FIRST CENTER, INC. v. COBB COUNTY
This text of 318 Ga. 271 (FIRST CENTER, INC. v. COBB COUNTY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
318 Ga. 271 FINAL COPY
S24A0309. FIRST CENTER, INC. et al. v. COBB COUNTY et al.
BETHEL, Justice.
This dispute between the parties stems from a disagreement
about the applicable rules dictating the height of a wall surrounding
a subdivision that is under development. Appellants brought suit
against Cobb County, County Commissioner JoAnn K. Birrell in her
official capacity, and Zoning Division Manager John Pederson in his
official capacity, setting forth numerous counts, including claims for
declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. Appellees responded
by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to OCGA § 9-
11-12 (b) (1) and (b) (6) arguing that Appellants’ claim for injunctive
relief was barred by sovereign immunity and asserting other
defenses to the remaining claims. Following a hearing, the trial
court denied Appellants’ request for mandamus relief. As to
Appellants’ remaining claims, the court granted Appellees’ motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Appellants filed an application for discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, which was
transferred to this Court on the basis that the appeal raises a novel
constitutional question left unanswered by this Court’s decision in
State v. SASS Group, 315 Ga. 893, 904 (2) (d) (885 SE2d 761) (2023)
— that is, whether Article I, Section II, Paragraph V (b) (2) of the
Georgia Constitution requires the dismissal of an action seeking
declaratory relief from acts of any county or county officer or
employee that names as a defendant the county officer or employee
in his or her official capacity. We granted Appellants’ discretionary
application pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (j) to consider this question.1
In the time since we granted the application for appeal,
however, we have decided the novel constitutional question
presented in this case. See Lovell v. Raffensperger, 318 Ga. 48 (897
SE2d 440) (2024). There, we made clear that where a party relies,
at least partially, on Paragraph V’s waiver of sovereign immunity in
pursuing its action, the party’s suit must be brought “exclusively”
1 We also posed a second question to the parties, but given our disposition
here, we need not reach that issue. 2 against and “in the name of” the State or local government. See id.
at 51. If a party fails to do this, then the entire action must be
dismissed. See id. at 52 (“The phrase ‘in the name of the State of
Georgia’ in Paragraph V (b) (2) means what it says: actions filed
pursuant to Paragraph V must name as a defendant only the State
of Georgia (or the relevant local government) or the action shall be
dismissed.” (emphasis supplied)). See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I,
Sec. II, Par. V (b) (2) (“Actions filed pursuant to this Paragraph
naming as a defendant any individual, officer, or entity other than
as expressly authorized under this Paragraph shall be dismissed.”).
Here, the trial court dismissed Appellants’ claim for injunctive
relief against the County and the Commissioner on this basis, while
it purported to dismiss Appellants’ remaining claims on other
grounds. However, as Lovell makes clear, the case was due to be
dismissed in its entirety on the basis that Appellants’ suit against
the County also named as defendants the Commissioner and the
Zoning Division Manager. While the trial court should have first
considered the threshold jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity
3 before reaching the other grounds raised in Appellees’ motion to
dismiss, we nevertheless affirm its ultimate ruling dismissing this
action. See McConnell v. Dept. of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 18-19 (805 SE2d
79) (2017) (holding that “[t]he applicability of sovereign immunity to
claims brought against the State is a jurisdictional issue” and
“[t]herefore, the applicability of sovereign immunity is a threshold
determination, and, if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over
the case and, concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the merits of
a claim that is barred”).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided February 6, 2024.
Sovereign immunity; constitutional question. Cobb Superior
Court. Before Judge Marbutt.
Smith Gambrell & Russell, Kathryn M. Zickert, Kirk R.
Fjelstul, William J. Diehl, for appellants.
Debra L. Blair, Hugh W. Rowling, Jr.; Hall Booth Smith,
Russell A. Britt, Pearson K. Cunningham, for appellees.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
318 Ga. 271, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/first-center-inc-v-cobb-county-ga-2024.