First National Bank v. Schween

127 Ill. 573
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 3, 1889
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 127 Ill. 573 (First National Bank v. Schween) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
First National Bank v. Schween, 127 Ill. 573 (Ill. 1889).

Opinion

Per Curiam :

The first and principal question presented by this record is, whether Kilbourne was the owner of the butter and cheese which he delivered to Bosworth on the night of October 14, 1883, in part payment of his indebtedness to the bank. If he was, then the bank is entitled to have its proceeds applied upon the indebtedness of Kilbourne to the bank. It is contended by appellees, who were complainants in the original bill, that the butter and cheese belonged to them, and was in the hands of Kilbourne as their factor and agent, under an agreement to make and sell the same for their benefit and use. The solution of this question depends upon the contract of Kilbourne with the patrons of his factory, under which they furnished milk, the contention being, on the one side, that the •milk was sold outright by complainants and others to Kilbourne, and on the other, that the milk was delivered to him to be manufactured and sold by him for and on account of the owners of the milk.

Prior to Kilbourne’s purchase of the cheese factory at Barrington, in April, 1881, it had been operated by one McAdam, on what is known as the dividend plan, by which he received milk from the neighboring farmers and dairymen, and manufactured it into butter and cheese for them at a certain price per pound, sold the product, and after deducting his commission for making and selling, he divided the balance of the proceeds among the patrons, in proportion to the quantity of milk each had furnished. Soon after his purchase, Kilbourne had a conference with the farmers and dairymen, and agreed with them to take and manufacture into butter and cheese their product of milk, he to receive four cents a pound for the butter manufactured and two cents a pound for cheese made therefrom, he to sell the product and pay them the proceeds of the sale, less his compensation, in proportion to the amount of milk furnished by each, and gave personal security for the faithful performance of his agreement for one year. At the end of the first year, on April 4,1882, Kilbourne, together with his wife, made their certain deed of trust to Alfred Bosworth, which deed contains the following recitals and provisions:

“Whereas, said Kilbourne, grantor, is engaged in a certain cheese factory, located on said premises, in the manufacture of cheese and butter from milk furnished by sundry persons or patrons, which said cheese and butter the said Kilbourne sells from time to time, paying said patrons the proceeds of such sales as dividends, or as indebtedness for milk delivered to him; and whereas, said Kilbourne will become indebted, from time to time, to said patrons for the milk so delivered or to be delivered, and the proceeds arising from the sale of the product thereof: Now, if default be made in the payment to the patrons by Kilbourne for the milk to be delivered to him, or the proceeds arising from the sale of the product thereof, as aforesaid, for the space of sixty days from the last day of any month in which such milk shall be delivered, payment for all milk delivered by said patrons to said Kilbourne up to the date of such default shall become immediately due. * * * The dividends arising from the proceeds of the sales of the product of the milk, as aforesaid, shall be considered due and payable to the said patrons at the expiration of eighty days from the beginning of any month in which the said milk shall be so delivered.”

The witnesses George W. and W. G. Waterman, Prouty, Kingsley and Clark, were present at Kilbourne’s first meeting with the patrons of the factory, and testified, that he solicited the farmers to furnish milk to be made into butter and cheese on the dividend plan, and agreed with them to charge two cents per pound for making cheese and four cents per pound for making butter and selling the same, and that he would render honest dividends, which should be equal to, if not more than, the average dividends of surrounding factories. He refused to buy milk of a number of persons who testify, giving as a reason therefor, that if he bought of one he would have' to buy of all. There is, in our opinion, no doubt,, from the evidence, that Kilbóurne promised his patrons that he would give them as good dividends, and that the same should average with those given by other factories. It is true, some of the witnesses, speaking of this, say that he agreed they should be paid for their milk as much as was paid by other factories. This, however, is not necessarily inconsistent with the idea of paying for the milk in dividends.

The allowance of two cents a pound for cheese and four cents for butter made, for the manufacture and sale by Kilbourne, is inconsistent with the idea of an absolute purchase of the milk .by him. If he bought the milk, for cash in hand •or on credit, the product was his own, and there could have been no good reason why the vendors of the milk should have •allowed him a commission for making and selling the same. It is shown, in accordance with the theory that Kilbourne was the agent of the complainants to manufacture and sell butter and cheese for them, that the patrons called him, to an account for buttermilk he had sold, and forbid sales in the future.

If there was any doubt of the fact of the agency of said Kilbourne in the matter, the recitals in the deed of trust before mentioned ought to remove it,—that Kilbourne was “engaged in the manufacture of cheese and butter from milk furnished by sundry persons or patrons, which said cheese and butter he sells from time to time, paying said patrons the proceeds of such sale as dividends, or as indebtedness for milk delivered» to him.” And again: “The dividends arising from the proceeds of the sales of the products of the milk, as aforesaid, shall be considered due and payable,” etc., would seem to clearly indicate that he was simply the factor of the farmers and dairymen, who accepted his proposition to furnish milk upon that plan. It is true the deed of trust has a provision looking to the security of any one who might sell milk to Kilbourne, and it appears that such provision was inserted to protect a party who sold his milk outright to him, and it would seem that the fact that such a provision was inserted for the purpose, would preclude the idea that the others made sale of their milk, for he appears to have been the only person shown to have made an absolute sale. The master in chancery, the Superior and Appellate Courts, have found that the milk was furnished by complainants to Kilbourne to be made and sold on their account, as their agent or factor, and with this conclusion we agree.

It appears that before Kilbourne bought the factory, the farmers and patrons o'f this factory managed and run the business through officers or agents of their own selection. KiB bourne, claiming to have large experience in the business and to have worked up a good trade for butter and cheese, represented to such patrons that he could make better sales than any agent they could appoint, and in the arrangement finally consummated, they give him full power not only to manufacture, but to sell the entire product of the milk furnished by them.

Eli bourne claimed to be, and undoubtedly was, an expert in the production' of butter and cheese, and his relation to the milk owners brought him directly within the definition of a factor. (Wharton on Agency, 735.) The fact that he was to prepare the product for market did not render him any the less a factor.

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Bluebook (online)
127 Ill. 573, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/first-national-bank-v-schween-ill-1889.