First Tower Loan, LLC d/b/a Tower Loan of Winnfield v. Haley Frederick
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Opinion
Judgment rendered May 21, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 56,236-CA No. 56,243-CA (Consolidated Cases)
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
***** FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC Plaintiff-Appellant D/B/A TOWER LOAN OF WINNFIELD versus
ROY COMBS Defendant-Appellee *****
consolidated with
***** FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC Plaintiff-Appellant D/B/A TOWER LOAN OF WINNFIELD versus
HALEY FREDERICK, A/K/A Defendant-Appellee HALEY MARIE FREDERICK, A/K/A HALEY M. FREDERICK ***** Appealed from the Eighth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Winn, Louisiana Trial Court Nos. 47,276 and 47,528
Honorable Anastasia S. Wiley, Judge ***** ROGERS, CARTER & PAYNE, LLC Counsel for Appellant By: Jessica L. Greber
HALEY FREDERICK, A/K/A In Proper Person HALEY MARIE FREDERICK, A/K/A HALEY M. FREDERICK *****
Before STONE, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ. ELLENDER, J.
In these consolidated cases, First Town Loan LLC, d/b/a Tower Loan
of Winnfield, appeals 15 default judgments in which the district court
rendered judgments for amounts different from those alleged in the petitions,
verified in the affidavits of correctness, and stated in the proposed
judgments. For the reasons expressed, we amend the judgments to conform
to the records and, as amended, render. A separate opinion is issued for each
borrower.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Haley Frederick, a/k/a Haley Marie Frederick or Haley M. Frederick,
of Winnfield, La., took out a loan from Tower Loan on May 23, 2023. The
amount financed was $2,877.28, at a stated APR of 35.16%, requiring
Frederick to make 26 payments of $162.00, for a total of $4,212.00. Her
final payment was to be August 7, 2025, but, according to Tower Loan’s
petition, her last payment was on January 26, 2024, leaving an unpaid
balance of $3,102.62.
Tower Loan filed this suit on February 26, 2024, seeking the unpaid
balance of $3,102.62, together with contractual interest of 32.78% per
annum for one year beginning February 8, 2024, and 18% thereafter. The
petition also prayed for late charges, court costs, collection costs, contractual
attorney fees, and a recognition of the security interest in the movables
described in the loan agreement.
Frederick filed no responsive pleading, so Tower Loan moved for
default judgment. In support, it attached an affidavit of correctness executed
by David Easley, an officer of the company, verifying that the balance due was $3,102.62 and that the interest rate, under the loan agreement, was
32.78% for one year beginning February 8, 2024, and 18% thereafter until
paid in full. Tower Loan also provided a proposed judgment stating this
balance due, the interest rate, and other matters not germane to this appeal.
The district court rendered judgment as prayed for, by judgment date-
stamped June 7, 2024. However, on July 15, 2024, the only minute entry in
the record, the court “reviewed record and amended judgment amount.” In
the transcript, the court stated merely, “Okay, I’ve signed the judgment and
I’m returning that to the Clerk.” The court drew a line through the principal
of the judgment, changing it from $3,102.62 to $2,877.28, and through the
interest rate of 32.78%/18%, changing it to “legal” interest.
Tower Loan has appealed, raising five assignments of error.
Frederick has not filed a brief.
DISCUSSION
Compliance with Art. 1702
By its first assignment of error, Tower Loan urges the court erred in
failing to accept Tower Loan’s affidavit of correctness, submitted in support
of the proposed judgment, as prima facie proof of the indebtedness owed
under the promissory note, as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1702(B)(3). By its
second assignment, Tower Loan urges the court erred in failing either to sign
the proposed judgment or direct that a hearing be held, as required by La.
C.C.P. art. 1702(C).
For the reasons expressed in First Tower Loan v. Combs, 45,236 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 5/21/25), rendered this day, these assignments have merit. The
district court lacked authority to disregard the affidavit of correctness and
erred in not signing the proposed judgment. 2 Reduction of Principal
By its third assignment of error, Tower Loan urges the court erred in
reducing the principal amount of the judgment from the amount prayed for
and properly rebated in accordance with La. R.S. 9:3533, to the amount
financed on the face of the loan agreement. For the reasons expressed in
First Tower Loan v. Combs, supra, this assignment has merit.
The loan agreement reflects a finance charge of $1,334.72. Total
payments would come to $4,212.00; according to the affidavit, the unpaid
balance, after all rebates, is $3,102.62. There is no further requirement for
an itemization of payments or how the amount sued upon was calculated.
Moore Fin. Co. v. Ebarb, 46,392 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/11), 70 So. 3d 856.
The district court lacked authority to render judgment for a principal amount
other than $3,102.62. The judgment will be amended to this amount.
Award of Interest
By its fourth assignment of error, Tower Loan urges the court erred in
failing to award interest as prayed for and as mandated by La. C.C. art. 1921.
By its fifth assignment, Tower Loan urges the court erred in reducing
interest in the judgment to “legal interest” from the amount stated in the loan
agreement, contrary to La. R.S. 9:3519 and 9:3522. For the reasons
expressed in First Tower Loan v. Combs, supra, these assignments have
merit.
The loan agreement states that the amount financed was $2,877.28.
Under La. R.S. 9:3519, Tower Loan could charge 27% on the portion of the
principal that exceeds $1,400 but does not exceed $4,000 (this portion would
be $1,477.28) and 36% on the remaining portion ($1,400). The affidavit
states that these rates, properly apportioned, yield a contractual rate of 3 32.78%. Moreover, Frederick’s loan was accelerated on February 8, 2024;
hence, after February 8, 2025, the interest cannot exceed 18%.1 The amount
prayed for in the petition, and stated in the proposed judgment, complies
with the applicable laws.
The district court lacked authority to award interest different from that
stated in the loan agreement, the petition, and the affidavit. The judgment
will be amended to provide the contractual and legal rate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, the principal and interest stated in the
judgment are amended as follows:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that there be judgment herein in favor of the plaintiff, FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC, a/b/a TOWER LOAN OF WINNFIELD, and against the defendant, HALEY FREDERICK, a/k/a HALEY MARIE FREDERICK, a/k/a HALEY M. FREDERICK (SSN XXX-XX-3232), in the amount of $3,102.62, together with interest thereon at the rate of 32.78% per annum for one year beginning February 8, 2024, and 18% thereafter.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. All costs are to be paid
by the borrower, Haley Frederick, a/k/a Haley Marie Frederick or Haley M.
Frederick.
AMENDED, AFFIRMED AS AMENDED, AND RENDERED.
1 In brief, Tower Loan states the cutoff date for contractual interest is August 7, 2026, but this is obviously a typo. 4
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