First Huntington National Bank v. Mount Holyoke College

West Virginia Supreme Court

First Huntington National Bank v. Mount Holyoke College

175 S.E. 338, 115 W. Va. 113, 1934 W. Va. LEXIS 22

CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

DecidedMay 29, 1934

Docket7925

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 175 S.E. 338 (First Huntington National Bank v. Mount Holyoke College) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

First Huntington National Bank v. Mount Holyoke College, 175 S.E. 338, 115 W. Va. 113, 1934 W. Va. LEXIS 22 (W. Va. 1934).

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Opinion

Hatcher, Judge:

The will of Mrs. Mary C. Patterson, deceased, devised the residue of her estate to trustees upon trust to pay the net income therefrom to her son, Thomas C. Patterson, as long as he survived. The will then proceeds: “At his death I direct that the Trustee use as much of the income and principal as is required to pay any expenses chargeable to his estate, and after these debts are all paid, I direct that the remaining income and principal be divided among the following religious, charitable and educational organizations,” etc. A short while after the death of his mother, the son died intestate, leaving an estate of some $50,000.00.

In this proceeding, the son’s administrator would require the surviving trustee to pay the expenses of the son’s estate. The administrator relies on the provision in the paragraph quoted from the mother’s will directing the trustee at the death of the son, “to pay any expenses chargeable to his estate.” The circuit court found against the administrator.

Counsel for appellees ingeniously array a number of reasons why the will could not have meant what the administrator contends for and why it should mean some *115 thing else. Authorities are cited tending to support counsel. We must not heed the persuasion of counsel though “charming never so wisely”. It is a cardinal rule that courts should not speculate on the intention of a testator when the words employed have a plain meaning. Harris v. Neal, 61 W. Va. 1, 5, 55 S. E. 740; Neal v. Hamilton Co., 70 W. Va. 250, 255, 73 S. E. 971. The words in question here — “to pay any expenses (debts) chargeable to his (the son’s) estate” — are, in our opinion, unequivocal. The application of rules of construction are not necessary. The words used evince the natural concern of the mother to insure her son’s name from the stain of debt. The fact that the son’s estate is ample to pay its own expenses is immaterial. The fact that the mother even knowingly directed her trustee to perform an unnecessary service for the son’s estate does not militate in the slightest against that direction. It is characteristic of brooding motherhood to do such things.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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Hatcher, Judge:

The will of Mrs. Mary C. Patterson, deceased, devised the residue of her estate to trustees upon trust to pay the net income therefrom to her son, Thomas C. Patterson, as long as he survived. The will then proceeds: “At his death I direct that the Trustee use as much of the income and principal as is required to pay any expenses chargeable to his estate, and after these debts are all paid, I direct that the remaining income and principal be divided among the following religious, charitable and educational organizations,” etc. A short while after the death of his mother, the son died intestate, leaving an estate of some $50,000.00.

In this proceeding, the son’s administrator would require the surviving trustee to pay the expenses of the son’s estate. The administrator relies on the provision in the paragraph quoted from the mother’s will directing the trustee at the death of the son, “to pay any expenses chargeable to his estate.” The circuit court found against the administrator.

Counsel for appellees ingeniously array a number of reasons why the will could not have meant what the administrator contends for and why it should mean some *115 thing else. Authorities are cited tending to support counsel. We must not heed the persuasion of counsel though “charming never so wisely”. It is a cardinal rule that courts should not speculate on the intention of a testator when the words employed have a plain meaning. Harris v. Neal, 61 W. Va. 1, 5, 55 S. E. 740; Neal v. Hamilton Co., 70 W. Va. 250, 255, 73 S. E. 971. The words in question here — “to pay any expenses (debts) chargeable to his (the son’s) estate” — are, in our opinion, unequivocal. The application of rules of construction are not necessary. The words used evince the natural concern of the mother to insure her son’s name from the stain of debt. The fact that the son’s estate is ample to pay its own expenses is immaterial. The fact that the mother even knowingly directed her trustee to perform an unnecessary service for the son’s estate does not militate in the slightest against that direction. It is characteristic of brooding motherhood to do such things.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

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175 S.E. 338, 115 W. Va. 113, 1934 W. Va. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/first-huntington-national-bank-v-mount-holyoke-college-wva-1934.

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