ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
Jerry Van Beek appeals from the order of the District Court for Mercer County denying his motion for summary judgment and granting the United States’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
On January 26, 1987, Jerry Van Beek obtained a judgment, in Emmons County, against Friese Manufacturing, Inc. (FMI), in the amount of $19,881.80. Apparently, between April of 1987 and June of 1989, FMI made payments on the judgment reducing the amount owed on the judgment as of June 28, 1989, to $14,039.54. On August 18, 1989, a writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of the District Court for Emmons County, directing the Sheriff of McLean County to satisfy the judgment out of FMI’s personal property. Arlin Thompson, the McLean County Sheriff, received the writ of execution on August 19, 1989, and prepared a notice of levy using a listing of property contained in an auction sale advertisement for FMI. At approximately 8:00 a.m., August 21, 1989, Sheriff Thompson went to FMI’s place of business with the intent to levy on FMI’s personal property and serve the notice of levy upon the president of FMI, Wayne Friese. The sheriff inquired of the two people present that morning of the whereabouts of Friese. Upon being told that Friese was not present but would return sometime after 12:00 noon that day, the sheriff left and checked later as to Friese’s return by telephone. Sometime in the afternoon of August 21, 1989, the sheriff reached Friese and succeeded in serving him with the notice of levy. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on August 21, 1989, between the time the sheriff first went out to FMI’s place of business and when he eventually returned to the premises and succeeded in reaching and serving Friese with the notice of levy, the United States filed a notice of federal tax lien with the North Dakota Secretary of State’s office.
On August 26, 1989, FMI’s personal property was sold at auction and the proceeds were deposited with the Clerk of District Court for Mercer County.
The First Security Bank of Underwood thereafter initiated this interpleader action against various defendants claiming an interest in the proceeds deposited with the court. First Security, as secured creditor, sought so much of the proceeds as necessary to satisfy FMI’s debt. Van Beek, Bernie Haas, and the United States were the only named defendants that answered First Security’s complaint. First Security subsequently moved for and was granted default judgment against the non-answering defendants, and summary judgment against the answering defendants. The clerk of court accordingly released approximately $27,000 to First Security to satisfy its perfected security interest. Answering defendant, Bernie Haas, also moved for and was granted summary judgment for the reason that some property belonging to Haas was sold in the FMI auction. The clerk of court accordingly released $700 to Haas.
On October 10, 1991, Van Beek moved for default judgment against all co-defendants and, alternatively, summary judgment against any answering defendant. The United States resisted Van Beek’s motion and moved for summary judgment in its favor. In a memorandum decision, dated December 2, 1991, the district court concluded that the United States, through its tax lien, had a priority interest in the remaining proceeds. The district court accordingly directed the clerk of court to release the remaining funds deposited with the court to the United States. This appeal followed.
Under federal law, a federal tax lien arises upon assessment and continues until the assessed liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.
See
26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6322. The validity and priority of federal tax liens is governed by § 6323 of Title 26, United States Code. Subsection (a) of 26 U.S.C. § 6323 provides that a federal tax lien “shall not be valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic’s lienor, or judgment lien creditor until notice
thereof ... has been filed.” In essence, the priority of federal tax liens is determined by the general “first in time is first in right” rule.
United States v. Wingfield,
822 F.2d 1466, 1473 (10th Cir.1987). “Therefore, a tax lien is junior to only those liens that not only attached to the asset, but also became sufficiently choate [as defined by federal law] before the tax lien” became effective.
Id.
In this case, the United States filed a notice of federal tax lien with the North Dakota Secretary of State’s office at approximately 11:00 a.m. on August 21, 1989. Thus, the specific issue in this case is whether or not Van Beek’s judgment lien became effective or choate before the notice of the federal tax lien was filed with the Secretary of State’s office.
Under North Dakota law, a judgment lien on personal property only arises upon the “actual levy” of the property in question.
Towne v. Sautter,
326 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D.1982); section 28-21-13, N.D.C.C. The parties disagree as to what ⅛ necessary for an actual levy,
Section 28-21-08, N.D.C.C.,
provides in
relevant part:
“Property subject to levy
— Manner
of levy.
