendle's Stores, Inc. (In Re Brendle's Stores, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
First Union National Bank of North Carolina v. Brendle's Stores, Inc. (In Re Brendle's Stores, Inc.), 165 B.R. 811, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 450, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20077, 1993 WL 639402 (M.D.N.C. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ERWIN, Senior District Judge.

Procedural Posture

On November 22, 1992, Brendle’s Stores, Inc. (Appellee) filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. After filing the petition, Appellee continued to operate its business and manage its property as debtor-in-possession. On or about March 17, 1993, First Union National Bank of North Carolina, for itself and as agent for NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. and First Citizens Bank & Trust Company (Bank Group), filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay to set off pre-petition deposits and proceeds of Appellee’s charge card sales of inventory.

As of the petition filing date, Appellee had credit card transactions in process from various credit card issuers generated from sales of Appellee’s inventory which took place pri- or to the petition filing date in an amount of One Million Sixty-one Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-eight and 83/100 .Dollars ($1,061,928.83). According to the terms of the ex parte order authorizing appellee to use pre-petition bank accounts with First Union and authorizing First Union as agent to freeze certain bank accounts (Depository Order), these funds were placed in a segregated interest bearing account. As of the petition date, none of the credit card transactions herein questioned had been forwarded to any member of the Bank Group for processing.

By virtue of the Depository Order and order granting emergency motion of debtor for authority under Bankruptcy Code §§ 105 and 365 to enter into amendment to credit card program agreement and to assume ex-ecutory contract with Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia (Monogram Order), the bankruptcy court authorized the proceeds of Brendle’s name brand charge card sales in the amount of Seven Hundred Sixty-one Thousand Two Hundred Thirteen and 10/100 Dollars ($761,213.10) to be transferred to the First Union National Bank’s suspense account, subject to a reservation of rights by both Appellees and the Bank Group.

On or about March 17, 1993, the Bank Group filed its motion requesting relief from the automatic stay pursuant to §§ 362, 506, and 553 of the Bankruptcy Code to set off the suspense account consisting of pre-petition deposits and the proceeds of pre-petition charge card receipts, and interest earned thereon, and to apply such funds to the balance of the Bank Group’s pre-petition debt. On March 30, 1993, Appellee filed its response to Bank Group’s motion for relief from automatic stay in which Appellee requested that the bankruptcy court allow the Bank Group to set off the pre-petition depos *813 its and interest thereon but to prohibit the Bank Group from setting off the proceeds of the charge card receipts.

On May 25, 1993, the hearing on the motion for relief from the automatic stay was held before the bankruptcy court. On June 16, 1998, the bankruptcy court entered an order denying Bank Group’s motion for relief from automatic stay on Charge Receivables. The matter presently before this Court is the Bank Group’s appeal from the order denying relief.

Facts

The Bank Group is the holder of a partially secured claim pursuant to an October 18, 1991 loan agreement, the loan documents executed in connection therewith, as amended, and secured by a security interest in some of Appellee’s assets, excluding inventory and such items that relate exclusively to the purchase of inventory. Consistent with the terms of the loan agreement, the parties executed the Appellee security agreement (security agreement). Under the terms of the security agreement, Appellee agreed to grant to the Bank Group a perfected security interest in its assets excluding inventory. This perfected security interest included Ap-pellee’s accounts receivable, equipment, instruments (as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code), and general intangibles.

It is undisputed that the Bank Group’s security interest in Appellee’s accounts and general intangibles is duly perfected by the filing of mortgages, deeds of trust, collateral assignment of leases, financing statements, and other documents required by applicable non-bankruptcy law to perfect the security interest granted. However, the Bank Group has no perfected security interest in Appel-lee’s instruments or proceeds of instruments since it does not have possession of Appel-lee’s instruments or proceeds thereof as required by N.C.Gen.Stat. § 25-9-304.

The Bank Group currently holds in the suspense accounts proceeds from credit card transactions in the amount of One Million Eight Hundred Twenty-three Thousand One Hundred Forty-one and 93/100 Dollars ($1,823,141.93). The bankruptcy court found that the credit card slips were “instruments” as defined by N.C.Gen.Stat. § 25 — 9—105(l)(i); therefore, the Bank Group does not have a perfected security interest because it does not have possession of the credit card slips.

Issues

1. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in finding that the credit card slips generated by sales of the inventory of Brendle’s Stores, Inc. are instruments.

2. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying the Bank Group’s motion for relief from stay relating to credit card receivables.

Analysis

Instruments are defined by N.C.Gen. Stat. § 25 — 9—105(l)(i) as “a negotiable instrument ... or security ... or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of money and is of a type which is in the ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary endorsement or assignment.” Sections 25 — 3—104(l)(d) and 25-3-110 of the North Carolina General Statutes make it clear that credit card slips are not negotiable instruments. Similarly, credit card accounts do not qualify as securities as defined by N.C.Gen.Stat. § 25-8-102(l)(a). Thus, if credit card slips are writings that evidence a right to the payment of money and are of the type that are, in the ordinary course of business, transferred by delivery, then they are instruments as defined by N.C.Gen.Stat. § 25-9-105(1)®.

The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) was drafted to facilitate business transactions and to conform, where appropriate, to the prevailing commercial practices. Accordingly, the role of credit card slips must be assessed in the context of the entire credit card system. Article 9 classification should depend in large part on how professionals who deal with such writings handle them; therefore, the law should place importance on possession of a writing only if professionals who deal with the -writings view them with similar importance. Stephen L. Sepinuck, Classifying Credit Card Receivables Under the U.C.C.: Playing With Instruments?, 32 Ariz.L.Rev. 789, 800 (1990).

*814 The Credit Card System

It is undisputed that the credit card system involves four primary parties including a customer, a merchant, a merchant bank, and a issuing bank. Pursuant to a contract, a credit card is issued to a customer by an issuing bank. In most transactions, the customer presents the credit card to a merchant. At the point of sale, the merchant uses the credit card to generate an embossed transaction slip with an issuing bank authorization code, and the customer receives some goods from the merchant.

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Related

§ 25
North Carolina § 25
§ 25-8-102
North Carolina § 25-8-102(l)(a)
§ 25-9-105
North Carolina § 25-9-105(1)
§ 25-9-304
North Carolina § 25-9-304

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Bluebook (online)
165 B.R. 811, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 450, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20077, 1993 WL 639402, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/first-union-national-bank-of-north-carolina-v-brendles-stores-inc-in-ncmd-1993.