First Horizon Bank, Etc. v. Steven Hayworth
This text of First Horizon Bank, Etc. v. Steven Hayworth (First Horizon Bank, Etc. v. Steven Hayworth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed March 18, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D25-2468 Lower Tribunal No. 16-4858-CA-01 ________________
First Horizon Bank, etc., et al., Petitioners,
vs.
Steven Hayworth, Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction—Prohibition.
Podhurst Orseck, P.A., and Ricardo M. Martínez-Cid and Ramon A. Rasco, for petitioners.
Leto Law Firm, and Matthew P. Leto; John C. Lukacs, P.A., and John C. Lukacs, Sr., for respondent.
Before SCALES, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and LINDSEY, JJ.
SCALES, C.J. Petitioner First Horizon Bank, as successor in interest to Gibraltar
Private Bank & Trust Company after merger (“the Bank”), the defendant
below, petitions this Court to issue a writ of prohibition that precludes the trial
court from exercising jurisdiction over the third amended complaint filed by
the plaintiff below, respondent Steven Hayworth. Because the trial court was
divested of case jurisdiction in the lower proceeding after the court’s entry of
a July 31, 2025 final summary judgment that fully adjudicated Hayworth’s
operative second amended complaint, we grant the petition.
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hayworth’s operative second amended complaint alleged
employment-related claims against the Bank that sounded in tort and
contract.1 Hayworth’s claims stemmed from the circumstances surrounding
his May 2012 resignation as president and chief executive officer of the Bank
and the Bank’s alleged failure to honor the severance provisions of his
employment agreement.
On October 25, 2018, the trial court entered a non-final order
dismissing, as premature, Hayworth’s contract claims against the Bank.
1 Hayworth’s second amended complaint also alleged a negligence claim against the Bank’s individual directors that Hayworth later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. The Bank’s directors, who are not parties to the instant appeal, have appealed Hayworth’s voluntary dismissal in appellate case number 3D25-1681.
2 (“Dismissal Order”). The dismissal was without prejudice to Hayworth
amending his pleading to reallege the contract claims once Hayworth
“obtained the appropriate federal regulatory agency approval” to pursue the
claims.2 The Dismissal Order struck from Hayworth’s surviving tort claims all
damages arising from his employment agreement.
Years passed without Hayworth obtaining the requisite federal
regulatory agency approval that would permit him to amend his pleading to
reallege his contract claims. Citing that failure, the Bank moved for summary
judgment on Hayworth’s surviving tort claims. Following a two-day hearing,
the trial court entered a July 31, 2025 order that adjudicated Hayworth’s tort
claims in the Bank’s favor and, noting Hayworth’s continued inability to refile
his contract claims, entered final summary judgment against Hayworth. This
final summary judgment reserved jurisdiction only to consider any timely filed
motions for attorney’s fees and/or costs.
Hayworth did not file a Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 motion for
rehearing. Nor did Hayworth appeal the July 31, 2025 final summary
judgment. Instead, on August 20, 2025, Hayworth filed below an August 19,
2025 letter from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation that Hayworth
2 The required federal regulatory agency approval concerned whether Hayworth’s claimed severance was prohibited under federal law.
3 claimed constituted the requisite federal regulatory agency approval to refile
his contract claims in this case. And, on August 22, 2025, Hayworth, without
having sought to vacate the July 31, 2025 final summary judgment, filed a
third amended complaint against the Bank that realleged his previously
dismissed contract claims.
The Bank then moved to strike Hayworth’s third amended complaint,
claiming that the trial court lacked case jurisdiction to hear matters beyond
the attorney’s fees and costs issues expressly reserved in the July 31, 2025
final summary judgment. Following a November 13, 2025 hearing, the trial
court entered an order denying the Bank’s motion to strike Hayworth’s third
amended complaint “for the reasons stated on the record.” The hearing
transcript reflects that the trial court refused to strike Hayworth’s third
amended complaint “as a matter of fundamental fairness” because Hayworth
had purportedly obtained the requisite federal regulatory agency approval
contemplated by the Dismissal Order. The Bank now petitions this Court to
issue a writ of prohibition precluding the trial court from conducting further
proceedings on Hayworth’s third amended complaint.
II. ANALYSIS
“The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that ‘may only be
granted when it is shown that a lower court is without jurisdiction or
4 attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction.’” Sentry Pub. Adjusting, LLC v.
Captiva Lakes Condo. Ass’n, 389 So. 3d 561, 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)
(quoting English v. McCray, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977)). Here, as
below, the Bank claims that the trial court acted in excess of its case
jurisdiction3 by permitting Hayworth to file the third amended complaint after
the court entered the July 31, 2025 final summary judgment from which
Hayworth failed to seek rehearing or appeal. We agree.
Hayworth argues that, because the Dismissal Order expressly
contemplated the filing of an amended complaint once he obtained federal
regulatory approval, the trial court retained case jurisdiction to adjudicate his
third amended complaint, notwithstanding the entry of the July 31, 2025 final
summary judgment. But the Dismissal Order – like all orders that grant
motions to dismiss with leave to amend – was a non-final, non-appealable
order. “It is well-settled that interlocutory orders merge into the final
judgment.” Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. All Ins. Restoration Servs., Inc., 365
So. 3d 434, 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). This merger “extinighuish[es] the trial
court’s authority to enter further orders regarding the interlocutory matters.”
3 Case jurisdiction, which is also referred to as continuing jurisdiction or procedural jurisdiction, “refers to a trial court’s jurisdiction to act in a case over which it has subject matter jurisdiction.” JJJTB, Inc. v. Schmidt, 415 So. 3d 129, 132 (Fla. 2025).
5 Shlimbaum v. Shlimbaum, 394 So. 3d 1157, 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). The
Dismissal Order merged into the July 31, 2025 final summary judgment, and
the judgment terminated the trial court’s case jurisdiction in this case beyond
the judgment’s reservation of jurisdiction to address attorney’s fees and
costs. See Mich Auto Sales Inc. v. 14004 NW 19th Ave., LLC, 347 So. 3d
438, 439-40 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). Thus, we grant the Bank’s petition for writ
of prohibition, issue the writ, and direct the trial court to refrain from
conducting further proceedings on Hayworth’s unauthorized third amended
complaint.4,5
4 Here, as below, Hayworth brushes aside the merger doctrine in favor of arguing that, when the Bank moved for summary judgment on his pending tort claims, he did not receive proper notice that his contract claims were subject to dismissal with prejudice. See Edward L. Nezelek, Inc. v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
First Horizon Bank, Etc. v. Steven Hayworth, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/first-horizon-bank-etc-v-steven-hayworth-fladistctapp-2026.