All goods, chattels, moneys, and other property, both real and personal, or any interest therein, of the judgment debtor not exempt by law, and all property and rights of property seized and held under attachment in the action are subject to execution.:.. The levy under an execution must be made as follows:
[[Image here]]
2. On personal property capable of manual delivery, the sheriff shall take the property into custody. When taking the property, the sheriff shall deliver a copy of the execution and notice of levy to the person from whom the property was taken.
[[Image here]]
4. On other personal property, the sheriff shall leave a copy of the execution and a notice of levy under an execution with the person holding the property....
The sheriff may elect not to seize property during the time period the debtor has to claim exemptions under chapter 28-22 or in the case of property which by reason of its bulk or other cause cannot be removed immediately and upon service of the notice of levy in accordance with this section and section 28-21-12, the levy is as valid and effectual as if the property had been seized and the possession and control thereof retained by the officer.
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ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
Jerry Van Beek appeals from the order of the District Court for Mercer County denying his motion for summary judgment and granting the United States’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
On January 26, 1987, Jerry Van Beek obtained a judgment, in Emmons County, against Friese Manufacturing, Inc. (FMI), in the amount of $19,881.80. Apparently, between April of 1987 and June of 1989, FMI made payments on the judgment reducing the amount owed on the judgment as of June 28, 1989, to $14,039.54. On August 18, 1989, a writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of the District Court for Emmons County, directing the Sheriff of McLean County to satisfy the judgment out of FMI’s personal property. Arlin Thompson, the McLean County Sheriff, received the writ of execution on August 19, 1989, and prepared a notice of levy using a listing of property contained in an auction sale advertisement for FMI. At approximately 8:00 a.m., August 21, 1989, Sheriff Thompson went to FMI’s place of business with the intent to levy on FMI’s personal property and serve the notice of levy upon the president of FMI, Wayne Friese. The sheriff inquired of the two people present that morning of the whereabouts of Friese. Upon being told that Friese was not present but would return sometime after 12:00 noon that day, the sheriff left and checked later as to Friese’s return by telephone. Sometime in the afternoon of August 21, 1989, the sheriff reached Friese and succeeded in serving him with the notice of levy. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on August 21, 1989, between the time the sheriff first went out to FMI’s place of business and when he eventually returned to the premises and succeeded in reaching and serving Friese with the notice of levy, the United States filed a notice of federal tax lien with the North Dakota Secretary of State’s office.
On August 26, 1989, FMI’s personal property was sold at auction and the proceeds were deposited with the Clerk of District Court for Mercer County.
The First Security Bank of Underwood thereafter initiated this interpleader action against various defendants claiming an interest in the proceeds deposited with the court. First Security, as secured creditor, sought so much of the proceeds as necessary to satisfy FMI’s debt. Van Beek, Bernie Haas, and the United States were the only named defendants that answered First Security’s complaint. First Security subsequently moved for and was granted default judgment against the non-answering defendants, and summary judgment against the answering defendants. The clerk of court accordingly released approximately $27,000 to First Security to satisfy its perfected security interest. Answering defendant, Bernie Haas, also moved for and was granted summary judgment for the reason that some property belonging to Haas was sold in the FMI auction. The clerk of court accordingly released $700 to Haas.
On October 10, 1991, Van Beek moved for default judgment against all co-defendants and, alternatively, summary judgment against any answering defendant. The United States resisted Van Beek’s motion and moved for summary judgment in its favor. In a memorandum decision, dated December 2, 1991, the district court concluded that the United States, through its tax lien, had a priority interest in the remaining proceeds. The district court accordingly directed the clerk of court to release the remaining funds deposited with the court to the United States. This appeal followed.
Under federal law, a federal tax lien arises upon assessment and continues until the assessed liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.
See
26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6322. The validity and priority of federal tax liens is governed by § 6323 of Title 26, United States Code. Subsection (a) of 26 U.S.C. § 6323 provides that a federal tax lien “shall not be valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic’s lienor, or judgment lien creditor until notice
thereof ... has been filed.” In essence, the priority of federal tax liens is determined by the general “first in time is first in right” rule.
