First Tower Loan, LLC d/b/a Tower Loan of Winnfield v. Mia County
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Opinion
Judgment rendered May 21, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 56,236-CA No. 56,242-CA (Consolidated Cases)
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
***** FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC Plaintiff-Appellant D/B/A TOWER LOAN OF WINNFIELD versus
ROY COMBS Defendant-Appellee *****
consolidated with
***** FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC Plaintiff-Appellant D/B/A TOWER LOAN OF WINNFIELD versus
MIA COUNTY, A/K/A MIA Defendant-Appellee CHARJUAN COUNTY, A/K/A MIA C. COUNTY ***** Appealed from the Eighth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Winn, Louisiana Trial Court Nos. 47,276 and 47,520
Honorable Anastasia S. Wiley, Judge ***** ROGERS, CARTER & PAYNE, LLC Counsel for Appellant By: Jessica L. Greber
MIA COUNTY, A/K/A MIA In Proper Person CHARJUAN COUNTY, A/K/A MIA C. COUNTY *****
Before STONE, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ. ELLENDER, J.
In these consolidated cases, First Tower Loan LLC, d/b/a Tower Loan
of Winnfield, appeals 15 default judgments in which the district court
rendered judgments for amounts different from those alleged in the petitions,
verified in the affidavits of correctness, and stated in the proposed
judgments. For the reasons expressed, we amend the judgments to conform
to the records and, as amended, render. A separate opinion is issued for each
borrower.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mia County, a/k/a Mia Charjuan County or Mia C. County, of
Winnfield, La., took out a loan from First Tower Loan on May 1, 2023.1
The amount financed was $2,006.32, at a stated APR of 31.99%, requiring
County to make 30 payments of $98.00, for a total of $2,940.00. Her final
payment was to be November 1, 2025, but, according to Tower Loan’s
petition, her last payment was on September 9, 2023, leaving a balance of
$2,145.52.
Tower Loan filed this suit on February 22, 2024, seeking the unpaid
balance of $2,145.52, together with contractual interest of 31.99% per
annum for one year beginning January 23, 2024, and 18% thereafter. The
petition also prayed for late charges, court costs, collection costs, and
contractual attorney fees.
1 There is no original loan agreement in this record. The first paragraph of the petition refers to “Gulfco of Louisiana LLC, d/b/a Tower Loan of Central,” but the caption of the petition, the disclosure statement, and every other document in the record identifies the lender as Tower Loan. County filed no responsive pleading, so Tower Loan moved for
default judgment. In support, it attached an affidavit of correctness executed
by David Easley, an officer of the company, verifying that the balance due
was $2,145.52 and that the interest rate, under the instrument, was 31.99%
for one year beginning January 23, 2024, and 18% thereafter until paid in
full. Tower Loan also provided a proposed judgment stating this balance
due, the interest rate, and other matters not germane to this appeal.
The district court rendered judgment as prayed for, by judgment date-
stamped June 7, 2024. However, on July 15, 2024, the only minute entry in
the record, the court “reviewed record and amended judgment amount.” In
the transcript, the court stated merely, “Okay, I’m returning the same to the
Clerk.” The court drew a line through the principal of the judgment,
changing it from $2,145.52 to $2,006.32, and through the interest rate of
31.99%/18%, changing it to “legal” interest.
Tower Loan has appealed, raising five assignments of error. County
has not filed a brief.
DISCUSSION
Compliance with Art. 1702
By its first assignment of error, Tower Loan urges the court erred in
failing to accept Tower Loan’s affidavit of correctness, submitted in support
of the proposed judgment, as prima facie proof of the indebtedness owed
under the promissory note, as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1702(B)(3). By its
second assignment, Tower Loan urges the court erred in failing either to sign
the proposed default judgment or direct that a hearing be held, as required by
La. C.C.P. art. 1702(C).
2 For the reasons expressed in First Tower Loan v. Combs, 45,236 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 5/21/25), rendered this day, these assignments have merit. The
district court lacked authority to disregard the affidavit of correctness and
erred in not signing the proposed judgment.
Reduction of Principal
By its third assignment of error, Tower Loan urges the court erred in
reducing the principal amount of the judgment from the amount prayed for
and properly rebated in accordance with La. R.S. 9:3533, to the amount
financed on the face of the instrument. For the reasons expressed in First
Tower Loan v. Combs, supra, this assignment has merit.
The disclosure statement reflects a finance charge of $933.68. Total
payments would come to $2,940.00; according to the affidavit, the unpaid
balance, after all rebates, is $2,145.52. There is no further requirement for
an itemization of payments or how the amount sued upon was calculated.
Moore Fin. Co. v. Ebarb, 46,392 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/11), 70 So. 3d 856.
The district court lacked authority to render judgment for a principal amount
other than $2,145.52. The judgment will be amended to this amount.
Award of Interest
By its fourth assignment of error, Tower Loan urges the court erred in
failing to award interest as prayed for and as mandated by La. C.C. art. 1921.
By its fifth assignment, Tower Loan urges the court erred in reducing
interest in the judgment to “legal interest” from the amount stated in the
disclosure statement, contrary to La. R.S. 9:3519 and 9:3522. For the
reasons expressed in First Tower Loan v. Combs, supra, these assignments
have merit.
3 The disclosure statement states that the amount financed was
$2,006.32. Under La. R.S. 9:3519, Tower Loan could charge 27% on the
portion of the principal that exceeds $1,400 but does not exceed $4,000 (this
portion would be $606.32) and 36% on the remaining portion.2 The
affidavit states that these rates, properly apportioned, yield a contractual rate
of 31.99%. Moreover, County’s loan was accelerated on January 23, 2024;
hence, after January 23, 2025, the interest cannot exceed 18%.3 The amount
prayed for in the petition, and stated in the proposed judgment, complies
with the applicable laws.
The district court lacked authority to award interest different from that
stated in the disclosure statement, the petition, and the affidavit. The
judgment will be amended to provide the contractual and legal rate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, the principal and interest stated in the
judgment are amended as follows:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that there be judgment herein in favor of the plaintiff, FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC, d/b/a TOWER LOAN OF WINNFIELD, and against the defendant, MIA COUNTY, a/k/a MIA CHARJUAN COUNTY, a/k/a MIA C. COUNTY (SSN XXX-XX-0743), in the amount of $2,145.52, together with interest thereon at the rate of 31.99% per annum for one year beginning January 23, 2024, and 18% thereafter, until paid.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. All costs are to be paid
by the borrower, Mia County, a/k/a Mia Charjuan County or Mia C. County.
AMENDED, AFFIRMED AS AMENDED, AND RENDERED.
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