United States v. Wingfield,
822 F.2d 1466, 1473 (10th Cir.1987). “Therefore, a tax lien is junior to only those liens that not only attached to the asset, but also became sufficiently choate [as defined by federal law] before the tax lien” became effective.
Id.
In this case, the United States filed a notice of federal tax lien with the North Dakota Secretary of State’s office at approximately 11:00 a.m. on August 21, 1989. Thus, the specific issue in this case is whether or not Van Beek’s judgment lien became effective or choate before the notice of the federal tax lien was filed with the Secretary of State’s office.
Under North Dakota law, a judgment lien on personal property only arises upon the “actual levy” of the property in question.
Towne v. Sautter,
326 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D.1982); section 28-21-13, N.D.C.C. The parties disagree as to what ⅛ necessary for an actual levy,
Section 28-21-08, N.D.C.C.,
provides in
relevant part:
“Property subject to levy
— Manner
of levy.
All goods, chattels, moneys, and other property, both real and personal, or any interest therein, of the judgment debtor not exempt by law, and all property and rights of property seized and held under attachment in the action are subject to execution.:.. The levy under an execution must be made as follows:
[[Image here]]
2. On personal property capable of manual delivery, the sheriff shall take the property into custody. When taking the property, the sheriff shall deliver a copy of the execution and notice of levy to the person from whom the property was taken.
[[Image here]]
4. On other personal property, the sheriff shall leave a copy of the execution and a notice of levy under an execution with the person holding the property....
The sheriff may elect not to seize property during the time period the debtor has to claim exemptions under chapter 28-22 or in the case of property which by reason of its bulk or other cause cannot be removed immediately and upon service of the notice of levy in accordance with this section and section 28-21-12, the levy is as valid and effectual as if the property had been seized and the possession and control thereof retained by the officer. The lien of the writ of execution is effectual from the time the actual levy is made in accordance with this section and section 28-21-12.”
Van Beek asserts that under the above section, a levy on personal property which by reason of its bulk or other causes cannot be easily seized is effective from the time the sheriff locates the property and elects not to seize it. The United States argues that in cases where the sheriff elects not to physically seize the property in question the levy is effective only upon service of the notice of levy.
We need not decide whether or not service of the notice of levy is necessary before a judgment lien becomes effective or choate in cases where personal property is not physically seized. If service were not required we would nevertheless conclude that some affirmative act or outward manifestation of the sheriff’s intent to levy and of his election not to seize must be shown. An uncommunicated secret intent to levy is insufficient.
See generally
30 Am.Jur.2d
Executions
§ 236 (1967).
In general, in order to constitute a levy there must be an assertion of dominion, or some overt act amounting to an assertion of dominion over the property in question.
Id.
Although a physical seizure is not, under certain circumstances, required under section 28-21-08, N.D.C.C., there nevertheless must be some overt act which manifests an intent to assume dominion over the property.
In this case, the sheriff did not tag the items of personal property or post some notice on FMI premises that FMI’s personal property was under the sheriff’s control. The sheriff did not post a deputy on FMI’s premises to assume control over the property nor did he indicate to anyone present at FMI that FMI’s personal property was constructively or otherwise taken under his control. Rather, the sheriff, except for what we have previously alluded to, merely entered FMI premises intending to levy on FMI’s personal property by serving Wayne Friese with a previously prepared notice of levy.
Not finding Friese present, the
sheriff simply left, intending to serve Friese later that afternoon. We conclude that, as a matter of law, the acts of the sheriff in this case prior to serving the notice of levy were insufficient to effectuate a levy. His later service of the notice of levy cannot relate back to the time he first appeared at FMI’s premises, inquired of Friese’s whereabouts and left without further exercising control of the property. The tax lien of the United States thus has priority over Van Beek’s judgment lien.
The order of the district court granting the United States’ motion for summary judgment is accordingly affirmed.
VANDE WALLE, LEVINE, MESCHKE and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.